



# EVALUATION REPORT

## 2022 TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT: LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO MASS DEMONSTRATIONS

October 2022



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## INTRODUCTION

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This is a continuation of the Training Division's evaluation of crowd management processes that began in 2021 for the main purpose of identifying related training needs. This topic continues to be complex and puts strain on community members, local businesses, law enforcement, and the City as a whole. Although processes are still in development, progress has been made in the City's preparedness for responding to mass demonstrations since last year.

The goal of this summary is to provide information on the Training Division's crowd management evaluation process, what training needs have been identified regarding crowd management, and a status update on training plans. The emphasis of this report is training needs, and therefore does not include recommendations about crowd management that do not have training components. However, some of the references utilized in these evaluation reports can be reviewed to obtain this additional information.

It is also the hope that this work may continue to support those in law enforcement and the community who are working towards the endeavor of ensuring safe and peaceful protests in Portland.

### *The Evaluation Process*

This evaluation focuses on crowd management events from July 1, 2021 (the ending timeframe of the last report) to June 30, 2022. Although there have not been many mass demonstration responses since the last report and less events since 2020 generally, this process continues to assess the extent that crowd management goals are being achieved, challenges to implementation, and training suggestions pertaining to enhancing implementation in the future. This evaluation process continues to consider factors such as local, state, and federal-level decisions that influence crowd management events, demonstration characteristics and impacts, the law enforcement response to the events, public perceptions of the protesting events and law enforcement's response to them, and national best practices for responding to crowd events. Additional focus is spent on areas of particular concern to the community and/or government stakeholders. This evaluation process currently includes additional research on use of force, safety considerations, and understanding different protesting groups. The evaluation process will expand and add other areas of concern as needed.

The goals for public order used for this evaluation process are the following<sup>1</sup>:

*Uphold the public's freedoms provided in the Constitution by:*

Monitoring public order events in a neutral and impartial manner.

Encouraging self-regulating behavior to maintain safe and peaceful gatherings.

Address criminal actions that only affect the safety or tension of the public or gathering.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> These align with current Portland Police Bureau training and are based on the Madison principles.

<sup>2</sup> This includes behavior such as setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles at people, launching mortars at buildings, shining lasers at people, threatening others with weapons, assaults, fencing in potentially occupied buildings and setting them on fire, throwing projectiles at passerby vehicles. Some examples that are usually not of concern for response are drone flying, blocking most streets, people on buildings, chanting/screaming, people walking around with weapons, and shining lasers at stationary objects.

Maintain open communication with the public and media before, during, and after an event.

*Maintain Bureau Essential Functions.*

### *Sources of Information*

Many sources of information have been utilized for this evaluation. Some of the new sources utilized during this timeframe, or those where new information was collected, include the following:

#### *Reports pertaining to recent law enforcement protests:*

21<sup>st</sup> Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety (2022) report by the National Policing Institute and COPS Office

An Independent Examination of the Los Angeles Police Department 2020 Protest Response report by Independent Counsel, Gerald Chaleff

DHM Research's 2020 Public Perspectives Survey Results Summary of Oregon Protests<sup>3</sup>

Lessons Learned: City's response to protests exposed vulnerabilities in Portland's police accountability system (2022) by the Independent Police Review

Oregon Secretary of State and Oregon Audits Division's 2022 Oregon Can Do More to Mitigate the Alarming Risk of Domestic Terrorism and Violent Extremist Attacks

Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest (2020) by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Intelligence Commanders Group

Portland City Auditor's 2022 Police Intelligence-Gathering and Surveillance: Better Management Needed to Protect Civil Rights report

Staying Healthy in the Fray: The Impact of Crowd Management on Officers in the Context of Civil Unrest (2021) by the National Police Foundation.

*Data:* pertaining to injuries, officer use of force, crime, Portland Police staffing levels, protest complaints, commendations/support of the police, dispatched calls, call response times, crowd management training needs, and crowd counts.

*Community interviews and feedback:* Representatives from neighborhood associations, the Training Advisory Council, the Portland Business Alliance, and letters and emails written to the Portland Police Bureau.

*Portland Police Bureau interviews and feedback:* Incident Command, Incident Management Team, Training Division management, and other crowd management staff.

*Published research articles:* A list of the research on less lethal devices and safety and understanding protesting groups is provided in Appendix C and E. Additional research articles are cited where applicable in this report.

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<sup>3</sup> DHM Research (2020). Protest Survey Results. DHM Research. Retrieved December 11, 2021 from Oregon Voters Disapprove of the Ongoing Protests - DHM Research (dhmresearch.com)

### *News articles*

*Other:* A list of those read for the research on less lethal devices and safety, and for understanding some of the protesting groups is provided in Appendix C and E.

Portland Police Bureau Directives and Oregon law updates were also read for this report.

### *Evaluation Work in Progress*

The external independent audit of the Portland Police Bureau's response to the 2020 protests is currently in progress. Once complete, this information will be incorporated into this evaluation process.

The Training Division is currently in the process of collecting additional information in the following areas:

- Less lethal safety and options (e.g., the injury risks associated with different use of force methods, which use of force methods are the safest)

- Understanding local protesting groups' mission(s) and goals

This information will be incorporated into the evaluation process and future reports as applicable.

### *Report Format*

The following sections of the report provide an update regarding the main challenges for effective crowd management, public perspectives regarding these protests and law enforcement's response to them, the Bureau's general preparedness for managing events, protest-related use of force, use of de-escalation, research regarding groups with more extreme protesting strategies, crowd response goal analysis, crowd management research, and current training recommendations and planning. In addition, there are appendices to provide the reader with additional information pertaining to topics within this evaluation process.

## RESPONDING TO MASS DEMONSTRATIONS: IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES

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During the last report process, several challenges to implementing the most effective law enforcement response were identified. Many of these critically impacted progress towards training planning, for instance in cases with unresolved information pertaining to new laws and procedures. Other challenges were lesser barriers to progress with crowd management training plans, though still inhibiting some of the training planning processes, such as the staffing issues and the lack of mutual aid agreements with neighboring law enforcement agencies. Resolving as many of these challenges as possible is critical to the Portland Police Bureau being able to provide the most effective response to mass demonstrations. While training is critical, it is largely ineffective in situations with significant barriers to effective on-the-job applications.<sup>4</sup>

The Portland Police Bureau's management and City Attorney's Office have been working towards resolving these challenges. The following provides a list of these challenges, additional challenges identified this year, and the current status update for them.

Area of Challenge and Lead Coordinator	Current Status
The Bureau needs a body-worn camera program.  Lead Coordinator: Body Worn Camera Committee	Purchasing is in progress. Policy negotiations are still in progress.
The Bureau needs to develop Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with other local law enforcement agencies for extreme mass demonstrations in Portland.  Lead Coordinator: City Attorney's Office and Chief's Office	There is no progress for this challenge.
The City should work with State officials to develop a program that allows for continued training with National Guard members and a protocol for their assistance during emergencies.  Lead Coordinator: Chief's Office	Having standardized training for crowd management through the Department of Public Safety Standards and Training (DPSST) is currently in discussion. If this occurs, it has been discussed that this may be the best venue for shared training. The Federal Law Enforcement training for crowd management is also being revised and will be offered nationally to agencies that respond to mass demonstrations.

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, Brinkerhoff, R. (2006), found that only about 15 percent of training participants were able to successfully apply training objectives when the focus of the intervention is on training. However, 85 percent were able to successfully apply training objectives when a more comprehensive intervention approach was used. The Training Division utilizes the Kirkpatrick Model of Training Evaluation which utilizes a comprehensive approach, including the assessment of barriers to effective on-the-job application and the alignment of training objectives with other organizational factors. More information can be found at: Kirkpatrick, J. & Kirkpatrick, W. (2016). *Kirkpatrick's Four Levels of Training Evaluation*. Alexandria, VA: ATD Press.



Area of Challenge and Lead Coordinator	Current Status
<p>Work with the City Attorney’s Office is needed to develop a definition of press (media) for the Portland Police Bureau policy.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: City Attorney’s Office and Policy Team</p>	<p>There is currently a definition for press that has been incorporated into policy and current training plans. Additional work regarding this may take place in order to have greater consistency with other agencies.</p>
<p>Work with the City Attorney’s Office is needed for modifications to the Temporary Restraining Order, to allow for reasonable response options.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: City Attorney’s Office</p>	<p>This is in progress.</p>
<p>Several legislative changes and discussions were in progress, such as: HB4008 (now ORS 181A.708), HB3059, HB3164, HB3355 (now ORS 181A.702), and HB4208</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Crowd Management Incident Command Program and City Attorney’s Office</p>	<p>These legislative changes have been processed and some have been integrated into Portland Police Bureau policy changes. Some training of this information has been delivered and additional training is planned for 2023.</p>
<p>There were diverging perspectives with extreme differences regarding how law enforcement should respond to the protesting events in Portland. This included differences between federal, state, and local government perspectives.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Crowd Management Incident Command Program and Chief’s Office</p>	<p>This is still a challenge for effective crowd management. Some areas of progress include:</p> <p>There are some national programs developing new evidence-based crowd management training that will be offered to law enforcement nationwide.<sup>5</sup> This is intended to create greater consistency among law enforcement agencies.</p> <p>In many cases, the Portland Police Bureau operates under more restricted standards than state statutes and national standards. Discussions are still in progress regarding how this might impact crowd management when assistance is needed from other agencies.</p>
<p>There were also changes in what the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office decided to prosecute due to concerns of demographic disparities and staffing.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office</p>	<p>Multnomah County District Attorney (MCDA) is now reporting serious staffing issues that is reducing their ability to assign cases deputy district attorneys. This will impact their ability to process lower level crimes.</p>

<sup>5</sup> For instance through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Protective Service, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, and National Tactical Officers Association.

Area of Challenge and Lead Coordinator	Current Status
<p>The Rapid Response Team resigned in 2021.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Special Resources Division and Chief's Office</p>	<p>The development of a new specialized team for crowd control is still in discussion.</p>
<p>The Portland Police Bureau (PPB) currently has no certified grenadier instructors. Some sworn members have knowledge in this area but do not have current certifications. The last members that were certified resigned from the Bureau.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Special Resources Division</p>	<p>Announcements for developing new specialized instructors have been created and are currently advertised.</p>
<p>Nationwide, there is movement towards using shields as a part of the response strategy as this provides needed protection and changes the threshold for force. Shields can be used for crowd management in Oregon, and some agencies are adopting this practice. The Portland Police Bureau does not currently use them.</p> <p>Lead Coordinator: Training Division, Chief's Office, and Special Resources Division</p>	<p>There are additional logistics needed for these since they are classified as military surplus equipment. There is no current progress for resolving this issue.</p>

## PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES

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The public perspectives findings about protests and the policing response continue to be mixed. Some continue to express strong support for or against law enforcement, though most have a more nuanced perspective that is supportive of some police reforms but also regards police presence during protests and policing in general as essential.

Since the last report, the Training Division has continued to read literature pertaining to understanding local protesting groups, review survey findings pertaining to Oregon public perceptions, and obtain information regarding perspectives from various public entities. A more detailed summary of the findings from the public outreach component of this research can be found in Appendix D.

Many of the previous findings continue to be applicable. For instance, there continues to be substantial support in the Portland community for peaceful protests (no crime or violence), concerns regarding protest-related violence in Portland, concerns about the negative impacts on businesses and community members due to disruptions in police services, and the need for community education and communication from the Portland Police Bureau regarding protest events and how community members can safely exercise their constitutional rights. There continues to be some differing perspectives and nuanced variables regarding what strategies will reduce and/or prevent protest-related violence and what actions define exercising one's freedom of speech according to the First Amendment rights.

Although some of this is beyond the scope of police responses, the research continues to suggest the importance of understanding what is being expressed through these protests more broadly and in their totality. For instance, what are the liveability factors for an area, how is quality of life differing among groups or individuals, do people have a sense of security and safety, are the social services matching the needs of community members, and how inclusive is the environment?

### New Findings Since the Last Report

Additional areas where greater communication from the Bureau would be helpful:

- Communication and customer service between officers and businesses, crime victims, and/or witnesses to help offset the current limitations of police services.

- How the Police Bureau will manage large-scale events, both planned and unplanned, without the Rapid Response Team (RRT).

- Information regarding resolving the staffing crisis.

- Information regarding where and how to make a police report online, where and how to make a police records request, when is it appropriate to call non-emergency versus 911, text messaging with 911, the distinctions between Project Respond and the Portland Street Response, and how to request City services through [pdxreporter.org](https://pdxreporter.org).

There were recommendations that a more comprehensive system analysis may be needed, recognizing that the Portland Police Bureau serves as only one part of a larger system. It was suggested that more coordinated leadership across the local, state, and national agencies, as well as city leaders, are needed.

## GENERAL MANAGEMENT FOR CROWD SITUATIONS

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The Portland Police Bureau utilizes the Incident Command System (ICS) for the management of mass demonstrations and other major events. The Incident Command System represents organizational "best practices" as an element of the Command and Coordination Component of National Incident Management System (NIMS), and is the standard for incident management across the country. The Incident Command System provides a common framework for people within an agency and/or across agencies to have a coordinated response.

In 2020, knowledge and skills in the Incident Command System were identified as an area needing further improvement. Although the Portland Police Bureau has some highly trained and skilled members in the Incident Command System and crowd management, the Bureau as a whole was not. This led to a greater burden of the workload placed on those with the specialty training, some critical incident management positions not always staffed, less organization of the administrative tasks, having to train members how to assist during the ongoing events, and less coordination of some of the Incident Command System positions (e.g. Planning, Public Information, Intelligence, and Logistics).

As a part of the Bureau's response plan to the 2020 After Action Review findings, the Bureau formulated a plan for increasing members' knowledge and skills in these systems. This included increasing training opportunities and orders<sup>6</sup>, and establishing additional situations for gaining proficiency in the practical application of these skills.

The trainings provide a structure for the management of major events. For instance, they provide structure for the Chain of Command, collaborations with other agencies, incident planning and reporting processes, information and intelligence management, and resource management. These components of incident management, although sometimes less visible, are critical for an effective response and enabling more resources for addressing the unique characteristics of an event.

Members of the Incident Management Team and Crowd Management Incident Command Program have seen an improvement in Incident Command System skills among members during crowd management incidents since these training efforts. There is additional work to be done to have enough members proficient in crowd management skills. Opportunities for providing members more experience in real-world applications is in progress. For instance, a daylong functional exercise is being planned for Incident Management Team members with less incident management experience. The Bureau is working with a State program for implementing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Qualification System (NQS), which will provide additional circumstances for members to demonstrate skill proficiencies. Opportunities for newer members of the Crowd Management Incident Command Program to gain experience in managing demonstrations is also taking place as events occur. The Incident Management Team leaders plan on building these practical skill building opportunities for other components of incident management as well, such as for documentation and resource tracking.

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<sup>6</sup> Much of these trainings are through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training program. More details regarding which trainings are being attended is listed in the Current Training Recommendations section of this report.

## USE OF FORCE

Information pertaining to the Portland Police Bureau's use of force is obtained from the Portland Police Bureau's Force Analysis Summary Reports, Force Audit Team, Professional Standards Division, Independent Police Review, Incident Command System reports, and the Training Division's review of force cases.

The following sections provide information regarding the amount and types of force utilized during events by the Portland Police Bureau, findings from reviewed cases, and information from research of less lethal use of force. During the timeframe for this report, there was no force used during protests.

### Amount and Type of Force

The amount of force applications used during a protest is going to vary depending on the amount and type of crime occurring, the number of people involved in aggressive behaviors, the level of cooperation with law enforcement interventions, and City and County decisions pertaining to what level of crime and disorder will be enforced. The following chart provides the amount of force<sup>7</sup>, estimated crowd counts<sup>8</sup>, and the percentage of force applications used per the number of people in the crowds for protests occurring during July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022. During this time, there was no force used at protests.

Year	Protest <sup>9</sup>	Number of Force Applications	Estimated Crowd Control Counts	Percentage of Force Applications Per the Number of People
2021	8/7/2021	0	140	0
2021	8/22/2021	0	400	0
2021	10/12/2021	0	100	0
2021	11/19/2021	0	88	0
2021	11/22/2021	0	33	0
2021	12/11/2021	0	300	0
2022	4/6/2022	0	60	0
2022	4/21/2022	0	150	0
2022	5/3/2022	0	200	0
2022	6/24/2022	0	300	0
2022	6/25/2022	0	113	0

<sup>7</sup> The use of force counts are obtained from the Office of Inspector General's Force Audit Team and their use of force summary reports which can be found at <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/62708>.

<sup>8</sup> Most of the estimated crowd counts were obtained from the Incident Command reports, which include crowd estimates throughout the event. Since many of the protests move around and people may leave and others join a protest within a day, there is no way to have an exact number. This report utilized conservative estimates, only counting the highest crowd size per distinct group for a given day. For a few of the events, the crowd estimates were obtained from the Lead Crowd Management Incident Commander (if not included in the reports).

<sup>9</sup> There were additional mass demonstrations during July 1, 2021 through June 31, 2022 in Portland that were assessed by the Portland Police Bureau. However, only these few had a police presence.

2022	6/26/2022	0	150	0
2022	6/27/2022	0	80	0

### Protest-Related Use of Force Cases Under Review<sup>10</sup>

There have been no complaint cases associated with protests after July 1, 2021.

There have been 29 new protest-related use of force complaints associated with protests prior to July 1, 2021. Of prior protest complaints, four have included out-of-policy force findings. Two of the cases involved pepper spray, and two impact munitions. In these cases, the force usage did not align correctly with the type of resistance or behavior the person was demonstrating at the time the force was used.

There are five protest-related use of force complaint investigations still in progress. The evaluation process will continue to incorporate information pertaining to the remainder of the cases as it becomes available.

### Less Lethal Safety Research

The Training Division is taking a multipronged approach to researching the injury risks associated with different less lethal devices and which methods are the safest. Although there have been some recent expressed concerns regarding these methods, many findings indicate that the use of some of these devices result in fewer subject injuries and have saved numerous lives.<sup>11</sup> However, these outcomes can be greatly influenced by what equipment is used and how it is used. The goal of this research is to ensure the Portland Police Bureau is using equipment, procedures, and training practices that promote the safest outcomes for all.

This research process currently focuses on the following<sup>12</sup>:

- Examining the Portland Police Bureau's use of force cases for identifying any serious injuries from less lethal use.

- Reviewing existing research on less lethal equipment, injuries, safety measures, and training.

- Contacting national experts in less lethal research and manufacturers for additional research and information.

- Reviewing the existing research findings in regards to applicability with the Portland Police Bureau's equipment, procedures, and training.<sup>13</sup> This includes identifying to what extent this

<sup>10</sup> This information was obtained from the Professional Standards Division in October 2022.

<sup>11</sup> Ashcroft, J., Daniels, D., & Hart., S. (2004). *NIJ Research for Practice: Impact munitions use types, targets, effects*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs.

MacDonald, J.M., Kaminski, R.J., & Smith, M.R. (2009). The Effect of Less-Lethal Weapons on Injuries in Police Use-of-Force Events. *American Journal of Public Health*, 99, 2268-2274.

<sup>12</sup> In the future, this will also include a review of tort claim and lawsuit cases pertaining to less lethal devices and serious injuries. The request for case information from the City Attorney's Office is currently in progress.

<sup>13</sup> This review is focused on equipment, procedures, and training applicable to crowd management.

equipment has been researched and potentially identifying information for improving the Bureau's equipment, procedures, and/or training.

#### Review of PPB data

One component of this research is to examine the Portland Police Bureau use of force data for any serious injuries caused from less lethal deployments. For this analysis, data of cases involving less lethal use and some hospital treatment are obtained from the Office of Inspector General. The General Offense, Force Data Collection, and After Action Reports are then reviewed for any information pertaining to serious injuries. For any cases where the information is unclear whether a serious injury occurred, they are further reviewed by other members and sent to the Force Inspector to see if any additional information is known or available regarding the injury.

The Training Division will further review any cases identified with serious injuries for any information that would inform Bureau equipment, procedures, or training.

For this analysis, serious injuries are classified as any death, permanent disability, fracture, or penetrations (from less lethal munitions, not from Conducted Electrical Weapon probes) caused by less lethal applications.

#### *Current Progress and Findings*

To date, this review has been completed for the cases of less lethal munition used on patrol since 2017 (when injuries and treatment data was collected in a searchable format for patrol). The cases of less lethal munitions used during crowd management have recently been obtained by the Training Division, and that review process will begin soon. The results from these reviews will be included in the next report.

For the patrol cases, out of the 91 cases involving less lethal munition deployment on patrol, 1 was identified as having a serious injury.

Serious Injury Type	Number of Identified Cases	Injury Description
Death	0	
Permanent disability	0	
Fracture	1	Leg fracture
Penetrations	0	

The following two cases were identified as having insufficient information for a complete assessment.

There was one case where there was a head laceration. This person received stitches and medical conducted an assessment for any serious injury. It was noted that medical personnel did not find any serious injuries at the time but was going to reassess in 24 hours.

There was another case where there was a head laceration but it is unknown whether the laceration was related to any of the police use of force. This person received stitches as well and was released from the hospital.

It was observed during the review that in many of these cases deadly force would have been justified, such as being armed with a weapon and threatening the life safety of themselves or others. Some of the reports commented on the officers' careful use of de-escalation, less lethal deployment, and/or planning potentially prevented deaths and/or more serious injuries. There was also substantial collaboration with medical professionals.

## Literature Research

The understanding of the risks and safety levels of some less lethal methods is complex due to the variation in standards and quality of manufacturers, as well as how they are utilized by different agencies. For instance, research has found substantial differences in the attributes of some devices (such as their accuracy, reliability, malfunction rate)<sup>14</sup>, which has the potential to impact effective deployment and injury risks. Substantial difference in injury risk have also been found pertaining to agency training standards and how the less lethal is deployed.<sup>15</sup> Other considerations pertaining to the likelihood of injury are the characteristics of the individuals the devices are used on (e.g., size, gender, age, health, body armor), environmental factors, and munition types. Law enforcement agencies have less control over individual characteristics but can substantially impact the safety of less lethal use through which manufactures to purchase, which inventory to carry, policy and procedural standards for use, training, research, and certification standards.

Because of these factors, it is critical that decision makers are making informed decisions based on information that applies specifically to that agency. Some of the cases and injury information in research reports, news articles, and other documents do not apply to a particular agency because that agency does not carry that type of weapon or munition or deployment factors. For instance, tear gas is made from different chemical agents and concentrations, which have differences in safety levels.<sup>16</sup> The timing of the information is also important, as it may no longer apply to any agency because the technology has been updated. For example, there have been substantial changes to the conducted electrical weapon and bean bag over the time.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Kenny, J., Heal, S., & Grossman, M. (2001). *The Attribute-Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extended-Range, Impact Munitions*. Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

Hughes, E., Kenny, J., Heal, S., Kaufman, P. (2007). *An Attribute Based Evaluation II (ABE-2) of Less-Lethal Impact Munitions*. The Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies at Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

<sup>15</sup> A difference in these factors can have dramatically opposite results. For instance, in relation to some changes made in both training and equipment at one law enforcement agency, their outcomes with less lethal deployment went from having several unintended deaths to none. Heal, C. S. (2020). *Concepts of Nonlethal Force: Understanding Force from Shouting to Shooting*. Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Publishing & Media.

<sup>16</sup> Heal, C. S. (2020). *Concepts of Nonlethal Force: Understanding Force from Shouting to Shooting*. Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Publishing & Media.

<sup>17</sup> Wyant, R.T., & Burns, T. (2014). *Risk Management of Less Lethal Options: Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath, and Forensics* (Allgire, J.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.



The following provides a summary of the current research findings and applicability to the Portland Police Bureau's inventory and use of chemical irritants that may be used for crowd management.<sup>18</sup> The Bureau is also conducting similar research for less lethal munitions and other less lethal equipment used for crowd management. A summary of this research will be included in subsequent reports.

### *Chemical Irritants (e.g., OC spray, tear gas)*

As mentioned previously, tear gas and/or chemical irritant sprays are made from different chemical agents and concentrations. The most commonly used chemical agents used by law enforcement in the U.S. today are CS (ortho chlorobenzalmalonitrile) and OC (oleoresin capsicum)<sup>19</sup>, which have undergone substantial testing and have been found to be safer and less toxic.<sup>20</sup> They have also been found to have high safety levels and seldom result in the need for medical treatment.<sup>21</sup>

To date, the research found suggests that the possibility of death caused from OC and CS during law enforcement encounters in the United States<sup>22</sup> is rare, and within these cases a causal relationship to the chemical irritant appears to be inconclusive. Out of the numerous deployments, there have only been a few cases where the research has indicated that one of these chemical irritants may have been a contributing factor. For instance, it may have exacerbated asthma or potentiated cocaine lethality.<sup>23</sup> Cases where someone has died during a police encounter where one of these chemical irritants is used is rare and the cases tend to be convoluted by many risk factors for morbidity unrelated to the encounter (e.g., high drug use, heart disease, obesity). These also tend to be cases where the person is extremely combative (e.g. assaulting people/officers) and are exhibiting unusual and/or incoherent behavior prior to the police encounter (e.g., running in traffic, biting people, eating dirt, undressed in public, drug overdose).<sup>24</sup> These nonconclusive findings are not the same for all chemical irritants. For

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<sup>18</sup> A list of the less lethal research reviewed is provided in Appendix C.

<sup>19</sup> Often referred to as pepper spray.

<sup>20</sup> Wyant, R.T., & Burns, T. (2014). *Risk Management of Less Lethal Options: Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath, and Forensics* (Allgire, J.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Heal, C. S. (2020). *Concepts of Nonlethal Force: Understanding Force from Shouting to Shooting*. Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Publishing & Media.

<sup>21</sup> Semple, T., Jenkins, B., & Bennell, C. (2021). Injuries and deaths proximate to oleoresin capsicum spray deployment: A literature review. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 94, 184-205.

Mesloh, C., Henych, M., & Wolf, R. (2008). *Less Lethal Weapon Effectiveness, Use of Force, and Suspect & Officer Injuries: A Five-Year Analysis*. Florida Gulf Coast University: Weapons & Equipment Research Institute. (Document No. 224081)

<sup>22</sup> This is clarified because of the different formulas of chemical irritants and how they are used can impact the severity of potential injuries. It is unknown to this author what the uses and impacts are worldwide. The findings from the following study indicate that although still mainly safe, the use in some other countries may have higher associations with permanent injuries and death: Haar, R., Iacopino, V., Ranadive, N., Weiser, S., & Dandu, M. (2017). Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray. *BMC Public Health*.

<sup>23</sup> Semple, T., Jenkins, B., & Bennell, C. (2021). Injuries and deaths proximate to oleoresin capsicum spray deployment: A literature review. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 94, 184-205. This is not to suggest people with asthma are likely to die from chemical irritants. This article provides more information pertaining to this topic for those interested.

<sup>24</sup> Petty, C. (2004). *Deaths in Police Confrontations When Oleoresin Capsicum is Used*. U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs. (Document No. 204029)

Semple, T., Jenkins, B., & Bennell, C. (2021). Injuries and deaths proximate to oleoresin capsicum spray deployment: A literature review. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 94, 184-205.

instance, although rare, research has found deaths occurring from CN (chloroacetophenone) exposure which has been banned by the U.S. military.<sup>25</sup>

Research has also found that the use of chemical irritants, in lieu of other force options, is correlated with significantly less injuries of civilians.<sup>26</sup> This is also an important consideration. While there are risks associated with all force options, and encounters should be resolved without force when possible, the goal is to identify the safest force options for when force needs to be used.

The research findings also suggest the following considerations may be helpful for reducing the rare chance of serious injury:

Due to other ingredients in some of these products, some may be flammable, which is a safety risk in situations involving conducted electrical weapons and/or fires.

Be aware of asphyxia symptoms and potential medical assistance considerations.

Utilize medical support as needed and help advise people regarding the best recovery procedures.

If the chemical irritant does not appear to be effective on a particular individual, move to another force option rather than continue chemical applications.

When used for police training purposes, avoid combining this exposure with extensive physical training exercises.

Avoid use in enclosed, potentially poor ventilated environments.

The Portland Police Bureau utilizes the following safety precautions for reducing the rare chance of serious injury:

The Portland Police Bureau mostly uses chemical irritant products made from CS and OC. There is currently one munition made with PAVA.

The aerosol chemical restraints used by the Portland Police Bureau have been tested and are nonflammable and Conducted Electrical Weapon safe.<sup>27</sup>

Some of the chemical irritant equipment<sup>28</sup>, such as those deployed through vapor or gas canisters are flammable, as that is part of the mechanism used for dispersal. Special training and

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<sup>25</sup> Heal, C. S. (2020). *Concepts of Nonlethal Force: Understanding Force from Shouting to Shooting*. Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Publishing & Media.

<sup>26</sup> MacDonald, J.M., Kaminski, R.J., & Smith, M.R. (2009). The Effect of Less-Lethal Weapons on Injuries in Police Use-of-Force Events. *American Journal of Public Health*, 99, 2268-2274.

Alpert, G., Smith, M., Kaminski, R., Fridell, L., MacDonald, J., & Kubu, B. (2011). *NIJ Research in Brief: Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Semple, T., Jenkins, B., & Bennell, C. (2021). Injuries and deaths proximate to oleoresin capsicum spray deployment: A literature review. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 94, 184-205.

<sup>27</sup> From the manufacturers' safety data and information documents. Some experts in the field, such as Wyant, R.T., & Burns, T., also encourage agencies to contact manufacturers for additional research study information and conduct additional testing of equipment. The Training Division is in the process of requesting additional research study information from manufacturers.

<sup>28</sup> This is in regards to the equipment itself (rather than the chemical irritant), such as those that are activated with a fuze.

precautions are required for the use of this equipment, to ensure it is used safely. These precautions include:

This equipment can only be used by Portland Police Bureau members with specialized training.

When this equipment may be deployed, the members are provided an environmental briefing from the Fire Department regarding any safety considerations.

Either a Portland Fire Bureau medic or police supervisor is assigned to have a halotron, and additional support is stored in vehicle(s) nearby the event.

Fire Medics are stationed near the event.

Only nonflammable equipment is utilized within buildings.

Officers are trained for potential medical assistance considerations and utilize medical professionals regularly for both patrol calls and crowd management.<sup>29</sup>

Officers are trained to move to another force type if a particular use of force is not effective and it is not possible to disengage or de-escalate the situation.

When officers are exposed to chemical irritants during training, the Portland Fire Bureau monitors the situation for health and safety considerations.

In addition to these precautions, the Portland Police Bureau plans on further reinforcing these safety considerations in crowd management training. The Bureau is considering providing additional specialized crowd management training regarding risks in confined structures and methods for managing an incident where a building becomes occupied. A procedure for regularly sending the Material Safety Data Sheets of the Portland Police Bureau's inventory to the hospitals in Portland is also being developed, in addition of the new law regarding hospital notifications.

The Training Division will continue to review research on these chemical irritants as it develops. There are some researchers presenting greater concern regarding the potential for serious injury from various chemical irritants.<sup>30</sup> The Training Division is reviewing this research as well for any applicable information for the equipment that the Bureau inventories and/or how it is deployed. To date, it does not appear this information changes any findings applicable to the Portland Police Bureau. For instance, some of the information pertains to different chemicals, uses in other countries where both the chemical and use may differ, extreme exposure situations unrelated to police work (e.g. factory workers), and theory. Some of the writing noticeably does not include mention of the more rigorous

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<sup>29</sup> The Bureau has done extensive training for this in general and continues to reinforce medical emergencies and assistance in training. The use of medical assistance and considerations is monitored through use of force reviews. The Bureau has seen substantial implementation of these skills and collaborations with medical.

<sup>30</sup> Rothenberg, C., Satyanarayana, A., Svendsen, E. & Jordt, S. (2016). Tear gas: An epidemiological and mechanistic reassessment. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*.

studies that have been done regarding specific subtopics, such as the impact on breathing or asthma.<sup>31</sup> The researchers do not appear to suggest that chemical irritants should not be used in law enforcement at all and acknowledge that medical reviews have found substantial safety margins, but do provide some extra caution and stress the importance of future research. The Training Division will continue to review this research and supports the need for future less lethal research.

The Training Division has also contacted the manufacturers associated with Portland Police Bureau inventory to collect any additional research reports and safety information specific to their products. At this time, the Bureau is awaiting this information from the manufacturers.

For the next series of Portland Police Bureau less lethal injury case reviews, the Training Division will also request cases specifically to the use of chemical irritants.

### Summary

The current research completed for the Portland Police Bureau case reviews and literature applicable to Portland Police Bureau equipment and use has found the risk of serious injury or death to be low. However, as mentioned previously the risk levels for less lethal use are partially dependent on the equipment, policy and procedure standards for use, training, research, and certification standards. Having a rigorous less lethal program is not only important for reducing unintentional serious injuries but also for saving lives by having safer force options. Having a program that operators, the community, and external stakeholders are confident in is critical.

To date, the findings for the Portland Police Bureau programs have been mostly positive, but areas for improvement have been found and some strategies for enhancing the programs are in progress. Some members have also suggested that it would be beneficial to provide operators more frequent training. In addition, the Bureau has lost some of its expertise for this work due to resignations and position cuts. The Bureau no longer has a position dedicated to the research and testing of equipment. It would be most prudent to restore this position as soon as possible and/or hire external experts for the testing of equipment and consulting regarding training standards.

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<sup>31</sup> This was noticed but this is not to suggest the exclusion of this information was intentional, which is unknown. For instance, the researchers express the following “With an asthma prevalence of 8.4% in the U.S. population and similar levels around the world, there is a high chance of exposure to tear gas and the development of complications in asthmatics” but do not provide support for this claim. The research they use to support this concern found “There was no convincing evidence of long-term sequelae from exposure to CS spray.” The article cited was: Karagama, Y., Newton, J., & Newbegin, C. (2003). Short-term and long-term physical effects of exposure to CS spray. *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 96, 172-174.

## USE OF DE-ESCALATION

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The Portland Police Bureau continues to implement de-escalation techniques to encourage peaceful protesting and de-escalate violence, which includes methods from the Decision Making Model and Enhanced Social Identity Model. The Bureau adapts its use of these methods based on feedback and observations pertaining to their effectiveness for different groups.

Information was gathered from Incident Command System reports, sworn members that managed or staffed the protests, and the Portland Police Bureau's research findings pertaining to community perspectives, to understand what de-escalation methods were used during this time and whether or not they were effective. The following is a summary of these findings.

### *De-escalation Methods Used*

Communicating with group leaders when possible (some were unwilling to communicate with the police).

The Demonstration Liaison Officer program<sup>32</sup> was utilized for some of the events during this timeframe. Efforts were made to communicate with group leaders prior to and during planned events, to build rapport and help ensure safe and peaceful protesting. These communications often include gaining an understanding of the group's plans for the demonstration, discussing ways to help ensure peaceful protesting, discussing how the Bureau can and cannot assist, and informing participants of the related laws and ordinances.

Providing a police presence to a community area that has been identified to be targeted.

Distributing informational flyers to businesses in an area planned to be targeted that provide recommendations for promoting safety.

Making announcements from the sound truck with simultaneous Twitter messages from the Portland Police Bureau's Public Information Officer (PIO).

Talking with individual protestors that requested to converse with the police.

Community Engagement Team work, which included communication outreach to the Bureau advisory councils and other neighborhood contacts and community discussions pertaining to specific priority concerns.

Staging of police assets, such as the Mobile Field Force, out of sight when possible to avoid confrontation.

Entirely keeping a distance from some of the protesting areas.

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<sup>32</sup> The Portland Police Bureau established this program in 2019 and it is operated by the Crisis Negotiation Team. These officers intentionally wear a different uniform with a white shirt to distinguish their facilitative role to the community. The mission of the Portland Police Bureau's Demonstration Liaison Officer program is to utilize communication to support the incident command team and other law enforcement and first responder personnel in providing a safe and lawful environment for event/ demonstration participants, nonparticipants, community members, and first responders during large-scale events and demonstrations.

The use of bicycle officers.

Other public information efforts outside of the protest times, such as press releases and responding to individual messages of concern sent to the Bureau.

Use of barriers/fencing and hardening of facilities.

Tolerating low levels of disorderly conduct or criminal mischief without taking enforcement actions.

Using time to allow for the groups to de-escalate and/or further assess the situation.

Pro-active messaging from the Bureau/Public Information Officer (PIO) about expectations around allowable conduct at demonstrations as well as messaging from PIO about human impacts on officers and why police do what we do during protests.

Using force action only after all other non-force options are considered.

Using Long Range Acoustic Device to call out individuals committing criminal behavior when possible to reindividuate single offenders in the larger group.

In addition, community members and businesses attempted to de-escalate the violence. This included peaceful protesting groups voicing their disapproval against protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors, protesting group members reinforcing peaceful protesting within their groups, and businesses providing security or other protections to their buildings.

#### *De-escalation Methods That Could Not Be Used*

The following are some methods that could not be used during this time due to no longer having the Rapid Response Team, a lack of police resources, policy restrictions, and legislative constraints.

Using protective gear that fits under a uniform to give a soft, less offensive look.

Assisting protestors with getting medical assistance.<sup>33</sup>

Removing those committing violence from the crowd when possible.

Use of strategic arrests of violent individuals when possible to reduce the impact on others.

The use of livestreaming and/or drones.

The use of shields, which can reduce the need for force in some circumstances by providing officers more time by reducing the immediacy of the threat.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Some of this is still possible but is currently limited. Medics accompanied the Rapid Response Team in the past so medical support was substantially more accessible. AMR will not enter many locations that are not safe, which is a function the specialized team for crowd management had provided.

<sup>34</sup> It is recognized that the use of shields can be escalating in some situations and de-escalating in others. For instance, their presence prior to violence in the crowd could be provoking to some protestors.

### *De-escalation Methods Effectiveness*

How effective de-escalation methods are continues to be difficult to determine. There is also less information to assess this year due to the reduction of protests, violence at protests, and law enforcement responses to protests. Information pertaining to direct feedback from individuals and groups, observations of individual and crowd dynamics (e.g., whether or not there was escalation or de-escalation, whether peaceful protestors turn violent, etc.), and crime patterns continues to be collected.

It appears that the methods continue to be at least partially effective. The following are some potential indicators:

Community members (including protestors) and businesses are attempting to help de-escalate the violence.

There appears to be substantial listening among both the police and community group leaders when dialogues occur in the pre-planning stages for events.

The amount of crime planned for some protests (as indicated from the group's communications to others) not being accomplished.

Protestors engaged in more violent behavior being unable to gain more influence over the peaceful protestors, and the peaceful protestors actively separating themselves from others.

While the amount and some of the characteristics of the 2020 protests being unusual makes it difficult for comparisons, some of the overall reduction in protest-related violence being initiated may be a positive indicator.

Feedback from community members that the Bureau communications pertaining to protests have been helpful and the recommendations that more communication would be beneficial.

In addition, some of these methods have been helpful for preparing patrol for their work, which may prevent any confusion between the police and community members. For instance, by having more knowledge regarding the community's plans for a demonstration, management is able to communicate this information to patrol working in the area.

Utilizing some of the methods, such as communication through the Demonstration Liaison Officer Program, with some of the groups (e.g., those opposed to communicating with law enforcement and/or government) continues to be a challenge. It is recognized that some methods may be effective for some groups and not others.

### *Future Considerations*

The Bureau leaders for crowd management continue to have thoughtful discussions regarding the crowd response methods used and what appears to be most effective with the different protesting groups in Portland. Information regarding de-escalation techniques for crowd management are being integrated into the training plans for next year. Providing members more knowledge regarding the protesting groups less receptive to peaceful protesting methods is also in discussion, so that members can better customize and innovate their attempts to de-escalate the situation.

Continuing to highlight the importance of not giving up on the integration of these methods, even when they do not appear completely successful or still having to use force and arrests, may be important. There have been indications during this study that both Bureau and community members have been discouraged at times when attempts at de-escalating violence does not appear to be effective. Some of the case reports and information reviewed as a part of this study, has suggested even when the de-escalation methods are not completely successful, they can still sometimes reduce the intensity of the situation, allow officers more time to collect additional information important for decision making, reduce the amount of force needed, and increase community perspectives of procedural justice and police legitimacy.



## PUBLIC GROUPS WITH MORE EXTREME PROTESTING STRATEGIES

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Much of the literature on crowd management stresses the importance of law enforcement being knowledgeable in their local groups that engage in protesting, in order to enhance communication and customize crowd management approaches to increase the likelihood of peaceful protesting. This recommendation applies to both peaceful protestors and those that engage in violent protesting.

Although the majority of protestors in Portland are peaceful, there is a fair amount of individuals and groups that engage in violent behavior. Some of this behavior is in association with groups with more extreme protesting strategies. Some are also unwilling to speak to law enforcement and/or are purposely antagonistic towards law enforcement,<sup>35</sup> which makes the implementation of some of the recommended methods for crowd management difficult. Portland may have more of this activity included in public demonstrations than many other agencies so being knowledgeable in these groups and effective strategies for responding to these situations may be particularly important. One study of the 2020 protests in U.S. major cities found that out of 67 major cities, Portland was among three cities with the highest percentage of protests with violence.<sup>36</sup> The Portland area is also a central location for some groups with more extreme protesting strategies, and Oregon in general has been identified as an area with a higher amount of violent extremism.

The Oregon Secretary of State and Audit Division has researched domestic violent extremism in Oregon and published a report of their current findings and recommendations in March, 2022.<sup>37</sup> In their report, they show the increase in these incidents nationwide for the last several years and found these incidents were about equal in respect to being associated with “far-right” or “far-left” ideologies. They also report that “Oregon ranks sixth in the nation in the number of violent extremist attacks from 2011 to 2020 despite ranking 27th in population according to U.S. Census data”. They provide several recommendations towards creating a multi-faceted approach for reducing these risks in Oregon, including the following suggestion specific to law enforcement training.

Identifying individuals on the pathway to violence is critical to threat management. Current law enforcement and state employee training is limited. Increased opportunities for training statewide may increase effectiveness in identifying potential threats.

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<sup>35</sup> Finkelstein, J., Goldenberg, A., Stevens, S., Jussim, L., Farmer, J., Donohue, J., and Paresky, P. (2020). *Network-Enabled Anarchy: How Militant Anarcho-Socialist Networks Use Social Media to Instigate Widespread Violence Against Political Opponents and Law Enforcement*. Network Contagion Research Institute.

Maguire, E., & Oakley, M. (2020). *Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police*. New York, NY; Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

No author (n.d.) *Vol. 1 ACRID Trajectory of an Uprising*. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from <https://rosecitycounterinfo.noblogs.org/2020/10/acrid-vol-1-trajectory-of-an-uprising/>

<sup>36</sup> Major Cities Chiefs Association and Intelligence Commanders Group (2020). Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest. extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/<https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> Oregon Secretary of State and Oregon Audits Division’s (2022). Oregon Can Do More to Mitigate the Alarming Risk of Domestic Terrorism and Violent Extremist Attacks. extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/<https://sos.oregon.gov/audits/Documents/2022-12.pdf>

The Training Division, in collaboration with Portland State University and the lead Crowd Management Incident Commander, has been researching these groups with a particular focus on learning the following:

Understanding these groups' mission(s), goals, assumptions, and strategies

What needs might be driving their mission

Why people join and leave these groups

What influences increases and decreases this type of violence

What has influenced polarization in the U.S.

Understanding what factors may increase the risk that an area will have more violent extremism activity

These are complex topics and strategies for interacting with these groups need to be well thought out. Any interventions pertaining to violent behavior must be careful to respect individual perspectives and focus on reducing violence.<sup>38</sup> Some groups or individuals may also have strong beliefs in the need to use violence, so any intervention may be seen as inhibiting their abilities. There is also the risk that police agencies and/or law enforcement members will be perceived as biased if assigned to interact with these groups. Developing expertise and a comprehensive plan for reducing these risks and increasing the effectiveness of these interactions may be beneficial. It appears this work may be best done utilizing an ongoing approach with multiagency and community collaborations, rather than through crowd management or law enforcement interventions alone.

The Training Division will continue researching this topic. A list of research and literature reviewed to date is provided in Appendix E.

### Application to Future Training

During the 2022 Enhanced Crisis Intervention Team In-Service training, a session pertaining to effectively intervening in targeted violence generally was conducted.

The Bureau's Crowd Management Leaders and Training Division are discussing what methods related to these topics may be helpful for promoting peace during protests, as well as the in the City of Portland generally. Additional potential training is also being discussed such as increasing knowledge of these groups so response strategies can be better customized depending on what responses may be more or less likely to be effective.

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<sup>38</sup> Jackson, B., Rhoades, A., Reimer, J., Lander, N., Costello, K., & Beaghley, S. (2019). *Practical terrorism prevention: Reexamining U.S. National approaches to addressing the threat of ideologically motivated violence*. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation.

## GOALS FOR CROWD MANAGEMENT

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The following are the program *goals for crowd management* and a brief preliminary summary of how well they were achieved during the timeframe for this report (July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022). Although the Police Bureau assessed and/or monitored many protests during this time, a police response was implemented for only a few. Many of the events did not require any police response and for others the Bureau was limited by the remaining unresolved challenges, such as the lack of staffing and a current specialized team, and changes in law and policy being processed.

*Uphold the public's freedoms provided in the Constitution by:*

*Monitoring public order events in a neutral and impartial manner.*

The current results suggest the Portland Police Bureau did well at monitoring both the public order events for this timeframe in a neutral and impartial manner. The Incident Command reports were reviewed in their entirety, information was gathered from Bureau managers and lead instructors for crowd management, and information regarding complaints were obtained from the Independent Police Review and the Professional Standards Division.

There continues to be some concerns regarding bias. There are currently no sustained complaints of bias related to protest encounters since 2020. Although not related to a law enforcement encounter, there have been concerns and an investigation pertaining to a training slide displaying a right-wing meme. This process is still in progress. The results will be incorporated into the evaluation process once the findings are adjudicated.

The importance of neutrality, as well as related perceptions, has been a component of many discussions during this evaluation process. This has included discussions regarding how best to integrate components for reinforcing neutrality into future training for crowd management. The Bureau also plans on continuing equity and bias training program, which relates to these concerns.

*Encouraging self-regulating behavior to maintain safe and peaceful gatherings.*

Although not all of the protests during this timeframe were peaceful, most have been substantially more peaceful compared to the protests in 2020. The Portland Police Bureau has continued to encourage peaceful protesting. This includes communicating with group leaders when possible (some were unwilling to communicate with the police), utilizing the Demonstration Liaison Officer program, making announcements from the soundtrack with simultaneous Twitter messages from the Portland Police Bureau, providing a police presence to an area, distributing informational flyers to an area being targeted providing recommendations for promoting safety, and talking with individual protestors.

In addition, community groups and protestors have continued to make attempts at de-escalating violence. For instance, some peaceful protesting groups have continued to voice

their disapproval against the protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors or actively maintain separation from groups trying to influence them.

*Address criminal actions that only affect the safety of the public or gathering.*

Although less of an issue this past year, the Portland Police Bureau has not had enough resources to address all of these crimes. Some of the protests have involved serious vandalism and assaults, including the killing of one protester. This continues to be a challenge with the lack of specialized team, current sworn staffing limitations, and some of the current legal restrictions. The Bureau has continued to be able to implement nondirect interventions to help prevent criminal activity, such as providing a general police presence in the area, talking with lead organizers, and promoting informal social control. The Strategic Communications Unit also takes this factor into account when they designing communication plans.

The planning process for the specialized response team is still in progress. There has been some progress with the clarifications of law and policy, and advancement in crowd management skills such as for identifying and separating out individuals committing crime within a crowd (with less impact on others). Most of the membership has not received the updated crowd management training though. Some of the training pertaining to law updates is currently in progress. The Bureau is planning a more extensive training for all sworn members starting in January 2023.

*Maintain open communication with the public and media before, during, and after an event.*

The main communication strategies continue to be press releases, Twitter announcements, Soundtruck announcements (along with simultaneous Twitter announcements), communication with protest and community leaders prior to the events, communication outreach to businesses and other neighborhood contacts, and responding to messages sent to the Bureau. In addition to the local communication needs, the Police Bureau continues to receive inquiries nationally about the protests in Portland. When the Bureau is able to respond to the communication needs and utilize the above strategies, they appeared to be beneficial. Some of the current challenges to implementing more communication strategies are staffing and resource limitations, having less detailed information regarding protest response plans due to the absence of the specialized unit for crowd management, some protesting groups being unwilling to communicate with law enforcement, and the Demonstration Liaison Officer Program being unable to have a presence at the demonstrations without the specialized unit for crowd management.

During 2021, it was also noted that additional work towards ensuring communication is presented in different languages and taking into consideration various disabilities would be beneficial. The Bureau has been able to translate some of its communications to different languages, though this has not been consistent due to resource limitations.

The Bureau is in the process of training additional members in communications at this time and has been able to increase communication opportunities with local media. Given the importance of this work and the many recommendations from the community to expand the communication efforts, further increasing support towards the communications components of crowd management could be beneficial.

*Maintain Bureau Essential Functions.*

This crowd management goal refers to the organization's ability to maintain these Essential Functions at a base level throughout an emergency, rather than a higher level that may be needed to meet an organizational goal and/or external expectations. The reduction of meeting the Bureau's Essential Functions due to mass demonstration responses has been minimal during the time of this report since there has been less large demonstrations and law enforcement responses to demonstrations.

Providing the planned crowd management training to all sworn members during next year may have more of an impact on the Bureau's ability to maintain these Essential Functions though. Although necessary, these trainings are difficult for units given the current staffing limitations.

## RESEARCH REFLECTING BEST PRACTICES AND LATEST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS FOR CROWD MANAGEMENT

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The Bureau's core leaders for crowd management and Training Division staff are continuing to research national standards and best practices related to public order and policing. Some of the main methods included in this are the Madison Method, Enhanced Social Identity Model, the RDFC (Reasonable, Disarming, Focused, and Consistent) Interaction Model, and the Decision Making Model.

The lead Crowd Management Incident Commander is in communication with some of the national organizations working towards designing updated and evidence-based training for crowd management. This includes the Federal Protective Service, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, and the National Tactical Officers Association. The Training Division's Sergeant and Lead Instructor for crowd management are scheduled to attend the US Department of Homeland Security Federal Protective Service Train the Trainer classes in the fall of 2022. This training includes a focus on understanding crowd dynamics, crowd psychology, First Amendment rights, social and political factors, decision making models, the Elaborated Social Identity Model, the RDFC Model, medical support teams, civilian injuries, and response options and procedures.

### Literature Research

The Training Division has continued to include crowd management as one of its main research topics for literature reviews. This information is used to help assess the alignment of training with national standards and best practices, identify potential future training needs or material for curriculum, and stay apprised of current trends.

Some of the reports reviewed during this report process were New Directions for Protesting Policing by Edward R. Maguire, the United Nations' Human Rights Committee: General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly document, the ACLU's Know Your Rights: Protesters' Rights document, and Amnesty's International's Good Practice for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations document.

### The New Directions for Protesting Policing

The New Directions for Protesting Policing<sup>39</sup> report is highlighted in this document because of its review of the interpersonal aspects of crowd management and thoughts regarding how these considerations can be used for enhancing crowd management response strategies. In this report, they outline the following recommendations for responding to protests.

### Education

Education in the following areas to enable a more nuanced police response, that is more effective at identifying how to interact with protestors (if at all), and what types of police action might escalate or de-escalate the situation:

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<sup>39</sup> Maguire, Edward R. (2015). New directions in protest policing. *Saint Louis University Public Law Review*, 35. <https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6>

The social identities of the crowd subgroups, including their values, goals, mission, beliefs, intentions, stereotypes, and their interactions with other groups.

Knowing who the influential moderates are in a group, whom may be more likely to have effective communication with the police, and/or reduce conflict in the group.

### *Facilitation*

Utilizing a more facilitative approach to crowd management, rather than solely control or regulation, to reduce the perception that the police are attempting to infringe upon their constitutional rights. This, along with differentiated response techniques, are important when groups are violent as well. This includes:

Explaining the police response and reasoning.

Ensuring law abiding members are able to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Identify the legitimate aims of a group and strategize a police response to best support those components.

Remaining neutral in communications and the police response.

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*‘An emphasis on facilitation needs to be paramount at all stages of the police operation. In planning for an event one needs to identify the legitimate aims of crowd members in order to consider how best to organize policing so as to enable them to be met. If there is some reason why they cannot be met in the way that organizers request it is essential not simply to give a negative response, but to be positive and creative in finding alternative ways of meeting (and being seen to meet) the underlying aims.’<sup>38</sup>*

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### *Communication*

This report’s recommendations focus on communication between police and protestors, although recognizes other components of communication are also critical. The importance of this work is connected to promoting more peaceful protesting, preventing moderates and peaceful protestors from aligning with those engaged in violence, increasing police legitimacy, and promoting self regulating behavior among crowds. The recommendations include the following.

Engaging in friendly conversation with protestors when possible, to establish rapport, humanize law enforcement, establishing trust, and reducing conflict. Sometimes much of this communication is done by a specific group of officers, such as the “Dialogue Police” in Sweden.

Remaining calm and utilizing patience with protestors who are aggressive towards the police, attempting to provoke the police, or are interpreting any police facilitation or communication as hostile.

Establishing communication with protestors before actual protests, to help overcome some of the additional emerging challenges such as the less structured organization and leadership among protesting groups.

Utilizing skirmish lines more judiciously.

### *Differentiation*

Utilizing graded and differentiated police responses to reduce the appearance of an overly aggressive police response, target police enforcement towards individuals, and ensure law abiding members can exercise their First Amendment rights. These methods also help reduce confusion regarding police responses and increase police legitimacy and procedural justice.

Utilizing arrests judiciously and rarely using mass arrests.

When possible, utilize force only after other methods have failed.

Reducing the burden of police enforcement methods on law abiding members, such as the use of restrictive crowd containment methods.

Implementing strategies to reduce officer safety risks, such as staging tactical support nearby during graded responses, rotating officers more regularly during protests involving aggression toward the police, and ensuring supervisor and peer support methods to relieve officers who are exhausted.

### United Nations' Human Rights Committee, ACLU, and Amnesty's International's guidelines for crowd management.

The United Nations' Human Rights Committee: General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly, the ACLU's Know Your Rights: Protesters' Rights, and Amnesty International's Good Practice for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations documents are being highlighted in this report because of their role and expertise pertaining to human rights concerns.<sup>40</sup> Not all of the recommendations are listed in this report, as some of them are extensive. For instance, one document lists 102 recommendation components.

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<sup>40</sup> United Nations (2020). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3884725?ln=en>

ACLU (n.d.). ACLU's Know Your Rights: Protesters' Rights. <https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/protesters-rights>

Amnesty International (n.d.). Good Practice for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations. At the time of this reporting, the exact wording of the guidelines posted on their website has been changed from those originally obtained. The current guidelines are at: <https://www.amnestyusa.org/good-practice-for-law-enforcement-officials-policing-demonstrations/>



These documents were reviewed for consistency with the Portland Police Bureau’s current policy<sup>41</sup> and procedures. A high amount of consistency and alignment was found. The following provides a brief summary of any areas identified that differ. There were also some recommendations that did not apply to the Portland Police Bureau, such as the use of geotargeting or rubber-coated metal bullets.

The Recommendation	Portland Police Bureau Application
All law enforcement officials responsible for policing assemblies must be suitably equipped, including where needed with appropriate and fit-for-purpose less-lethal weapons and protective equipment. [United Nations]	In general, the Portland Police Bureau meets this recommendation. As the equipment and tactics of protestors evolve, there are times when the protective equipment is not sufficient. For instance, better ear and eye protection was needed for the 2020 protests.
States parties must ensure that all weapons, including less-lethal weapons, are subject to strict independent testing, and that officers deployed with them receive specific training, and must evaluate and monitor the impact of weapons on the rights of those affected. [United Nations]	The Portland Police Bureau does conduct some testing of their less lethal weapons. It is recommended that police agencies conduct more scientific and rigorous testing. The Police Bureau is currently reviewing the independent research testing that has been conducted on the same or similar equipment it inventories, as well as gathering information regarding these testing methodologies. Depending on these results and funding, the Bureau may decide to enhance their testing processes.
In accordance with article 20 of the Covenant, peaceful assemblies may not be used for propaganda for war (art. 20 (1)), or for advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (art. 20 (2)). [United Nations]	This is from the United Nations report. The Oregon government and culture allows for very strong protections for freedom of speech, but there are some limitations (e.g., time, place, and manner restrictions). It is unknown how well this aligns with the United Nations’ recommendation.

<sup>41</sup> At the time of this reporting, the current directive for crowd management is still under its final review stages. For that policy, it was the current draft of the policy that was included in this review.

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Individuals must receive clear and detailed notice of a dispersal order, including how much time they have to disperse, the consequences of failing to disperse, and what clear exit route they can follow, before they may be arrested or charged with any crime. [ACLU]

This is aligned with the Portland Police Bureau's policy and procedures, with the exception of providing an exact amount of time for dispersing. This is sometimes provided and sometimes not, depending on whether the Incident Command believe it will most aid the goal of dispersing and/or calming the crowd. For instance, some protestors may find this as another opportunity to cause harm, or there may be other times the police may decide additional time is needed to resolve the situation as peacefully as possible.

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### Application to Future Training

The Bureau agrees with the recommendations listed in The New Directions for Protest Policing report. These are integrated into the current Advanced Academy public order training, the training needs included in this report, and current In-Service training plans for next year.

## CURRENT TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the current crowd management training needs and where possible, current training planning information.<sup>42</sup> The Training Division has been working on prioritizing these training needs. Some of this work is reflected in the current training plans information. Additional prioritizing and resource planning will occur after the external assessment of the protests is complete.

### For All Bureau Members

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Ensure that all Portland Police Bureau members receive the necessary Incident Command System (ICS) training outlined in the special order for National Incident Management System compliance and ensure sufficient staffing of multiple Incident Management Teams (IMT) to allow rotation of staffing during ongoing events.	The Bureau has made substantial progress with this training. This is being met through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training for Bureau members. See the FEMA training section for more information.
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	All members of the Police Bureau have an obligation to assist in times of emergency and under special circumstances. In order to effectively do so, all members need to be trained in at least one role within the Incident Command System.	First, the PPB should identify what contingency roles members are assigned to, and then training to commensurate with the position they are assigned can be identified (if training in addition to what is already included in the FEMA training list is needed).

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<sup>42</sup> In addition, the reviews and evaluation process findings support the need for continual work in the following areas generally (many of which are in progress):

Improving the organizational health

Strengthening the general management and leadership of the organization

Improving strategic communications planning and implementation

Increasing the use of strategic planning, implementation, and evaluation generally to identify, track, and achieve Bureau goals

Identifying effective and meaningful strategies for mending police and community relations

Continuing to integrate comprehensive cultural competency and anti-racism training throughout the Bureau

Continuing to integrate robust officer wellness training throughout the Bureau

### For Specialized Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Training

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Provide training on methods for enhancing collaboration with local media outlets (e.g., television stations, radio stations, newspapers, social media) to communicate objective, factual information and promote transparency about crowd control events and police management of those events. Incorporate training in social media messaging including themes of ownership and acknowledgement of issues that the community values.	See FEMA training list for Public Information Officers (PIO). Also, the Bureau is considering sending additional members to the PIO training track provided at the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Major Cities Chiefs Association Conferences.
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Ensure the Portland Police Bureau has enough trained personnel in strategic communications to allow for more proactive responses, including methods for ensuring messaging is accessible for different languages and disabilities. This would also allow for additional members to help coordinate the flow of information and memorialize the event.	FEMA training for PIOs (see FEMA training list).
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Reinstitute the quarterly Incident Management Team meetings. All command staff must attend the Incident Management Team quarterly meetings. Regular tabletop exercises must be developed to provide practice for newer Incident Commanders and Deputy Incident Commanders to gain confidence and consistency.	These have been reinstituted and they are currently meeting more regularly. They are planned to include a combination of review of previous incidents, current trends in incident management, decision making exercises, and exercises managed under the FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).
Leadership  Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Require all who will assume the role of Incident or Deputy Incident Commander to attend the biannual Public Order Training (as well as the semi-annual training if instituted) to ensure they develop a working knowledge of the concepts and theories and build rapport with the public order teams.	The biannual Public Order Training. The Bureau is considering the best strategy for officers and command to work together during crowd management training.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Work with regional partners to develop an all hazards Incident Management Team, allowing for insertion of outside Incident Management Teams personnel, when necessary using the FEMA National Qualification system as a guide.	The Portland Police Bureau is currently working with Oregon Emergency Management to develop the training requirements to implement a multi-agency Type 3 IMT IAW, the FEMA National Qualification System. This effort is in the beginning stages and is currently working on State-level qualifications.
Reporting / Documentation	<p>Ensure some members are trained for the ICS Documentation Unit.</p> <p>Create a system for storing all Incident Command System documents in one location with consistent naming conventions.</p>	<p>FEMA training for Bureau members (see FEMA training list).</p> <p>Ensure the Document Unit personnel are specially trained in not only city documentation requirements but also the role in incident management. In addition, they may benefit from shadowing the State Fire Marshal Incident Management Team.</p>
Reporting / Documentation	Establish a workgroup to develop a Resource Tracking Standard Operating Procedure to ensure accurate resource tracking throughout an event that provides for operational accountability as well fiscal tracking.	In addition to the FEMA training list, members assigned to Resources (Planning Section) should receive an additional Incident Command System Resources Unit Leader course. The Finance Section should receive the Finance Section Chief training and develop the Resource Tracking Standard Operating Procedure in conjunction with Planning Section (to ensure procedures are comprehensive yet not to overly burden Operations Section personnel involved in the incident).

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Ensure enough professional staff positions are identified and trained to fill the Logistics and Finance Section Chief and other IMT roles.	FEMA training for Logistics staff (see FEMA training list)
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Train all Lieutenant and above, in an Incident Command System Command or General Staff position.	This is in progress.

#### For Incident Command System Management

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Leadership  General Crowd Management	General crowd management methods and fundamentals, such as crowd psychology, facilitation and communication methods, knowing the local protest culture, and principles from the Elaborated Social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.	The 2021 Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy was provided last year. Components of this training have been incorporated into curriculum for other sworn members.  These concepts will continue to be integrated into the IMT and Crowd Management Incident Command Program (CMIC) meeting discussions and exercises.
Leadership  Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Crowd management tactics and contingency planning, including when and how to utilize staging and a graduated tactical response, officer health and safety considerations, and targeted arrest strategies. Consideration should be given to any applications for community members with disabilities (e.g., ensuring they have enough time to respond to directions).	The 2021 Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy was provided last year. Components of this training have been incorporated into curriculum for other sworn members.  These concepts will continue to be integrated into the IMT and CMIC meeting discussions and exercises.

## For All Sworn Supervisors

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation  Leadership	Educate supervisors on the importance of promoting and recognizing empathic acts in employee-community interactions as a way of building public trust.	The Training Division incorporated some of this training into the 2021 Supervisors In-Service Procedural Justice class. Additional training is to be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures  Leadership	Crowd control tactics and fundamentals for supervisors (including overall plan and contingency plans for crowd management, graduated response tactics and related safety, and options).	Some components of this are included in the 2023 In-Service training plans for crowd management. Additional supervisor specific training is to be determined.
Leadership	Effectively leading a Mobile Field Force Team	To be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures  Leadership  General Crowd Management	Provide additional training for sergeants running Mobile Field Force with an emphasis on leadership and decision-making practice and scenarios.	Some components of this were integrated into the 2021 Crowd Control training. General leadership and decision-making skills are being reinforced in the 2022-2 In-Service training on Directive 1010.00.  Additional training is planned for the 2023 In-Service on crowd management.
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Supervisory level training on de-escalation techniques for crowd control events (this may incorporate strategies about general public communications, informing the public of the crowd response decisions and reasons, collaboration and unified messaging among City government, communications to businesses, and collaborating with community groups interested in maintaining public peace and safety). This may also include an understanding of crowd psychology, and principles from the Elaborated social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.	Some components of this are included in the 2023 In-Service training plans for crowd management. Additional supervisor specific training is to be determined.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Leadership	Implementing internal legitimacy and procedural justice during and after protesting events to increase the effectiveness of crowd response efforts and maintain organizational health factors such as morale and employee retention.	Some components pertaining to implementation during a protest is included in the 2023 In-Service training plans for crowd management. Additional supervisor specific training is to be determined.
Reporting / Documentation	<p>Assign specific personnel outside of public order actions to review force and write the after actions.</p> <p>These members will need training regarding the specific tools and procedures of the specialized team for crowd management, when reinstituted.</p>	<p>This training is to be determined. This is awaiting the identification of members who are going to do After Action Reports for large-scale incidents and decisions regarding the specialized team for crowd management.</p>

#### For All Sworn Members

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	<p>Managing protestors engaged in aggressive and challenging behaviors (e.g., surrounding or blocking police vehicles, breaking into precincts, surrounding a law enforcement individual or group such as a Mobile Field Force).</p> <p>Incorporate into training examples from past events, contingency planning, response effectiveness, and what-if scenarios.</p>	<p>Part of this training was included during the 2021 online training. Some components of this are included in the 2023 In-Service scenario training plans for crowd management.</p> <p>Additional training is to be determined. The Bureau is considering creating some debriefs that include what occurred at the street level and related thought processes.</p>



Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	<p>Provide training on methods for strengthening police-community relations specific to crowd management situations, such as transparent communication, empathic acts, casual/individualized interactions, etc. Include communication skills that may promote greater dialogue and understanding between the police and the community.</p> <p>This may include some aspects of crowd psychology, facilitation and communication methods, knowing the local protest culture, and principles from the Elaborated Social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.</p>	The Training Division incorporated some of this training topic into the 2021 Supervisors In-Service Procedural Justice class. Additional training is planned for the Crowd Management Incident Command Program class in the 2023 In-Service training.
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Effective de-escalation techniques for crowd control events. Including training on response tactics that are perceived as “less threatening” by citizens during crowd control events; such as employing “out of sight” response strategies, graduated responses, targeted arrest strategies, avoiding the use of chemical agents, etc.	This training is planned for the Crowd Management Incident Command Program class in the 2023 In-Service training.
Directives, Law, and Policy	Directives, Law, and Standard Operating Procedures pertaining to crowd management (including clarity on the use of force for crowd management, the Temporary Restraining Order, law enforcement use of recording devices related laws and policy, definition of press, and concrete guidance for how law enforcement can effectively apply these laws in crowd management situations). <sup>43</sup>	Some of this training is currently being conducted through an online training session. Additional training is planned for the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management.

<sup>43</sup> This may include the following:

HB2928, Regulates use of chemical incapacitants, projectiles, sound devices by law enforcement

HB3059, Relates to unlawful assemblies and arresting of people who do not disperse

HB3164, Interfering with a police officer

HB3355, ID requirements for law enforcement during crowd management

HB4208, Use of teargas for crowd management

TRO, the Temporary Restraining Order for PPB

635.10 Crowd Management Directive

1010.00 Use of Force Directive

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Officer Safety  General Crowd Management	Situational awareness and ambush preparedness specific to crowd control situations. Including continuing to provide training to officers regarding the rearguard security and cases where this may be particularly helpful in crowd control situations.	Further integrate this into the Mobile Field Force training, emphasizing the importance of the rearguard and cases where that may be helpful, and integrating other tactics pertaining to officer safety.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures  General Crowd Management	Potential Bureau strategies and contingency plans for addressing different types of crowd control situations.	This training is planned for the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management.
Officer Safety	Provide training to all sworn members pertaining to situational awareness and ambushes specifically to Crowd Control events (including knowledge and study on violent crowds, information regarding related tactics to distract and/or agitate officers, and the inherent dangers of direct action events).	Training for supervisors is being considered for the Supervisors In-Service. Training for all sworn is be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Provide additional training on Control Tactics techniques utilized in Crowd Control situations.	Components of baton and OC spray training is planned for the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management. Additional training is to be determined.
Reporting / Documentation	Refresher training for all officers and supervisors in the use of RegJIN force codes.	This was included in the 2021 Crowd Control training. The Training Division is considering reinforcing this through the 2023 In-Service training, a reminder email, or through Incident Action Plan processes.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Crowd control tactics and fundamentals (including crowd arrest procedures, rail use safety training, shield training, and Mobile Field Force movement).	Part of this training is planned for the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation  Officer Safety	Maintaining composure during unrelenting, hostile situations. This may include some components of crowd dynamics and the importance of maintaining composure to increase chances of calming the violence, stress inoculation training, and options available to officers to break from the violence if needed.	Some of this is being integrated into the 2023 In-Service training. Additional training is to be determined.
Directives, Law, and Policy	Incorporate information from the District Attorney's Office regarding the filing and prosecution of protest-related cases.	To be determined. The Training Division will be collecting more information regarding this topic.
Use of Force	Training for all members on force justification specific to the use of force in crowd management situations.	Part of this training was conducted during the 2021 Crowd Control training. Additional training, including scenario-based and applied training, is currently planned for the 2023 In-Service on crowd management.
Use of Force	Other use of force decision making (including what is important for preventing litigation, what constitutes a crowd, and if the Conducted Electrical Weapon can be utilized when arresting a combative subject during a crowd event).	This training is planned for the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management.
Use of Force	Use of force reporting (including providing training to all members on the following force terminology as it pertains to batons to ensure consistent reporting: shove, push and strike; and force reporting audit deficiencies that apply to current reporting processes and requirements).	Some components of this were integrated into the 2021 Crowd Control training. Additional training is also planned for the 2022 In-Service on Directive 1010.00 and the 2023 In-Service training on crowd management.
Reporting / Documentation  Directives, Law, and Policy	Investigation and litigation preparation. Familiarize members with the processes, and related directive articulation and documentation.	To be determined.

#### For Specialized Public Order Unit

During the time of this reporting, the Bureau is in the process of developing the plans for a new specialized team for public order. This section will be further developed once more information is known. At this time, the following needs for this Unit have been discussed.

The training will be coordinated with the Training Division to ensure consistency in the Bureau training curriculum and have additional support pertaining to the evaluation of training and tracking of training needs.

All grenadiers will receive training at least every six months per the Temporary Restraining Order.

All members will receive more specialized training for crowd management than was done previously. A set schedule for these maintenance training requirements will be established, such as one day per month.

The training will include more stress inoculation training, crowd psychology, and public order methodology.

Including training that focuses on all hazards to ensure that they are well-rounded and able to rapidly adapt to evolving tactics.

#### For Public Order Bike Program

The certification and maintenance training plans for the Bike Program need to be reassessed within the next year. The use of bike squads are more frequently recommended for crowd management. The Bureau no longer has the specialized bike unit for crowd management as it was a component of the Rapid Response Team. Many of the general bike certified members that could be assigned to crowd management have not received training or been deployed using the current equipment.

#### For 40mm Operator Program

The following training needs have been identified for the 40mm Operator Program:

A day of training to the regular 40mm Operator Certification Program, in order to include curriculum specific to crowd management. This certification program is for regular patrol operators. These members can be tasked with some operator roles during crowd management situations.

A regularly scheduled 40mm Operator In-Service that incorporates crowd management specific applications.

## Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Training

The following list of FEMA training needs have been identified for Bureau members.<sup>44</sup> Additional FEMA training needs are anticipated to be identified as the Bureau works through the crowd response recommendations.

FEMA Training	People to Attend	# of Members Completed (Since 1/1/2020)	# of Members to Complete <sup>45</sup>	Training Status
IS-100: Introduction to Incident Command System	All Bureau Members	240	40	In progress
IS-700: National Incident Management System	All Bureau Members	246	42	In progress
IS-200: Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS-200	All Sergeants, Lieutenants, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	154	9	In progress
IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction	All Sergeants, Lieutenants, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	135	18	In progress
ICS-300: Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents	All Sergeants and above, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	133	21	In progress
G0191: Emergency Operations Center/Incident Command System Interface	All Lieutenants and above	32	15	In progress

<sup>44</sup> Additional information regarding these trainings is included in the General Management for Crowd Situations section.

<sup>45</sup> Some members have been more recently assigned these trainings due to promotions or hiring. Members have a year to complete the trainings once assigned.

FEMA Training	People to Attend	# of Members Completed (Since 1/1/2020)	# of Members to Complete	Training Status
ICS-400: Advanced Incident Command System for Command and General Staff Complex Incidents	All Lieutenants and above, and PIOs	51	14	In progress
ICS-402: Emergency Management Director Briefing	Chief, DC, AC's	3	2	The scheduling of another local training session is currently in progress.
E/L0967: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Logistics Section Chief Course*	All those assigned to Logistics Section Chief	0	5	In progress
IS-29: Public Information Officer Awareness	All Bureau and IMT PIO staff	3	0	In progress
G0290 or E/L/K0105: Basic Public Information Officer	PIO Sergeants and Professional Staff Supervisors	1	TBD	To be determined. Need to find a course for members to travel to or request to host it.
MGT314: Enhanced Incident Management at Texas A&M TEEX*	All IMT members	10	4	In progress
ICS-305: USFA O-305, Type 3 All-Hazards Incident Management Team*	All IMT members	TBD	TBD	To be determined.
EO388: Advanced PIO*	All PIO Staff	TBD	TBD	To be determined.

\*These trainings are not required for maintaining NIMS compliance.

### Additional Potential Training Needs

There are several recommendations still pending other decisions, such as legislative decisions, City decisions, changes to reporting processes, and the status of the Rapid Response Team (RRT). These recommendations include the following and will be reassessed for any training implications after additional information is known.

PPB should continue to work with the City to implement the body-worn camera program.

PPB should bolster its ability to observe, identify, track, and apprehend individuals committing criminal activity.

Continue to build positive relations with our outside law enforcement agencies by continuing to train with them.

The City should work with State officials to develop a program that allows for continued training with National Guard members and a protocol for their assistance during emergencies.

Regional basic and biannual group training should continue to include National Guard units to maintain the operational familiarity and cohesiveness of all units involved.

Explore expanding the regional basic and biannual group training to include more agencies and possibly agencies from Washington State.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to develop a definition of press for the Portland Police Bureau policy.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to seek modifications to the Temporary Restraining Order, to allow for reasonable response options.

The Portland Police Bureau and the City should continue to identify ways to provide better protective gear to members responding to the crowd control events. This includes continuing to research protective film that can be placed over the helmet shields to provide laser protection and uniform protective gear.

Create a system in SharePoint Enterprise that would allow for the tracking of information related to arrests in a centralized location, which could be used by the PIO's office for faster communications.

Find ways for the Bureau to better track, and report on, officer injuries during protest events.

Update Standard Operating Procedures for Formal and Field arrest to reflect the learned efficiencies.

Review use of force policy to develop an abbreviated Force Data Collection Report and process to better streamline the capturing of data and flow of review for public order force reports.

The Portland Police Bureau should look for ways to connect video to After Action Reports that are in the process or have been completed and find ways to incorporate them in the analysis. Depending on timelines and when evidence may be received, this could be challenging.

Consider developing a system (potentially using SharePoint Enterprise) to collect and track subject injury reported to the Field Arrest Team to ensure it was followed up on and the appropriate documentation was completed by the arresting officer. This would be to capture injuries reported by persons in custody after they had been transferred to the Field Arrest Team.

Create a box for members to check if the video or photos observed are taken by non-Portland Police Bureau persons.

### Training For Other Government Officials and Boards

The following are recommendations pertaining to providing training for those involved but not necessarily part of law enforcement.

Incident Command System training for those with policy-level input so they understand their role and the development of the objective and planning processes to enable an event to run more effectively.

Crowd management training should be provided to elected officials to help provide an understanding of crowd dynamics and Portland Police Bureau capabilities.

Specific training on techniques, tools, and force should also be mandatory for any Portland Police Bureau or community member who participate in Public Review Boards related to crowd management events.



## CLOSING SUMMARY

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Since 2020, national progress has been made in additional research regarding crowd management, upgrades to training, and the development of national standards. Reports since the 2020 protests further confirm that the protesting dynamics have been significantly changing over the last several years, impacting law enforcement responses and planning.

Since the last report, the Bureau has made substantial progress in crowd management preparedness. This includes, but is not limited to, reviewing the national developments, training members in the Incident Command System, conducting research into less lethal devices and safety considerations, obtaining clarifications of law changes, revising policy, updating and creating new curriculum for crowd management, reviewing information for understanding local protesting groups' mission(s) and goals, reinstituting the Incident Management Team meetings, and training planning.

The Bureau will continue to work towards its goals for crowd management preparedness. Some of the next steps include further discussions pertaining to the establishment of a new specialized team, delivering a crowd management training to all sworn members in 2023, developing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with other local law enforcement agencies, implementing the FEMA National Qualification System, and further research regarding less lethal devices.

Some of the main challenges to accomplishing the crowd management preparedness goals are the Bureau's staffing limitations, funding for specialized less lethal research and training, remaining obstacles for developing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with other local law enforcement agencies, and some of the legal constraints. Although there may have been some improvements in this area, having a more unified strategy among local government officials for promoting peaceful protesting and resolving or preventing protest-related violence may be critical.

The Training Division will continue to collect and analyze information to support the training needs assessment and planning processes. In 2022, the Training Division obtained one Sergeant and one full-time instructor with expertise in crowd management and the Incident Command System. Maintaining these designated positions for crowd management training and preparation within the Bureau will be critical for the continual progress of this work.


## APPENDIX A: PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU SWORN STAFFING DISPARITY

The Portland Police Bureau's sworn staffing levels continue to be a concern for crowd management preparedness, as well as for general operations. With the limited police response to protests, this has been a less frequent difficulty for staffing the protests themselves during the past year although this was an influencing factor for at least one of the protests. This also continues to limit the ability of the communications and community outreach components of crowd management.

It also continues to impact the Bureau's ability to conduct training and other preparations for crowd management, and to meet the Bureau's goals and community expectations. The Bureau would also be unable to meet the staffing demands if numerous major incidents were to occur again.

The Portland Police Bureau sworn staffing numbers have been substantially lower than the average rate for police jurisdictions of a similar size for many years. Concerns regarding the low sworn staffing levels for the City of Portland have been recognized and discussed for many years.<sup>46</sup> Despite this, the disparity has been worsening over time and the staffing challenges are further exacerbated by difficulties in hiring and retaining officers. Both the number of authorized and working sworn positions decreased further in 2022. The current authorized sworn staffing counts are the lowest they have been since 1992, and the actual sworn staffing counts are the lowest they have been since the collection of that information (2002).

The following graph provides the rate of sworn Portland Police Bureau staffing given the inhabitant population in Portland. The amount of authorized and working (currently staffed) sworn staff were obtained from the Business Services Division,<sup>47</sup> and the population estimates were obtained from the Oregon Population Research Center<sup>48</sup>. The red line represents the 2019 national average amount of sworn members for police jurisdictions of a similar population size to Portland.



\*The population counts for 2021 were utilized for this calculation, since the numbers for 2022 are not yet available.

<sup>46</sup> In 2015, the City contracted with Matrix Consulting Group for a Police Bureau Staffing Study. The results of this study recommended adding additional positions. In 2016, the City of Portland conducted another analysis of patrol staffing needs. While noting that the previous staffing study's (since 2013) projected staffing capacity had not yet been met, it estimated that in order to accomplish the current expectations for policing an even greater amount of patrol officers were needed.

<sup>47</sup> This information was obtained in September 2021 and updated in August 2022.

<sup>48</sup> This was obtained through their population estimate reports which can be found at Population Estimate Reports | Portland State University (pdx.edu).

The following chart demonstrates the amount of sworn members the Portland Police Bureau would need to match different benchmarks based on the jurisdiction location or population.

882 Authorized Positions 776 Currently Filled Positions <sup>49</sup>	Portland Police Bureau Sworn Staffing Levels as of July 1, 2022	Portland Police Bureau's Budgeting Office
Amount of Sworn Members PPB would need to meet the following standards: <sup>50</sup>		
1,713 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of a similar population size (26 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics <sup>51</sup>
1,364 Sworn Positions	The national median amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of a similar population size (20.7 sworn/10,000 pop)	Governing calculations of the 2016 FBI UCR Statistics <sup>52</sup>
1,515 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of all sizes (23 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics
1,054 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of all sizes in the West of the nation. (16 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics

Although identifying the exact amount of sworn members Portland needs requires a more in-depth analysis,<sup>53</sup> this information provides support that the staffing amounts are concerning. This is an essential factor for understanding on-the-job outcomes and understanding how to enhance Bureau outcomes for the future.

<sup>49</sup> These staffing counts are recorded at the end of June of each year. These numbers reflect the staffing counts at the time of July 1, 2022.

<sup>50</sup> These numbers are slightly less compared to the 2021 crowd management report, due to the decrease in population size of Portland.

<sup>51</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigations (Fall 2020). FBI UCR Statistics: Full-time Law Enforcement Officers, by Region and Geographic Division by Population Group, Number, and Rate per 1,000 Inhabitants, 2019. Retrieved on September 21, 2021 from <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/table-71/table-71.xls#overview>

<sup>52</sup> Maciag, M. (2014, May 7: Updated July 2018). Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities. *Governing*. Retrieved September 21, 2021. <https://www.governing.com/archive/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-departments.html>

<sup>53</sup> There are different approaches to assessing sworn staffing needs. Population is one important consideration but there are also many others influencing jurisdiction characteristics such as crime rates and calls for service, the amount of influx of people to a City (e.g., for employment, tourism, social), the amount of public events to manage (e.g., protesting, parades), and public expectations of law enforcement (e.g., influencing time required on calls, community engagement).

## APPENDIX B: PROTEST-RELATED CRIMINAL OFFENSES

The Training Division continues to review protest related crime information. This included reviewing the Incident Command System reports, offense statistics obtained from the Strategic Services Division, and Portland Police Bureau press releases.

The protest related crime in Portland has continued to decrease. There were 159 reported offenses from July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022. This included some serious person crimes, including one protester being killed<sup>54</sup>. There were no burglaries or robberies.

The following provides the Portland Police Bureau offense statistics for protest related crimes for the timeframe of July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Olmos, S., Ramzy, A., & Delkic, M. (2022, February 20). One dead in shooting at Portland protest against police violence. The New York Times. Retrieved October 20, 2022, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/20/us/portland-shooting-protest.html>

<sup>55</sup> The offense statistics were obtained from the Strategic Services Division in September 2022.



## PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION




### Reported Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland July 1, 2021 - June 30, 2022

This report provides offense statistics reported to the Portland Police Bureau during a protest or demonstration between July 1, 2021 - June 30, 2022.

These statistics only include known protest or demonstrations where a police report was submitted and a protests/demonstrations offense code was applied to the case, regardless of whether a crime occurred. The presence of an offense code does not indicate the size of the protest event or the type of response from PPB. Statistics may include a small number of offenses that are related to a protest case but occurred during a non-protest incident (ie: a warrant arrest at a protest for a separate non-protest incident). The statistics do not include protest/demonstration cases that occurred in Portland but were reported by another law enforcement agency.

Total Days with a Known Protest	30
Total Reported Protest-Related Cases	91
Total Reported Group A Offenses	72
Total Reported Offenses	159

Total Days with a Known Protest is the count of days with a police report containing a protest/demonstration offense. Total Reported Protest-Related Cases is the count of cases with a protest/demonstration offense plus any related cases. Total Reported Group A Offenses is the total number of reported NIBRS Group A offenses during a protest or related case. Total Reported Offenses is the total number of reported offenses during a protest or related case. This includes Group A offenses as well as Group B and Traffic offenses. Disorderly Conduct accounts for about 48% of these offenses (77 offenses).



#### Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between July 1, 2021 and June 30, 2022. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on August 31, 2022.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on August 31, 2022



## PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Reported NIBRS Group A Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland  
July 1, 2021 - June 30, 2022

This report groups the NIBRS Group A offenses into custom reporting categories to better highlight key offenses of interest.

Person	Aggravated Assault	7
	Murder/Negligent Manslaughter	1
	Simple Assault/Intimidation	4
	Total	12
Property	Arson	4
	Vandalism	55
	Total	59
Society	Weapons Law Violations	1
	Total	1
Total Group A Offenses		72

### Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between July 1, 2021 and June 30, 2022. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on August 31, 2022.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on August 31, 2022

## APPENDIX C: LITERATURE RESEARCH FOR LESS LETHAL RESEARCH SECTION

The following is a list of literature articles that have been reviewed for the less lethal research.

Alpert, G., Smith, M., Kaminski, R., Fridell, L., MacDonald, J., & Kubu, B. (2011). *NIJ Research in Brief: Police use of force, tasers and other less-lethal weapons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Ashcroft, J., Daniels, D., & Hart, S. (2004). *NIJ Research for Practice: Impact munitions use types, targets, effects*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs.

Ashcroft, J., Daniels, D., & Hart, S. (2003). *NIJ Research for Practice: The effectiveness and safety of pepper spray*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs.

Brito, D., Challoner, K., Sehgal, A., & Mallon, W. (2001). *The injury pattern of a new law enforcement weapon: The police bean bag*. *Annals of Emergency Medicine*. Doi: 10.1067/mem.2001.117272

Department of Health and Human Services (2003). *NIOSH Health hazard evaluation report: Fort Collins Police Services*. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. HETA # 2002-0131-2898.

extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2002-0131-2898.pdf

E-LABS, Inc. (2003). *Performance characterization study: Noise Flash Diversionary Devices (NFDDs)*.

National Criminal Justice Reference Service.

extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205642.pdf

Kenny, J., Heal, S., & Grossman, M. (2001). *The Attribute-Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extended-Range, Impact Munitions*. Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

Haar, R., Iacopino, V., Ranadive, N., Weiser, S., & Dandu, M. (2017). *Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray*. *BMC Public Health*. DOI 10.1186/s12889-017-4814-6.

Hughes, E., Kenny, J., Heal, S., Kaufman, P. (2007). *An Attribute Based Evaluation II (ABE-2) of Less-Lethal Impact Munitions*. The Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies at Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

Heal, C. S. (2020). *Concepts of nonlethal force: Understanding force from shouting to shooting*. Brooklyn, NY: Lantern Publishing & Media.

MacDonald, J.M., Kaminski, R.J., & Smith, M.R. (2009). The Effect of less-lethal weapons on injuries in police use-of-force events. *American Journal of Public Health*, 99, 2268-2274.

Mesloh, C., Collie, K., Gibson, L., Werbalis, J., & Grimes, J. (2009). *Performance evaluation of chemical agent delivery systems*. Law Enforcement Executive Forum.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263808310\\_Performance\\_Evaluation\\_of\\_Chemical\\_Agent\\_Delivery\\_Systems/link/0f31753becfe589a2d000000/download](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263808310_Performance_Evaluation_of_Chemical_Agent_Delivery_Systems/link/0f31753becfe589a2d000000/download)

Mesloh, C., Henych, M., & Wolf, R. (2008). *Less lethal weapon effectiveness, use of force, and suspect & officer injuries: A Five-Year Analysis*. Florida Gulf Coast University: Weapons & Equipment Research Institute. (Document No. 224081)

Olson, K.A. et al. (2020). Penetrating Injuries from “Less Lethal” beanbag munitions. *The New England Journal of Medicine*. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2025923

Petty, C. (2004). *Deaths in police confrontations when oleoresin capicum is used*. U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs. (Document No. 204029)  
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204029.pdf

Rothenberg, C., Satyanarayana, A., Svendsen, E. & Jordt, S. (2016). *Tear gas: An epidemiological and mechanistic reassessment*. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.

Semple, T., Jenkins, B., & Bennell, C. (2021). Injuries and deaths proximate to oleoresin capicum spray deployment: A literature review. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 94, 184-205.

Watson, W., Stremel, K., & Westdrop, E. (1996). Oleoresin capicum (Cap-Stun) toxicity from aerosol exposure. *The Annals of Pharmacotherapy*, 30, 733-735.

Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center. (2010). *A Guidebook for Less-Lethal Devices: Planning for, selecting, and implementing technology solutions*. State College, PA: The Pennsylvania State University’s Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center.

Wyant, R.T. (2016). 40MM Less-Lethal: Are you losing effectiveness with Multi-Shot Launchers? *Tactical Edge*, 58-60.

Wyant, R.T., & Burns, T. (2014). *Risk management of less lethal options: evaluation, deployment, aftermath, and forensics* (Allgire, J.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.



## APPENDIX D: PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES

In order to gain an accurate understanding of community and stakeholder perspectives regarding crowd management events in 2021, it was important to gather input from a variety of sources and varying community perspectives. Due to staffing limitations, the Training Division was unable to conduct as extensive outreach for gathering public perspectives, compared to last year. Input was still collected in a variety of formats, including discussions, letters and emails, and questionnaires.<sup>56</sup> The results continue to provide valuable findings that builds upon the previously collected information.

### *Sources of Information*

Input from representatives of Neighborhood Associations

Input from advisory councils including the Training Advisory Council

Input from the Portland Business Alliance

Input from letters and emails written to the Portland Police Bureau (PPB)

### *Summary of Perspectives and Impacts*

#### *Social Media*

Input obtained from community and neighborhood association members suggest social media was as an effective means of communication during crowd control events. The social media posts from the PPB accounts can provide meaningful information such as public safety resource messages to help members prepare themselves in case there is a planned or unplanned response, explain the action of events that will transpire (i.e. real-time) or had transpired, and provide meaningful educational information to the public.

In 2021, the Strategic Communications Unit reached out internally to the precincts and asked if officers would be interested in posting on social media (specifically on Instagram and Twitter).<sup>57</sup> The interested members were provided training via the Bureau's Learning Management System (LMS) before posting content to the Bureau's social media platforms. This allowed for precincts to provide the public with direct information about crimes and events in their geographical area. Additionally, the social media posts provide a platform in which they can collaborate with local media outlets to communicate objective and factual information while promoting transparency about the events themselves as well as police management of those events.

#### *Calls for Service*

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Police Bureau has been impacted by staffing shortages. Some of these members have retired, left the profession altogether, or relocated to a different geographical area. Additionally, the hiring of new recruit officers and Public Safety Support Specialists was briefly

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<sup>56</sup> To preserve anonymity, all those that were interviewed were provided a written and/or verbal statement that names would not be linked to specific quotes or information provided and that reporting would be done in aggregate.

<sup>57</sup> To read more about the Strategic Communications Unit, see the 2021 Police Annual Report pgs. 16-19.

placed on hold because of budgetary reasons but this process has since resumed. With fewer police officers on the streets, this has led to an increased demand in calls for service.

Compared to the last two years, there has been a decreased amount of civil unrest and protests within the City of Portland. Some members of the public, including members who reside outside of the Portland-metro area, have provided written commentary through the TrackIT application on the City's website. The information received was similar to commentary provided last year albeit in a drastically lesser quantity. The common themes include the police bureau's lack of response or presence at planned events, the lack of communication through social media regarding the protest events, and the ongoing vandalism and property destruction occurring within the City.

One of the areas for improvement that was noted by several individuals, is the communication and customer service lag between officers and businesses, crime victims, and/or witnesses. Some of these members are not receiving communication from the assigned patrol officer or not receiving communication in a timely manner. For the businesses, who have experienced a theft, detained the person(s) through their loss prevention programs, and would like to press charges, have found themselves letting the suspect(s) go because there was no communication from an officer after a police report had been generated. It was expressed that even if the businesses received a call, stating that no officers were available, this would be preferred to no communication at all. This absence of communication between the businesses and officers may be eroding community support for police services.

Additionally, through the course of this publication, an additional concern was raised about how the City and police bureau will manage large-scale events, both planned and unplanned, without the Rapid Response Team (RRT). This unit was responsible for policing protests within the City and in June of 2021, all of the members of RRT resigned from this voluntary position. Several members of the public have suggested that information be provided on how the City plans to address this issue. Consequently, it was also asked which surrounding agencies would be willing to assist and support the Portland Police Bureau if the officers are overwhelmed by a large-scale event. In mid to late 2020, several law enforcement agencies stated they would no longer aid PPB in policing protests due to concerns regarding the City's decision to reduce the Portland Police Bureau's budget, the District Attorney's decision to limit the prosecution of crime, and the extra liabilities of policing in Portland.<sup>58</sup>

### *Community Support*

Some members of the public, including members who reside outside of the Portland-metro area, have provided supportive written commentary through the TrackIT application on the City's website. Not all of the commentary pertained to crowd control events. Some of the common themes included

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<sup>58</sup> A few resources pertaining to this are the following:

Clackamas County Sheriff's Office (2020, August 31). Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Response to Governor Brown's Proposed Plan. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Response to Governor Brown's Proposed Plan | Clackamas County

Ramakrishnan, J. (2020, September 2). Clackamas, Washington county sheriffs rebuff Gov. Kate Brown's request to staff Portland protests. *OregonLive*. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Clackamas, Washington county sheriffs rebuff Gov. Kate Brown's request to staff Portland protests - oregonlive.com

Ellis, R. (2020, August 31). Portland-area agencies say they won't help police protests. *OPB*. Retrieved September 7, 2022, from Portland-area agencies say they won't help police protests - OPB

appreciation for police officers who assisted members of the public on a variety of cases (i.e. missing persons, suspicious activity, recovery of stolen property, and mental health related calls), asking how best to support the Portland Police Bureau (i.e. who to speak to or write to in City Hall), community engagement activities, ideas for assistance (i.e. having members of the public submitting information through an application regarding possible stolen vehicles), and words of encouragement.

There were also messages written about recent and past protest events, inquiries about hiring new officers, future plans, and criticism of local politicians. One member expressed that they understood the staffing crisis within the police bureau would not be solved overnight but they would like communication on how PPB plans to be a more effective agency in the future. Another member commented how much they appreciated officers willing to go to work every day despite the law enforcement legislation changes happening at all levels of the government. One person wrote how they were disappointed regarding the investigations into the Portland Police Bureau and suggested the Department of Justice also needed to look into the protesters who abused officers by throwing objects. Lastly, two individuals commented how the defund the police movement has led to a rise in crime rates.

### *Communication for Public Education*

One of the overarching themes that has emerged through the course of this report is that the public would like to receive more communication from the Portland Police Bureau. This communication should not be limited to social media posts regarding planned events, civil unrest or protests, but rather it should include useful information to help maximize public safety. The Public Information Officer (PIO) has the ability to communicate through a variety of social media platforms to introduce a variety of law enforcement educational topics to members of the public. These topics should include but are not limited to: where and how to make a police report online, where and how to make a police records request, when is it appropriate to call non-emergency versus 911, text to 911, the distinctions between the Project Respond and the Portland Street Response, how to safely practice your first amendment rights at an event, and reporting and requesting City services through [pdxreporter.org](https://pdxreporter.org). By providing this information publicly on social media platforms, the Portland Police Bureau can help members of the public by providing them with tools and some basic knowledge of law enforcement as well as help restore community support for police services.

### *Part of a Larger System*

Another predominant theme that surfaced was that of PPB serving as only one part of a larger system that needs to be assessed. Several individuals suggested more coordinated leadership across the local agencies and city leaders as well as at the state and national level. The various local and federal agencies that have assisted in Portland not only had conflicting tactics and strategies, but their objectives also did not align with PPB's crowd management policies. Furthermore, it was mentioned that any poor decisions made by these external agencies ended up reflecting poorly on the Portland Police Bureau. Other aspects that were addressed were deficiencies in the Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) and the unacceptable long wait times for 911. Additionally, several people highlighted the important role the public plays and the critical aspect of personal responsibility. Whether it be reporting a crime or practicing your first amendment right, the direction of an event often lies firmly on the behavior of individuals.

## APPENDIX E: LITERATURE RESEARCH FOR PROTESTING GROUPS SECTION

The following is a list of literature that has been reviewed by the Portland Police Bureau's Training Division for this section of research, during the timeframe of this report.

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. New York, NY: Currency, Crown Publishing Group.

Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

Bray, M. (2017). *Antifa: The Anti-Fascist handbook*. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing.

Brown, R., Helmus, T., Ramchand, R., Palimaru, Al, Weiland, S., Rhoades, A., & Hiatt, L. (2021). *Violent extremism in America: Interviews with former extremists and their families on radicalization and deradicalization*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). *White supremacy groups in the United States*.  
<https://www.counterextremism.com/content/white-supremacy-groups-united-states>

Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). *Extreme left groups in the United States*.  
<https://www.counterextremism.com/content/extreme-left-groups-united-states>

CrimeThinc.com (n.d.). Between electoral politics and civil war: Anarchists confront the 2020 election. Retrieved December 1, 2020, from <https://crimethinc.com/2020/10/21/between-electoral-politics-and-civil-war-anarchists-confront-the-2020-election>

CrimeThinc.com (n.d.). Tools and tactics in the Portland Protests: From leaf blowers and umbrellas to lasers, balloon, and power tools. Retrieved October 3, 2020, from <https://crimethinc.com/2020/08/03/tools-and-tactics-in-the-portland-protests-from-leaf-blowers-and-umbrellas-to-lasers-bubbles-and-balloons>

CrimeThinc.com (n.d.). *Why we break windows: The effectiveness of political vandalism*. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from [extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cdn.crimethinc.com/assets/zines/why-we-break-windows/why-we-break-windows\\_print\\_black\\_and\\_white.pdf](https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cdn.crimethinc.com/assets/zines/why-we-break-windows/why-we-break-windows_print_black_and_white.pdf)

Gonzalez, M. (2020). *The plot to change America: How identity politics is dividing the land of the free*. New York, NY: Encounter Books.

Jackson, B., Rhoades, A., Reimer, J., Lander, N., Costello, K., & Beaghley, S. (2019). *Practical terrorism prevention: Reexamining U.S. National approaches to addressing the threat of ideologically motivated violence*. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation.

Kiley, B. (2012). Why all the smashy-smashy? A beginner's guide to targeted property destruction. Retrieved July 6, 2021, from <https://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/05/02/why-all-the-smashy-smashy-a-beginners-guide-to-targeted-property-destruction>

Maguire, Edward R. (2015). New directions in protest policing. *Saint Louis University Public Law Review*, 35. <https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6>

Ngo, A. (2002). *Unmasked: Inside Antifa's radical plan to destroy democracy*. New York, NY: Center Street.

No author (n.d.) *Vol. 1 ACRID Trajectory of an uprising*. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from <https://rosecitycounterinfo.noblogs.org/2020/10/acrid-vol-1-trajectory-of-an-uprising/>

Program on Extremism (2021). *Anarchist/Left-wing violent extremism in America: Trends in radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization*. The George Washington University.

Sharp, G. (2012) *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. New York, NY: The New Press.

Sharp, G. (n.d.) *There are Realistic Alternatives*. The Albert Einstein Institution.

Sharp, G. & Jenkins, B. (n.d.) *The Anti-Coup*. The Albert Einstein Institution.

The Ruckus Society (n.d.) *Action Strategy: A How-To Guide*. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from <https://ruckus.org/training-manuals/the-action-strategy-guide/>

The following is a list of literature that has been reviewed by the Portland State University for this section of research, during the timeframe of this report.

Asal, V., Chermak, S. M., Fitzgerald, S., & Freilich, J. D. (2016). Organizational-level characteristics in right-wing extremist groups in the United States over time. *Criminal Justice Review*, 45(2), 250–266. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0734016815626970>

Behera, N. C., Hinds, K., & Tickner, A. B. (2021). Making amends: Towards an antiracist critical security studies and international relations. *Security Dialogue*, 52(1\_suppl), 8–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211024407>

Borum, R. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Psychology of Terrorism Initiative. Tampa: University of South Florida.

Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). *White supremacy groups in the United States*. Retrieved May 30, 2022, from <https://www.counterextremism.com/content/white-supremacy-groups-united-states>

Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). *Extreme left groups in the United States*. Retrieved May 30, 2022, from <https://www.counterextremism.com/content/extreme-left-groups-united-states>

Dresser, P. (2019). PREVENT policing in practice—the need for evidenced-based research. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 15(2), 716–726. <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paz049>

Finkelstein, J., Goldenberg, A., Stevens, S., Jussim, L., Farmer, J., Donohue, J. K., & Paresky, P. (n. d.). *Network-Enabled Anarchy: How Militant Anarcho-Socialist Networks Use Social Media to Instigate Widespread Violence Against Political Opponents and Law Enforcement. A Contagion and Ideology Report*. Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience, Network Contagion Research Institute. NCRI-White-Paper-Network-Enabled-Anarchy-25- Sept-259pm.pdf.

Gill, P., Silver, J., Horgan, J., Corner, E., & Bouhana, N. (2021). Similar crimes, similar behaviors? comparing lone-actor terrorists and public mass murderers. *Journal for Forensic Sciences*, 66, 1797-1804. DOI: 10.1111/1556-4029.14793

Hou, M., Jia, L., & Tan, J. (2020). To tip off or not? predicting gatekeepers' reporting intentions of a deviant close-other through desirability and feasibility. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 27(9), 890–913. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2020.1863404>

Jackson, B. A., Rhoades, A. L., Reimer, J. R., Lander, N., Costello, K., Beaghley, S. (2019). Building an Effective and Practical National Approach to Terrorism Prevention. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center. RB-10030-DHS. Retrieved from [www.rand.org/t/RB10030](http://www.rand.org/t/RB10030) (07.28.2022).

Kumah-Abiwu, F. (2021). Africa's security landscape of securitised-development and human rights issues. *African Security Review*, 31(1), 99–114. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1980412>

Langman, P. (2019). Desperate identities. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 19(1), 61–84. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12468>

Mazerolle, L., Cherney, A., Eggins, E., Hine, L., & Higginson, A. (2021). Multiagency programs with police as a partner for reducing radicalisation to violence. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 17(2). <https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1162>

Onursal, R., & Kirkpatrick, D. (2019). Is extremism the 'New' terrorism? the convergence of 'extremism' and 'terrorism' in British parliamentary discourse. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 33(5), 1094–1116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1598391>

Pallas, J. (2021). Heed the call: The implied freedom of political communication and the terrorism high-risk offenders regime. *Current Issues in Criminal Justice*, 34(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10345329.2021.1983103>

Sarteschi, C. M. (2021). Sovereign citizens: A narrative review with implications of violence towards law enforcement. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 60, 101509. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2020.101509>

Sausdal, D. (2019). Terrorizing police: Revisiting 'The policing of terrorism' from the perspective of Danish police detectives. *European Journal of Criminology*, 18(5), 755–773. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819874449>

Schils, N., & Verhage, A. (2017). Understanding how and why young people enter radical or violent extremist groups. *International Journal of Conflict & Violence*, 11(2), 1-17.

Schultz, W. J., Bucerius, S. M., & Haggerty, K. D. (2020). The floating signifier of "radicalization": Correctional officers' perceptions of prison radicalization. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 48(6), 828–845. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854820969749>

Shortland, N. D., Evans, N., & Colautti, J. (2021). A public health ethics model of Countering Violent Extremism. *Ethics and Terrorism*, 104–117. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222873-9>

Tetrault, J. E. (2021). Thinking beyond extremism: A critique of counterterrorism research on right-wing nationalist and far-right social movements. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 62(2), 431–449. <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azab062>

Thiessen, C. (2019). The strategic ambiguity of the United Nations approach to preventing violent extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 45(2), 111–132. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1647685>

Weeks, D. (2018). Barking mosque and quintessential insight: Overcoming the problematic government/community counterterrorism partnership in the UK. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 42(8), 735–754. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2018.1425087>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (n. d.). *Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3)*. <https://www.dhs.gov/CP3>

## APPENDIX F: BUREAU ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS

The following is a list of the Bureau Essential Functions<sup>59</sup> as well as an update on dispatch response times and calls for service. While there have been substantial improvements in call response times since the height of the 2020 protests, they have not returned to their normal levels prior to the 2020 protests. This may be due to having further sworn staffing shortages and continued higher amounts of calls for shootings and serious crimes. This will continue to be monitored since it is such an impacting factor for training planning, understanding capabilities for crowd management response, and limits the Bureau's ability for preventative and community engagement work.

### *Bureau Essential Functions*

- Public Safety- Emergency Call Response (Life Safety)
- Public Safety- Major Felony Investigations
- Public Safety- Critical incident response
- Public Safety- Public Information Services
- Public Safety- Custody processing
- Public Safety- Follow up on felony crimes, including traffic crimes
- Public Safety- Planned tactical operations for arrests of violent offenders.
- Public Safety- Planned tactical operations (warrant service)
- Public Safety/Records- Support for case processing of in-custody arrests and non-custody situations
- Business Services- Vehicle Service (through OMF Fleet vehicle service)
- Business Services- Facilities issues (through OMF Facilities)
- Technology- Critical infrastructure maintenance (RMS, LEDS, Radios, Mobile Phones)
- Records- Maintain Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) compliance
- Records- Police report processing
- Records- Mail/Copy
- Records- Process subpoenas
- Records- Information and Records Dissemination
- Property and Evidence- Maintain the ability for members to drop off evidence at a secure storage location/facility or directly to Property and Evidence technicians
- Property and Evidence- Process DNA evidence
- Property and Evidence- Process sexual assault kits

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<sup>59</sup> The Portland Police Bureau's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) had 54 essential functions identified in 2020. Since then, this list has been condensed.





## PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



### Dispatch Response Times & Calls for Service by Precinct


January 1, 2016 - June 30, 2022

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
CITY OF PORTLAND  
prepared August 9, 2022

## NORTH PRECINCT Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)\*

### Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time) by Priority & Year




Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)  
by Priority & Month/Year




\*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

### EAST PRECINCT Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)\*

### Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time) by Priority & Year




Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)  
by Priority & Month/Year




\*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

**CENTRAL PRECINCT** Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)\*

Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)  
by Priority & Year



Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)  
by Priority & Month/Year




\*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

## NORTH PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2021 - June 2022



Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year  
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %




## EAST PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2021 - June 2022




Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year  
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %






## CENTRAL PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2021 - June 2022



Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year  
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU  
TRAINING DIVISION

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