



EVALUATION REPORT

2021 TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT: LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO MASS DEMONSTRATIONS

December 2021



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INTRODUCTION

In late July 2021, the Training Division was assigned to conduct an evaluation of crowd management for the main purpose of identifying related training needs. Throughout this evaluation process, it has been clear there is much complexity regarding this topic, as well as much trauma and strain for community members, local businesses, law enforcement, and the City as a whole. This topic is complex and this is expected to be an ongoing analysis, with additional information incorporated into future studies and reports.

The goal of this summary of the evaluation process and its main findings is to provide information on the Training Division's crowd management evaluation process and what training needs have been identified regarding crowd management. The emphasis of this report is training needs, and therefore does not include recommendations about crowd management that do not have training components. However, some of the references utilized in this report can be reviewed to obtain this additional information.

It is also the hope that this report may help support those in law enforcement and the community who are working towards the courageous endeavor of ensuring safe and peaceful protests in Portland. While working through protest cases, best strategies, understanding of laws, and the impacts of history can be a painful process, it provides a tremendous opportunity for healing and restoration that can positively impact both future protests and other law enforcement interactions.

The Evaluation Process

This evaluation focuses on crowd management events since 2020, assessing the extent that crowd management goals were achieved, challenges to implementation, and training suggestions pertaining to enhancing implementation in the future. To the extent possible, this evaluation process' aim is to have a comprehensive view of these events, including an understanding of contextual factors, local, state, and federal-level decisions pertaining to how the events would be managed, the characteristics of the protests, the law enforcement response to the events, public perceptions of the protesting events and law enforcement response, the impacts of the events, and national best practices for responding to crowd events. Additional focus is spent on areas of particular concern to the community and/or government stakeholders (e.g., use of force, de-escalation, crime, and public perspectives). The evaluation process will expand and add other areas of concern as needed.

The goals for public order used for this evaluation process are the following¹:

Uphold the public's freedoms provided in the Constitution by:

Monitoring public order events in a neutral and impartial manner.

Encouraging self-regulating behavior to maintain safe and peaceful gatherings.

Address criminal actions that only affect the safety or tension of the public or gathering.²

¹ These align with current Portland Police Bureau training and are based on the Madison principles.

² This includes behavior such as setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles at people, launching mortars at buildings, shining lasers at people, threatening others with weapons, assaults, fencing in potentially occupied buildings and setting them on fire, throwing projectiles at passerby vehicles. Some examples that are usually not of concern for response are drone flying,

Maintain open communication with the public and media before, during, and after an event.

Maintain Bureau Essential Functions.

Sources of Information

Many sources of information have been utilized for this evaluation, including the following:

Reports pertaining to recent Portland protests:

Portland Police Bureau After Action Reviews and recommendation reports

Portland Police Bureau's 2020 Crowd Control Audit Results report

Training Advisory Council Coursework Comments and Suggestions reports

Portland Protests 2020: Citizen Review Committee Summary and Recommendations

Police Violence is Hate Violence: Testimonies of Police Brutality from the Streets of Portland report from Portland United Against Hate and Coalition of Communities of Color

Independent Police Review's 2020 Protest Related Cases summary report

Homeland Security's 2021 report: DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities

Data: pertaining to injuries, officer use of force, crime, Portland Police staffing levels, protest complaints, commendations/support of the police, dispatched calls, call response times, crowd management training needs, and crowd counts.

Community interviews and feedback: Representatives from Neighborhood Associations, Advisory Councils, Portland Business Alliance and Clean and Safe, and letters and emails written to the Portland Police Bureau³.

Portland Police Bureau interviews and feedback: Incident Command, Incident Management Team, Training Division management, and other crowd management staffing.

Published research articles

News articles

Other: Multnomah County District Attorney's Policy Regarding Protest Related Cases, US District Judge Hernandez' Opinion and Order for the Don't Shoot Portland versus City of Portland and Multnomah County case, Independent Police Review feedback, the 2021 DOJ Compliance Report and the City's response document, and the US District Judge Simon's Temporary Restraining Order for the Index Newspapers LLC *et al* v. City of Portland *et al* case.

blocking most streets, people on buildings, chanting/screaming, people walking around with weapons, and shining lasers at stationary objects.

³ This included over 200 messages sent to the Portland Police Bureau from a variety of public members.

Evaluation Work in Progress

The Training Division is currently in the process of collecting additional information in the following areas:

- The impacts of these events on maintaining Bureau essential functions

- Less lethal safety and options (e.g., the injury risks associated with different use of force methods, which use of force methods are the safest)

- Understanding local protesting groups' mission(s) and goals

- Additional information pertaining to investigated complaints⁴

This information will be incorporated into the evaluation process and future reports as applicable.

Report Format

The following sections of the report provide an overview of the unique factors related to the 2020 protests, public perspectives regarding these protests and law enforcement's response to them, the Bureau's general preparedness for events of this magnitude and duration, sworn member perspectives of future training needs, protest-related use of force, use of de-escalation, crowd response goal analysis, crowd management research, and current training recommendations and planning. In addition, there are several appendices to provide the reader with additional information pertaining to topics within this evaluation process.

Additional Note

It is important to note that throughout the protests of 2020, as well as during this evaluation process, Portland law enforcement has continually expressed appreciation and concern for the peaceful protesting groups, community members generally, and local businesses. While parts of this report will examine the crime that occurred due to the protest activity, this is not a reflection on all, or even most, of those protesting. Many peaceful protestors left when things became violent and/or made efforts to separate from these groups.

⁴ Complaint data and findings from the Independent Police Review and the Professional Standards Division were obtained and reviewed as a part of this evaluation process and are integrated into some of the summaries (e.g., use of force and use of de-escalation sections) and training recommendations in this report. Some of the cases were still pending during the time of this evaluation process. The Training Division is obtaining updated information regarding complaint findings to see if there are any additional implications for future training.

2020 PROTESTS: UNIQUE INFLUENCING FACTORS

This evaluation focused on crowd management events from January 2020 through June 2021⁵. The 2020 part of this timeframe was particularly convoluted by many factors that made the protesting events more challenging for law enforcement, community members, and local businesses. These are important for interpreting the outcomes of the protests and what training and other recommendations may apply to future crowd responses. The following is a brief description of these extraordinary factors.

Amount of Protests and Protestors

There was an unprecedented amount of protests in Portland in 2020, with a greater number of protests and a larger number of people at these events than previous years. The protests pertaining to the murder of George Floyd⁶ lasted over 170 days, with almost nightly civil unrest and crowd numbers of up to 12,600 people. In addition, Portland experienced election-year protests and some additional protests in the fall of 2020. In 2020, the estimated crowd numbers⁷ reached a total of 136,046 people. In comparison, from January through June of 2021, the estimated crowd numbers were 2,978.

Scale of Violence

Although most of the demonstrators were peaceful protesting groups, there was an unusually high number of protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors⁸ at these events. Portland has a long history of public demonstrations and activism and is a central location for some related groups, so higher amounts of protesting during times of national civil unrest are expected. However, the 2020 protests included more violence than is typical of Portland protests. The Training Division will continue to research contributing factors to this throughout its evaluation processes. Potentially contributing factors are: greater anti-police sentiments nationwide, the impacts and additional strain of the COVID-19 global health pandemic, understaffing of law enforcement, and a reduction in crime enforcement.

Thousands of crimes occurred during and in relation to the 2020 protests. The crimes included numerous assaults, arsons, vandalism, burglaries, and weapon law violations. One protestor was shot and killed by another protestor. The weapons used by some of the protestors included firearms, swords, batons, baseball bats, commercial-grade fireworks, M-80 explosives, and Molotov cocktails, all of which can (and in many cases did) cause serious harm. Lasers were shone on flying planes, which is a federal

⁵ The focus of this timeframe ends in June 2021 because this evaluation process began in July 2021. The Training Division will continue to collect data pertaining to protests after June 2021 and related information will be included in future crowd management reports.

⁶ The United States Department of Justice (2021, December 15). Former Minneapolis Police Officer Derek Chauvin Pleads Guilty in Federal Court to Depriving George Floyd and a Minor Victim of Their Constitutional Rights. The United States Department of Justice: Justice News. Retrieved December 22, 2021, from Derek Chauvin pleads guilty to violating George Floyd's rights | Reuters

⁷ Most of the estimated crowd counts (including those for the 2020 George Floyd Protests) were obtained from the Incident Command reports, which include crowd estimates throughout the event. Since many of the protests move around and people may leave and others join a protest within a day, there is no way to have an exact number. This report utilized conservative estimates, only counting the highest crowd size per distinct group for a given day. For a few of the events (primarily some of the 2021 ones), the crowd estimates were obtained from the Crowd Management Incident Commander (if not included in the reports).

⁸ For example, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles at people, launching mortars at buildings, shining lasers at people, threatening others with weapons, assaults, fencing in potentially occupied buildings and setting them on fire, and throwing projectiles at passerby vehicles.

crime and can completely block the pilot's view and cause a plane crash. Lasers capable of causing eye damage were shone in people's eyes.

The targets for the assaults were not solely focused on law enforcement. They included community members, speakers, other emergency responders such as Emergency Medical Services, media members, businesses (including those owned by underrepresented groups), and other demonstrators. Businesses experienced significant losses as their buildings were damaged (some were even set on fire), property stolen, and employees threatened as some of the cases occurred with people armed with chainsaws, guns, and bats.

The police received calls from people just travelling through the area of the protests who were being attacked by demonstrators, such as people being chased by protestors (some armed) and getting trapped in their vehicle with protestors yelling at them and attacking their vehicles.

Information regarding the crime that occurred during the protests was collected from the Portland Police Bureau Incident Command System reports, offense data, and press releases, as well as from external sources. More details regarding the sources and crime occurring in both the 2020 and 2021 protests can be found in Appendix B.

COVID Health Pandemic Impacts

These events occurred during the global COVID-19 pandemic, which had devastating financial and other impacts on the City, many businesses, and community members. A few of those impacts were:

Unemployment rates in Oregon rose higher than those seen during the Great Recession, peaking at 13.2% in April of 2020 (13.2⁹).

Oregon businesses experienced substantial decreases in revenue and an estimated 40 percent experienced temporary business closures.¹⁰

The Portland Police Bureau's staffing was negatively impacted by members having to take time off due to: contracting COVID-19, being exposed to COVID-19 and needing to quarantine, or to care for family members affected by the pandemic.

\$4.2 million had to be allocated to just the COVID-19 impacts on the Portland Police Bureau (primarily due to staffing impacts).¹¹

Additionally, many Police Bureau trainings pertaining to crowd management were postponed or eliminated due to COVID-19 disruptions, such as the 2020 In-Service Mobile Field Force training, two

⁹ State of Oregon Employment Department. (n.d.). Unemployment Estimates (Local Area Unemployment Statistics). Retrieved September 27, 2021, from <https://www.qualityinfo.org/ed-uesti/?at=1&t1=4101000000~unemprate~y~2000~2021>

¹⁰ The Oregon Tourism Commission. (n.d.). COVID-19 Statewide Business Impact Survey Results. Retrieved December 3, 2021, from https://industry.traveloregon.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/TO_COVID-19_impact-survey_exe-summary_FINAL-2.pdf

Travel Oregon and Business Oregon (2020). COVID-19 Business Survey Results. Retrieved September 17, 2021, from <http://www.oregon4biz.com/assets/docs/C19BizSurveyResults.pdf>

¹¹ Information regarding the Portland Police Bureau budget impacts of COVID-19 were obtained from Business Services Division in September 2021.

Rapid Response Team In-Service training sessions, the Sergeants Academy Crowd Control class, and the Rapid Response Team training courses.

Additional research is needed to fully understand the impacts of this pandemic and how they may have influenced the protest activities. However, researchers have noted that “a pandemic event threatens all aspects of the economic and social fabric”¹², and can exacerbate social inequalities, conflicts, and tension between society and institutions.¹³ They have been found to impact individuals’ mental health (including PTSD and high amounts of uncertainty), suicide rates, social health (including isolation), and security¹⁴. Throughout history, health pandemics have been correlated with many revolts, rebellions, and protests occurring during the epidemic or shortly thereafter.¹⁵ It is anticipated that the COVID pandemic impacts may have influenced the 2020 crowd dynamics, some of the unusual behaviors, and amounts of people. The COVID-related policies and procedures also caused a unique situation with downtown Portland being substantially shutdown. This may have reduced the number of people passing through being negatively impacted, which would be a positive impact. However, it also likely reduced the amount of public outcry pertaining to the protest-related destruction as well as opportunities for informal social control to take place¹⁶. The information reviewed to date suggests the pandemic had at least some influence on these unprecedented protests. The Training Division will continue to review this information for insights into how conditions might impact future demonstrations in Portland.

Different Perspectives and Approach for Law Enforcement Response

There were diverging perspectives with extreme differences regarding how law enforcement should respond to the protesting events in Portland. This included differences between federal, state, and local government perspectives. These differences even led to Federal law enforcement taking a more proactive policing response to protect the federal government buildings in Portland, which resulted in different approaches to managing the crowds. For part of the time during the protests, Portland’s City

¹² Drake, T., Chalabi, Z., & Coker, R. (2012). *Cost-effectiveness analysis of pandemic influenza preparedness: what's missing?* Bull World Health Organization, 90, 940-941. (doi: 10.2471/BLT.12.109025)

Qiu, W., Rutherford, S., Mao, A., & Chu, C. (2016-2017). The Pandemic and its Impacts. *University of Pittsburgh, Vol 9–10*, DOI 10.5195/hcs.2017.221.

¹³ Gander, K. (2020, September 7). History tells us epidemics are followed by huge civil unrest for these three reasons. *Newsweek*. Retrieved September 17, 2021, from History Tells Us Epidemics Are Followed by Huge Civil Unrest for These Three Reasons (newsweek.com)

Censolo, R. & Morelli, M. (2020). COVID-19 and the Potential Consequences for Social Stability. *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 26(3),1-5.

¹⁴ Johnson E. Johnson Corporation Counsel (2020). *New York City Law Department Corporation Counsel Report Pursuant to Executive Order 58 (June 20, 2020) Directing an Analysis of Factors Impacting the George Floyd Protest in New York City*. New York City Law Department: Office of the Corporation Counsel.

Censolo, R. & Morelli, M. (2020). COVID-19 and the Potential Consequences for Social Stability. *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 26(3),1-5.

Saladino, V., Algeri, D., & Auriemma, V. (2020). The psychological and social impact of Covid-19: New perspectives of well-being. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, 1-6.

Qiu, W., Rutherford, S., Mao, A., & Chu, C. (2016-2017). The Pandemic and its Impacts. *University of Pittsburgh, Vol 9–10*, DOI 10.5195/hcs.2017.221.

¹⁵ Censolo, R. & Morelli, M. (2020). COVID-19 and the Potential Consequences for Social Stability. *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 26(3),1-5.

¹⁶ Research has found that informal social control and collective efficacy (e.g., influences of community members and their willingness to intervene), in addition to formal social control methods (e.g., policing, laws) are important factors for reducing crime. The following provides an example of this research: Wesburd, D., White, C., Wire, S., & Wilson, D. (2021). Enhancing Informal Social Controls to Reduce Crime: Evidence from a Study of Crime Hot Spots. *Prevention Science*, 22, 509-522.

Council enacted a resolution which banned communications between the Portland Police Bureau and Federal law enforcement authorities who were acting in Portland during this time, complicating efforts to coordinate a crowd control response.¹⁷ A review of the Federal law enforcement response also noted the following challenges: not all of the Department of Homeland Security Officers had the necessary equipment, not all had consistent uniforms and tactics, and not all were trained for cross-designation, riot, and crowd response situations.¹⁸

Having the different approaches to managing the crowd events has also led to some substantial misperceptions of the Portland Police Bureau's response efforts. Both members of the public and government officials have mistakenly attributed some law enforcement response incidents to the Portland Police Bureau.

Law and Application Changes

There were law changes in discussion and made during the time the protests were ongoing. These changes impacted police use of force, use of surveillance, and interactions with media.¹⁹ The Bureau messaged out these changes to members. However, having these changes made while managing ongoing crises was challenging.

There were also changes in what the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office decided to prosecute due to concerns of racial disparities²⁰ and staffing. This impacted both law enforcement's ability to manage the crime (including the Clackamas and Washington County Sheriff's Offices' refusal to send staff and resources into Portland on account of disagreeing with the District Attorney's policy²¹), the willingness of community members to report crime, and people's willingness to commit criminal activity. While it is unknown to what extent this increased criminal activity, this impact has been acknowledged publically.²²

¹⁷ City of Portland Auditor's Office (2020). Resolution 37496 "Immediately cease cooperation between Police and militarized federal forces resolution" <https://efiles.portlandoregon.gov/Record/13915294/>

¹⁸ U.S. Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (2021). *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

¹⁹ This includes the City Council's resolution regarding cooperation with Federal law enforcement, the court decision from American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc. v City of Portland regarding the use of surveillance, and the temporary court decision from Index Newspapers LLC *et al* v. City of Portland *et al* regarding the rights of media during protests. Some of these were Legislative Concepts (e.g. 742 & 743) or pending court processes (Don't Shoot Portland v. City of Portland and Multnomah County) at the time, but were implemented proactively by the City of Portland and Police Bureau prior to being finalized.

²⁰ During the 2020 protests, the Multnomah County District Attorney announced they would not be prosecuting certain crimes pertaining to the protests such as IPO, Disorderly Conduct in the 2nd, Escape in the 3rd, Harassment, and Riot. In addition, some crimes would be managed more leniently such as Criminal Mischief in the 2nd or 3rd, Theft in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, and Burglary in the 2nd. The policy was retrieved on September 25, 2021 from <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/7033865-DASCHMIDTpolicy-Regarding-Protest-Related-Cases.html>

²¹ Clackamas County Sheriff's Office (2020, August 31). Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Response to Governor Brown's Proposed Plan. Retrieved December 15, 2021, from <https://www.clackamas.us/sheriff/2020-08-31-CCSOPR-SheriffStatementOnPortland.html>

²² For example: Lambert, H. (2021, January 5). 91% of Portland protest arrests not being prosecuted. *KOIN 6 News*. Retrieved October 7, 2021, from Pamplin Media Group - 91% of Portland protest arrests not being prosecuted

Reduced Law Enforcement Assistance

The Bureau was unable to utilize many of their customary law enforcement emergency response collaborations due to other agencies' concerns regarding the City's decision to reduce the Portland Police Bureau's budget, the District Attorney's decision to limit the prosecution of crime, and the extra liabilities of policing in Portland.²³ This led to Portland Police members having to work more hours to meet basic staffing needs, having fewer resources to manage the same number of people, and less ability to utilize some tactics that may have lessened the strain on officers and community members.

Maintaining Essential Bureau Operations

Due to the Portland Police Bureau's low sworn staffing levels²⁴ and the continual protesting activity for nearly six months, the Bureau was unable to respond to and follow-up on normal call loads and associated crime issues. For instance, at times only priority calls were dispatched and no cold calls²⁵ were taken (e.g., during some of the protesting hours). Starting in June 2020, the average monthly call response times dramatically increased for low, medium, and high priority calls.²⁶

During part of this time, many investigator caseloads were largely put on hold. At times, over half of the detectives (with the exception of those assigned to homicide) were assigned to process arrests made by the Rapid Response Team and Mobile Field Forces. This severely reduced their ability to investigate measure 11 crimes, as even when they were not busy with protest duties, working afternoons made it difficult for many investigators to conduct follow-up. The protests also generated a lot of additional felony level crime which added to their work load.

This caused additional strain for both Bureau and community members.²⁷

²³ A few resources pertaining to this are the following:

Clackamas County Sheriff's Office (2020, August 31). Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Response to Governor Brown's Proposed Plan. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Response to Governor Brown's Proposed Plan | Clackamas County

Ramakrishnan, J. (2020, September 2). Clackamas, Washington county sheriffs rebuff Gov. Kate Brown's request to staff Portland protests. *OregonLive*. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Clackamas, Washington county sheriffs rebuff Gov. Kate Brown's request to staff Portland protests - oregonlive.com

Flaccus, G. (2020, September 1). Sheriffs criticize governor's plan to curb Portland violence. *OPB, PBSO News Hour*. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Sheriffs criticize governor's plan to curb Portland violence | PBS NewsHour

²⁴ The Portland Police Bureau sworn staffing amounts have been substantially lower than the average rate for police jurisdictions of a similar size for many years. This disparity is increasing over time. Additional information regarding this is provided in Appendix A.

²⁵ Cold calls are often priority 5, 6, or 7, where no one is in danger and the crime is not currently active. Some cold call examples are burglary, car prowling, or fraud cases where the crime has already occurred, or a shoplifting case with no one in custody.

²⁶ More information regarding the Bureau's call response time and dispatched call trends can be found in Appendix F. Overall, the rates show a substantial increase in response times during the start of the 2020 protests and many decreases correlated with the reduction of protests. Although substantially improved, many of the response times have remained higher compared to the start of the 2020 protests. This may be related to the continual decrease in sworn staffing and some sustained increases in dispatched calls.

²⁷ The following articles demonstrate some of these strains on the community. During interviews and discussions with law enforcement, the stressors associated with not being able to respond to these calls for both law enforcement and community members were discussed.

Bernstein, M. (2021, January 22). Portland police leave 911 calls on hold for hours, then closed them without response, records show. *OregonLive*. Retrieved December 27, 2021 from Portland police leave 911 calls on hold for hours, then closed them without response, records show - oregonlive.com

Staffing Challenges

The extensive protesting, already low staffing resources²⁸, and reduced external assistance, resulted in unrealistic work schedules for most sworn Portland Police Bureau members. Most sworn members worked at least 12 hour days, every day, for the first two weeks (with vacation time and weekends cancelled). Thereafter, many worked 12 hours days with often only partial weekends for most of the summer. Some specialty units and/or those with specialized skillsets for crowd management worked even longer hours.

Pagones, S. (2020, August 24). Portland police forced to prioritize riot unable to immediately respond to other 911 calls. Fox News. Retrieved December 31, 2021 from Portland police forced to prioritize riot unable to immediately respond to other 911 calls | Fox News

²⁸ More information regarding the Bureau's sworn staffing amounts can be found in Appendix A.

PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES

Much of the public perspectives findings about the protests and policing response were mixed. Some have expressed strong support for or against law enforcement. Most have a more nuanced perspective, that is supportive of at least some police reforms but also regards police presence during protests as well as policing in general as essential. A more detailed summary of these public perspectives can be found in Appendix D.

The information available to date suggests consistency in the following findings among different groups of the community:

There is substantial support in the Portland community for peaceful protests (no crime or violence).

There is extensive, although not complete, agreement that the Portland protests since 2020 have included too much violence. This perspective was even found among protestors.²⁹

Many are concerned about the negative impacts on businesses and community members from the disruptions in police services throughout the City that occurred due to the protests.

There is substantial confusion regarding some of the policing procedures, as well as why some things were enforced during the protests and not others.

More community education and communication from the Portland Police Bureau regarding protest events and how community members can safely practice their 1st Amendment rights would be beneficial. In addition, methods for the Portland Police Bureau and the community to debrief the 2020 protests may be helpful.

The public perspectives appear to differ more in the following areas:

What strategies will reduce and/or prevent protest-related violence.

²⁹ For more information regarding these public perspectives, see the use of de-escalation, public perspectives (appendix), and protest-related criminal offenses sections of this report. In addition, during this evaluation process it was reported that many reports were made through the Independent Police Review indicating concern about the amount of crime occurring and/or not being enforced, law enforcement personnel spoke of the public concerns expressed through calls for service and/or crime reporting, and concerns have been publically noted regarding the Multnomah County's District Attorney's Office role in reduced enforcement. There are also news reports and a DHM Research report reflecting some of these concerns. Some examples of these are:

Burch, L. (2021, October 13). KOIN One-on-One: Multnomah County DA Mike Schmidt. *KOIN 6 News*. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from KOIN One-on-One: Multnomah County DA Mike Schmidt | KOIN.com

Associated Press/Report for America. (2021, March 15). Portland leaders condemn ongoing violence by 'anarchists'. *The Columbian*. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from Portland leaders condemn ongoing violence by 'anarchists' - The Columbian

Bernstein, M. (2021, September 10). Estate of Aaron 'Jay' Danielson, man killed in downtown Portland after pro-Trump rally, sues city, mayor and DA. *OregonLive*. Retrieved September 24, 2021 from Estate of Aaron 'Jay' Danielson, man killed in downtown Portland after pro-Trump rally, sues city, mayor and DA - oregonlive.com

Dowling, J. (2021, October 14). Pearl District residents to PPB: 'Are we a lawless city?'. *KOIN 6 News*. Retrieved November 9, 2021 from Pearl District residents to PPB: 'Are we a lawless city?' | KOIN.com

Lin, F. (2021, November 21). Portland leaders condemn 'criminal destruction, violence' after riot declared downtown. *KATU News*. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from Portland leaders condemn 'criminal destruction, violence' after riot declared downtown | KATU

DHM Research (2020). Protest Survey Results. DHM Research. Retrieved December 11, 2021 from Oregon Voters Disapprove of the Ongoing Protests - DHM Research (dhmresearch.com)

Whether the Portland Police Bureau's response to the 2020 protests was too forceful or not forceful enough.

What the law enforcement, City government, and District Attorney's response to protest-related crime and crime, in general, should be.

What actions define exercising one's freedom of speech, according to the 1st Amendment rights.

A complete investigation into the motivations behind the recent protest movements is beyond the scope of this current report.³⁰ Additional research and analysis of what is being expressed through these protests more broadly and in their totality may be beneficial for law enforcement and other government agencies. For instance, it would appear that taken in their entirety, some of the overall messages may be:

People are still experiencing a lot of strain pertaining to racial and class inequities in general.

There is a need to continually innovate law enforcement practices to ensure the missions are accomplished in the safest possible way for both the public and officers.

There is a need for balance and a concern that the main missions of police departments (e.g., preventing and addressing crime) are getting lost during efforts to modernize their practices.

³⁰ The Training Division is currently in the process of learning more regarding this topic.

GENERAL MANAGEMENT FOR CROWD SITUATIONS

The Portland Police Bureau has some highly trained and skilled members in the Incident Command System (ICS) and crowd management. The Incident Command System represents organizational "best practices" as an element of the Command and Management Component of National Incident Management System (NIMS), and is the standard for emergency management across the country. These systems provide a common framework for people within an agency and/or across agencies to have a coordinated response, and enable more resources for addressing the unique characteristics of an event.

The magnitude and duration of the 2020 protests extending for months required staffing assistance from a good majority of the Bureau. The Bureau as a whole was not prepared for or trained for responding to events of this duration. This led to a greater burden of the workload placed on those with the specialty training (including having to manage multiple roles), some critical incident management positions not always staffed, less organization of the administrative tasks, having to train members how to assist during the ongoing events, and less coordination of some of the Incident Command System positions (e.g. Planning, Public Information, Intelligence, and Logistics).

More specifics regarding these challenges can be found in the Portland Police Bureau's 2020 Portland Civil Unrest After Action and Recommendations report, 2020 Challenge and Solution Analysis report, and the 2020 Crowd Control Audit Report³¹. This report includes training recommendations stemming from these reports, but does not include detailed analysis of these management and reporting functions as they are already well documented in these other reports.

Although sworn personnel had some crowd management and/or Incident Command System (ICS) training, most did not have experience applying the training in real-world applications. Additional training and experience may have enhanced the Bureau's capacity to manage the massive demands from these protests. These training needs are documented in the training recommendations section of this report and methods for further preparing members with applied experience are being discussed during the training planning processes.


³¹ The 2020 Crowd Control Audit Results report is being finalized at the same time of this evaluation report. The training needs pertaining to this report have been incorporated into the training needs list. This audit report focuses on a review of reporting compliance and deficiencies. Overall, a high reporting compliance rate was found (96 percent). Of the deficiencies found, the main trends pertained to documentation of formal debriefs, chain of command review, timeliness, injuries, communication, and review of force by other agencies. No deficiencies were found pertaining to the classification of the event and response, such as the authorization for crowd dispersal, use of Riot Control Agents, and specialty munitions.

FUTURE TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SWORN MEMBERS OF ALL RANKS

The training evaluation survey for the 2021 Crowd Control training for all sworn members included survey items pertaining to preparedness for assisting in crowd management situations and related future training needs. A total of 315 members responded to the survey. The following is a summary of their feedback.

Preparedness for Crowd Management Situations

Most of the respondents reported feeling at least moderately prepared to assist in crowd management, with approximately 20 percent feeling less than moderately prepared and 40 percent higher. Given the intensity of some of these situations, members will ideally feel more prepared over time. The Training Division will continue to monitor this as more training is delivered and clarity of related information pertaining to law and procedure changes is available and provided.



Future Training Needs


Members were asked to rate how helpful additional training pertaining to several crowd management training topics would be for preparing for future events. The majority of respondents rated all of the training topics as at least moderately helpful. The following topics were rated as most helpful for additional training needs:

- Potential Bureau strategies and contingency plans for addressing different types of crowd control situations

- Managing protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors (e.g., surrounding vehicles, breaking into precincts)

- Situational awareness and ambush preparedness (specific to crowd control situations)

- Directives, Law, and S.O.P.s pertaining to crowd management



In addition, members were provided the space to list out additional crowd control training topics that would be helpful. Of those that provided recommendations, the main themes were the need for practical application training (including skills and scenario components) pertaining to what effective crowd response strategies can be used and clarity on crowd management-related laws and policy. These suggestions included crowd control tactics and fundamentals, crowd arrest procedures, rail use safety training, new tools that can be used in these situations, shield training, options for clearing intersections, Mobile Field Force movement, effectively leading a Mobile Field Force squad, use of force and reporting (including what is important for preventing litigation, what constitutes a crowd, and if the conducted electrical weapon can be utilized when arresting a combative subject during a crowd event), effective strategies for addressing organized and criminal protesting groups, and responses to protestors surrounding or blocking police vehicles.

Many people indicated the need to have concrete guidance pertaining to crowd management related laws and policy, such as those impacting use of force, the Temporary Restraining Order, when to arrest (including what is needed for the District Attorney's Office), and when law enforcement can use recording devices.

Some additional recommendations were having more training on how the Incident Management Team is operated, management level decision making, how to inform the public of the Portland Police Bureau's crowd response decisions, and understanding of the core reasons for the protesting.

Some also noted the need for mending internal legitimacy and procedural justice in relation to the protests since 2020 and the need for internal and external management and decision-makers to

communicate their support and collaboration in effectively addressing criminal behavior at demonstrations. One person indicated the need for training to incorporate a hopeful message that encourages exceptional law enforcement service that will help contribute to the City's future well-being. They mentioned concern for the push for de-policing, the City's correlated growing crime rates, and the irony that the police will likely be blamed for the City's resulting crime issues.

USE OF FORCE

Information pertaining to the use of force has been obtained from the Portland Police Bureau's Force Analysis Summary Reports, Force Audit Team, Professional Standards Division, Independent Police Review, and Incident Command System reports. The Training Division will continue to collect additional information regarding the application of force pertaining to these protests as it becomes available.

The following sections provide information regarding the amount and types of force utilized during these events by the Portland Police Bureau and findings from reviewed cases. The data available pertaining to subject injuries was also reviewed. Unfortunately, the information available in an analyzable format does not include all subject injuries³². The counts known are low and equate to less than 3 percent of the force applications resulting in injury. Since it is unknown how much the data underrepresents the actual injury counts, the Bureau analysts have decided not to include this information in any comprehensive analyses or interpretations at this time. It is known that were no subjects killed by the Portland Police Bureau, and there are no known cases of serious injuries requiring hospitalization from Portland Police Bureau protest-related use of force since 2020.

There has been a fair amount of confusion regarding force usage by the Portland Police Bureau versus force used by other law enforcement agencies or even the protestors themselves. For instance, there have been cases of attributing force usage by other agencies to the Portland Police Bureau, there have been protestors mistakenly thinking the smoke from the protest fires was from law enforcement devices, and there have been businesses thinking law enforcement equipment was responsible for broken windows caused by the protestors. To clarify some of the misunderstandings, there were no uses of firearms or conducted electrical weapons by the Portland Police Bureau during these events.

Amount and Type of Force

The amount of force applications used during a protest is going to vary depending on the amount and type of crime occurring, the number of people involved in the aggressive behaviors, the level of cooperation with law enforcement interventions when needed, and City and County decisions pertaining to what level of crime will be enforced. The following chart provides the amount of force, estimated crowd counts³³, and the percentage of force applications used per the number of people in the crowds for protests occurring in 2020 and the first half of 2021. There is considerable variation, with no force being used at many protests to 49 percent of force applications used at one of the 2021 protests.

³² Due to some of the force being used on subjects that were not taken into custody and difficulties identifying many people due to their attire, some of the subject injury information could not be completed. Some injuries were not reported to the arresting officer but were later reported to the Field Arrest Team. Some injuries were recorded in the narrative of the Force Reporting form, which would require reading through all the force reports to code and include that data in the analyses.

³³ Most of the estimated crowd counts (including those for the 2020 George Floyd Protests) were obtained from the Incident Command reports, which include crowd estimates throughout the event. Since many of the protests move around and people may leave and others join a protest within a day, there is no way to have an exact number. This report utilized conservative estimates, only counting the highest crowd size per distinct group for a given day. For a few of the events (primarily some of the 2021 ones), the crowd estimates were obtained from the Crowd Management Incident Commander (if not included in the reports).

In 2020, the percentage of force applications used given the estimated crowd sizes ranged from 0.25 to 23 percent. The percentage of force applications used during the 2020 George Floyd Protests was 4.73³⁴, which is among the lower percentages for protests that included force.

Year	Protest ³⁵	Minimum Number of Force Applications ³⁶	Estimated Crowd Control Counts	Percentage of Force Applications Per the Number of People
2020	2020 George Floyd Protests	6251	132031	4.73
2020	S26 Call to Action	144	2000	7.20
2020	2020 Election	4	1615	0.25
2020	Red House Mission	46	200	23.00*
2020	New Year's Eve	40	200	20.00*
2021	J20 - Inauguration Day	30	150	20.00
2021	January 27 Event	1	100	1.00
2021	Fields Park Event	1	165	0.61
2021	March 11 Event	3	100	3.00
2021	Jamison Square Event	49	100	49.00***
2021	3/14/2021	0	150	0.00
2021	3/20/2021	0	70	0.00
2021	4/1/2021	1	50	2.00
2021	4/9/2021	0	40	0.00
2021	4/10/2021	1	55	1.82
2021	4/11/2021	0	45	0.00
2021	4/12/2021	74	350	21.14*
2021	4/13/2021	0	110	0.00
2021	4/16/2021	39	175	22.29
2021	4/17/2021	0	87	0.00
2021	4/18/2021	0	50	0.00
2021	4/19/2021	0	80	0.00
2021	4/20/2021	36	100	36.00**
2021	4/21/2021	0	35	0.00
2021	4/22/2021	0	100	0.00
2021	4/23/2021	0	75	0.00
2021	5/25/2021	2	350	0.57

³⁴ The George Floyd Protests included over 100 events. Force was not utilized at all of the events.

³⁵ At the time of this reporting, there are a few potential additional 2021 mass demonstrations during January 1 through June 31, 2021 brought to the attention of the Training Division. These additional mass demonstration dates are currently being reconciled and any confirmed will be included in the next crowd management report. At this time, it appears none of them required a police response.

³⁶ The number of force applications used during the protests was obtained from the Office of Inspector General. For more information regarding how the force applications were counted, please see Appendix E.

Year	Protest	Minimum Number of Force Applications	Estimated Crowd Control Counts	Percentage of Force Applications Per the Number of People
2021	5/28/2021	1	113	0.88
2021	6/17/2021	0	55	0.00
2021	6/18/2021	0	40	0.00
2021	6/24/2021	12	70	17.14
2021	May Day Event	13	163	7.98

*The Rapid Response Team did not respond to this event.

**The Rapid Response Team arrived after the majority of the force had been used.

***Most of the force used during this event was low-level control against resistance during an arresting procedure.

There are also some differences in the types of force being used. The force charts in Appendix E provide a detailed breakdown for the types of force used during the protests since 2020, as well as some additional information pertaining to the force coding. In 2020, there was a higher percentage of use of launchable impact and chemical weapons compared to 2021 due to public concerns and changes in the law. Although people tend to have more concerns regarding these methods, some of the findings during this evaluation process indicate that the use of some of these devices may result in fewer subject injuries.

For instance, research has found that the use of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, in lieu of physical force, is correlated with significantly less injuries of civilians³⁷ and the use seldom results in the need for medical treatment³⁸. An extensive research study into the potential injuries of several less lethal devices was conducted by a team with specialization in law enforcement, less lethal devices, medicine, and forensic science.³⁹ One of this study's findings indicated particularly low injury risk for the rubber ball distraction device style of less lethals tested. Of course, the safety risk levels are also dependent on appropriate use of these devices, which is noted in much of the literature and manufacturer's specification documents. As one study noted, many objects, including a pencil, can cause serious injury if improperly used.⁴⁰

³⁷ MacDonald, J.M., Kaminski, R.J., & Smith, M.R. (2009). The Effect of Less-Lethal Weapons on Injuries in Police Use-of-Force Events. *American Journal of Public Health*, 99, 2268-2274.

Alpert, G., Smith, M., Kaminski, R., Fridell, L., MacDonald, J., & Kubu, B. (2011). *NIJ Research in Brief: Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

³⁸ Mesloh, C., Henych, M., & Wolf, R. (2008). *Less Lethal Weapon Effectiveness, Use of Force, and Suspect & Officer Injuries: A Five-Year Analysis*. Florida Gulf Coast University: Weapons & Equipment Research Institute. (Document No. 224081)

Alpert, G., Smith, M., Kaminski, R., Fridell, L., MacDonald, J., & Kubu, B. (2011). *NIJ Research in Brief: Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less-Lethal Weapons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center. (2010). *A Guidebook for Less-Lethal Devices: Planning for, Selecting, and Implementing Technology Solutions*. State College, PA: The Pennsylvania State University's Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center.

³⁹ Wyant, R.T., & Burns, T. (2014). *Risk Management of Less Lethal Options: Evaluation, Deployment, Aftermath, and Forensics* (Allgire, J.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

⁴⁰ Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center. (2010). *A Guidebook for Less-Lethal Devices: Planning for, Selecting, and Implementing Technology Solutions*. State College, PA: The Pennsylvania State University's Weapons & Protective Systems Technology Center.

In addition to how the device is utilized and the type of device, research has found substantial differences in the attributes of some devices (such as their accuracy, reliability, malfunction rate)⁴¹, which has the potential to impact effective deployment and injury risks. Other considerations pertaining to the likelihood of injury are the characteristics of the individuals the devices are used on (e.g., size, gender, age, health, body armor), environmental factors, and munition types.

This information is solely to note the importance of further researching this topic and the related complexities, not to imply any specific recommendations at this time. While the Portland Police Bureau has researched these devices and upgraded its equipment as the safety of the technology has evolved over time, continual research of this topic is warranted. The Training Division is currently further researching less lethal equipment options for crowd management, the potential injuries, and methods for mitigating injury risk. This includes a review of any serious injuries related to Portland Police Bureau deployments of less lethal devices in the past decade, a close examination of the injury risk potential of devices currently inventoried at the Bureau for potential use, and the training curriculum pertaining to these risks. This information may be critical to consider prior to any final decisions pertaining to eliminating any of these force options.

Protest-Related Use of Force Cases Under Review

There have been 102 protest-related use of force cases (with 151 allegations) investigated from the 2020 protests, and 3 (with 8 allegations) from the 2021 protests. Most of these investigations have been completed, although 9 cases are still in progress.⁴²

Of these cases, five of them included out-of-policy force findings. Two of the cases involved pepper spray, two less lethal launchers, and one baton. In one of the cases the less lethal struck an unintended subject. In the rest of the cases, the force usage did not align correctly with the type of resistance or behavior the person was demonstrating at the time the force was used.

In addition, the Office of the Inspector General conducted an audit of the 2020 crowd control events. This audit included an assessment of the classification of the event and response, such as the authorization for crowd dispersal, use of Riot Control Agents, and specialty munitions. No deficiencies were noted pertaining to these areas.⁴³

The evaluation process will continue to incorporate information pertaining to the rest of the cases as it becomes available.

⁴¹ Kenny, J., Heal, S., & Grossman, M. (2001). *The Attribute-Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extended-Range, Impact Munitions*. Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

Hughes, E., Kenny, J., Heal, S., Kaufman, P. (2007). *An Attribute Based Evaluation II (ABE-2) of Less-Lethal Impact Munitions*. The Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies at Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory.

⁴² This information was obtained from the Professional Standards Division in October 2021.

⁴³ Portland Police Bureau (2021). 2020 Crowd Control Audit Results report.

USE OF DE-ESCALATION

There were numerous attempts from the Portland Police Bureau to encourage peaceful protesting and de-escalate the violence, which included utilizing methods from the Decision Making Model and Enhanced Social Identity Model. Throughout the events, the Bureau adapted its use of these methods based on feedback and observations pertaining to their effectiveness for different groups.

Information was gathered from Incident Command System reports, sworn members that managed or staffed the protests, the Citizen Review Committee's Portland Protests 2020: Citizen Review Committee Summary and Recommendations report, and the Portland Police Bureau's research findings pertaining to community perspectives, to understand what de-escalation methods were used and whether or not they were effective. The following is a summary of these findings.

De-escalation Methods Used

Communicating with group leaders when possible (some were unwilling to communicate with the police).

The Demonstration Liaison Officer program⁴⁴ was utilized for many of the 2020 events. Efforts were made to communicate with group leaders prior to and during planned events, to build rapport and help ensure safe and peaceful protesting. These communications often include gaining an understanding of the group's plans for the demonstration, discussing ways to help ensure peaceful protesting, discussing how the Bureau can and cannot assist, and informing participants of the related laws and ordinances. They have a summary handout for event organizers, which provides general demonstration guidelines and information for contacting the Demonstration Liaison Officer during the event (see Appendix G).

Using protective gear that fits under a uniform to give a soft, less offensive look.

Making announcements from the sound truck with simultaneous Twitter messages from the Portland Police Bureau.

Talking with individual protestors that requested to converse with the police.

Communicating with protestors in general. For instance, many sworn members made efforts to connect with individuals or groups of protestors. In one case, a protestor and officer united in prayer.⁴⁵

Community Engagement Team work, which included communication outreach to the Bureau Advisory Councils and other neighborhood contacts and community discussions pertaining to specific priority concerns.

⁴⁴ The Portland Police Bureau established this program in 2019 and it is operated by the Crisis Negotiation Team. These officers intentionally wear a different uniform, with a white shirt, to distinguish their facilitative role to the community. The mission of the Portland Police Bureau's Demonstration Liaison Officer program is to utilize communication to support the incident command team and other law enforcement and first responder personnel in providing a safe and lawful environment for event/ demonstration participants, nonparticipants, community members, and first responders during large-scale events and demonstrations.

⁴⁵ Goodwin, J. (2020, June 12). Protestor and officer reunite and pray together at Portland demonstration. *KGW8 News*. Retrieved November 26, 2021, from Portland protestor shares special moment with police officer | kgw.com

Staging of police assets, such as the Mobile Field Force and Rapid Response Team, out of sight when possible to avoid confrontation.

Entirely keeping a distance from some of the protesting areas.

The use of bicycle officers.

Other public information efforts outside of the protest times, such as press releases and responding to individual messages of concern sent to the Bureau.

Assisting protestors with getting medical assistance and locating lost items.

Removing those committing violence from the crowd when possible.

Use of barriers/fencing and hardening of facilities.

Tolerating low levels of disorderly conduct or criminal mischief without taking enforcement actions.

Assisting protestors with getting medical assistance and locating lost items.

Using time to allow for the groups to de-escalate and/or further assess the situation. The following is an example of the amount of time provided to the protestors before law enforcement reinforcements were used.

Timeframe of event types for 5/29-5/30/20 from the ICS reports.	
1735	People observed
2036	Red flags have been noted (e.g., gear, objects, behavior)
2114	First protest-related crime noted
2148	Violence observed (toward human)
2159	First sound truck warnings delivered
2304	Dispersal orders begin
2311	Dispersal
2323	Reinforcements noted (e.g., gas, RBDD)

Pro-active messaging from the Bureau/PIO about expectations around allowable conduct at demonstrations as well as messaging from PIO about human impacts on officers and why police do what we do during protests.

Using force action only after all other non-force options (as listed above) were exhausted.

Use of strategic arrests of violent individuals when possible to reduce the impact on others.

Using Long Range Acoustic Device to call out individuals committing criminal behavior when possible to reindividuate single offenders in the larger group.

In addition, community groups and even other protestors attempted to de-escalate the violence. This includes speeches from the faith community, live-stream comments from protestors against the police messaging out disapproval of the violence against the businesses and arson of occupied buildings, peaceful protesting groups voicing their disapproval against the protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors, group leaders reinforcing peaceful protesting within their groups, and peaceful protestors guarding the fence to help prevent attempts to damage it.

De-escalation Methods Effectiveness

How effective the de-escalation methods were is difficult to determine. To determine effectiveness, we examine information pertaining to direct feedback from individuals and groups, observations of individual and crowd dynamics (e.g., whether or not there was escalation or de-escalation, whether peaceful protestors turn violent, etc.), and crime patterns.

These crowd management methods appeared to be effective with the peaceful protestors. All the peaceful events that occurred in the afternoons and evenings remained peaceful through the 30 days of those events, and only one occasion could be recalled where any of the daytime events turned into riots or civil disturbances. The fact that some community groups and protestors were attempting to help de-escalate the violence is also indicative that the Portland Police Bureau efforts may have been helpful. On multiple occasions, peaceful protesting groups pushed back against the violence of others and were unwilling to join violent groups. The police helped to facilitate and support those that wanted to be peaceful. Groups engaged in violent behavior made numerous attempts to gain more influence of the peaceful crowds. These attempts appeared to be mostly unsuccessful with the exception of during the initial Federal law enforcement response in Portland, which did initially spark additional resources and support for these groups. When Federal law enforcement began to adopt similar methods of the Portland Police Bureau, the violence targeted at the Federal buildings was reduced. The Portland Police Bureau also received many letters and messages of support from community groups and leaders during the ongoing protests.

Whether or not the de-escalation methods were effective with groups engaged in more violent behavior is more difficult to determine. It appears that some of them were at least partially effective. Some groups would continue to escalate their violence and would appear to be doing so in order to instigate a response from law enforcement. Some of them would escalate the situation until law enforcement was forced to respond to the crimes. These groups would gravitate to attacking the Federal officers and buildings when they would receive a lack of response from the Portland Police Bureau. When the Federal officers reduced their response to them, they started targeting other locations. They would cheer when they would finally get a response from the Portland Police Bureau, such as a warning from the soundtruck. That they were unable to gain more influence over the peaceful protestors and the crime rates noticeably decreased after the first few days (although they continued to remain at problematic levels and severity for some time), are positive signs. None of the methods were successful at stopping all of the violence at the protests. However, it is unknown whether any of them could have been. These methods increase the likelihood of compliance and police legitimacy, but they do not guarantee it, particularly with people who have a voiced goal of complete abolition of the police.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Although not the majority of protestors, some were extremely violent towards law enforcement and have expressed goals of abolishing the police. Some examples of this can be found in the protest-related criminal offenses and protest-related officer injuries sections of this report. These sentiments were also messaged through many of the protest signs and chants. In addition

These efforts are still critical when responding to these groups and even when they may not end the violence, they may still be successful at reducing the amount of violence and/or tension between the police and community, preventing additional issues, and improving police and community relations.⁴⁷ Situations may have been worse without these efforts.

It was also noted that some of the community efforts appeared to have a noticeable positive impact on de-escalating the violence at times. For instance, a crowd was noticeably calm during speeches from faith community leaders. The group became violent again later in this particular case, but this brings up an important consideration pertaining to the impact of community leaders. Baltimore has received some attention regarding its dramatic shift towards more peaceful protests. While some have remarked on the impacts of the policing approach, others have attributed the impacts more towards the different approaches of the community leaders.⁴⁸

Future Considerations

One of the factors that seem to be important is not giving up on the integration of these methods, even when having to use force and arrests as well. While the Bureau and community as a whole continued to make attempts at de-escalating the violence, there were indications during this study that individuals lost hope in the possibility of success. On occasion, some Bureau members made remarks back to the protestors in response to the aggression and threats. For instance, if the police officers were being yelled at to leave, quit, or to go home in addition to the more violent messages and assaults⁴⁹, rather than remain silent some responded back questioning why the protestor doesn't leave. As much as is humanly possible, it is critical to implement these techniques with extensive consistency and solidarity.

There have been some that have expressed dislike of the sound truck, although others have indicated more announcements are needed at the protests. Some have expressed concern pertaining to communication with group leaders appearing as favoritism towards some groups. Others have expressed concern regarding not having enough police presence or intervention at protests. Most of the current evaluation findings suggest that there is substantial community support for the use of the above techniques used generally. However, there may be some need to refine when to utilize them. There are

to the messaging for defunding and/or abolishing the police, some of the chants included "kill a cop save a life", "kill all white people", and "all cops are bastards".

The following report also notes some of these examples in Portland, Oregon: Finkelstein, J., Goldenberg, A., Stevens, S., Jussim, L., Farmer, J., Donohue, J., and Paresky, P. (2020). *Network-Enabled Anarchy: How Militant Anarcho-Socialist Networks Use Social Media to Instigate Widespread Violence Against Political Opponents and Law Enforcement*. Network Contagion Research Institute.

The following report notes some limitations of these interpersonal policing methods on impacting individuals: Maguire, E., & Oakley, M. (2020). *Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police*. New York, NY; Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

⁴⁷ Maguire, E., & Oakley, M. (2020). *Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police*. New York, NY; Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

⁴⁸ Johnson E. Johnson Corporation Counsel (2020). *New York City Law Department Corporation Counsel Report Pursuant to Executive Order 58 (June 20, 2020) Directing an Analysis of Factors Impacting the George Floyd Protest in New York City*. New York City Law Department: Office of the Corporation Counsel.

Cassie, R. (2020, June 4). Why Baltimore's Protests are so Peaceful. *Bloomberg CityLab*. Retrieved November 12, 2021 from Why Baltimore's George Floyd Protest Is Different - Bloomberg

⁴⁹ For more information regarding the types of threats and assaults law enforcement experienced, please see the appendices on protest-related criminal offenses and protest-related officer injuries.

some that have recommended these techniques, or others, to be used more frequently during the Bureau's response to protests.

The Bureau leaders for crowd management continue to have thoughtful discussions regarding the crowd response methods used and what appears to be most effective with the different protesting groups in Portland. The Bureau is also continuing to research the effectiveness of other techniques. This information will continue to be implemented into the crowd management planning and training processes.

The Demonstration Liaison Officer program is reflecting on what methods may be more effective for working with groups that do not want to communicate with law enforcement and/or are leaderless. As a part of this, they are working on building a program with those in the community to discuss the best strategies for communicating with different groups and ensuring peaceful demonstrations.

GOALS FOR CROWD MANAGEMENT

The following are the program goals for Public Order and a brief preliminary summary of how well they were achieved. These findings will be reviewed, and updated if needed, as additional stages of the evaluation process are completed.

Uphold the public's freedoms provided in the constitution by:

Monitoring public order events in a neutral and impartial manner.

The current results suggest the Portland Police Bureau did well at monitoring both the 2020 and 2021 public order events in a neutral and impartial manner. The Incident Command reports currently reviewed in their entirety (from 5/29-7/31/20⁵⁰), and additional feedback indicates that police actions were based on the actions of the groups and individuals. There was no police intervention with the solely peaceful protesting groups. There were many protesting events that occurred, many of which were of Black Lives Matter, that had no police intervention.

Unfortunately, there were many occasions when protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors infiltrated the peaceful protests, leading to police intervention. In these situations, the police attempted to warn the peaceful protesting groups of the progressively changing dynamics to situations that would require police intervention so they could leave the area.

There are several reports pertaining to police bias during the 2020 protests. For instance, some have remarked about the police not intervening in one group's destruction of a building. However, there is nearly the same incident involving an opposite group's destruction of a building without police intervention, so these particular examples do not support bias. Without film of the events in greater entirety, it is difficult to do a more thorough investigation into the concerns of bias. The limitations on enforcing crime during these events also make it more challenging to evaluate such claims of an intervention or a lack of intervention alone indicates potential bias. The Training Division will continue to review and investigate such information to the extent possible and regardless of the results, the Bureau plans on continuing with the equity and bias training program, which relates to these concerns.

Encouraging self-regulating behavior to maintain safe and peaceful gatherings.

Although not all the attempts were successful, there were numerous attempts from the Portland Police Bureau to encourage peaceful protesting. This included communicating with group leaders when possible (some were unwilling to communicate with the police), utilizing the Demonstration Liaison Officer program, making announcements from the soundtrack with simultaneous Twitter messages from the Portland Police Bureau, providing

⁵⁰ The Incident Command reports for all of 2020 have been reviewed by one of the Training Division analysts to some extent. However, for this timeframe, they have been reviewed more extensively, with data findings (beyond the crowd counts) more systematically retrieved for this evaluation process. The Training Division will continue to review Incident Command reports as a part of the crowd management evaluation process.

sound-amplifying equipment for the group leaders to help de-escalate the crowds, and talking with individual protestors that requested to converse with the police.

In addition community groups and even other protestors attempted to de-escalate the violence. This includes speeches from the faith community, live-stream comments from more aggressive protestors regarding the violence against the businesses and the arson of occupied buildings being unacceptable, peaceful protesting groups voicing their disapproval against the protestors engaged in aggressive behaviors, and peaceful protestors guarding the fence to help prevent attempts to damage it.

Additional research and/or planning in this area may be beneficial. Potentially having more consistent messaging from the multiple government entities may have been helpful. There may also be additional collaboration with these community groups willing to help that may have been helpful in the future.

Address criminal actions that only affect the safety of the public or gathering.

In 2020, the Portland Police Bureau initially enforced a lot of these crimes, but there were not the resources nor the support to continue this enforcement. The City's strategy changed to addressing only some felony crimes. The Bureau attempted to identify and differentiate individuals committing crime within the crowd, but did not have the resources or strategies in place to do this most effectively. Sometimes others in the crowd had to be impacted in order to gain access to those committing the actual crimes. There were announcements to the crowd prior to such actions taking place so they would have the opportunity to leave.

Unfortunately, a lot of crime took place during the 2020 protests that were not addressed due to City and County decisions pertaining to enforcement, staffing limitations, and limitations of resources and strategies for effectively identifying and managing individuals within these crowd situations.

The Police Bureau was able to advance their skills and resources for identifying and separating out individuals committing crime within a crowd by 2021, so achieving this public order objective has improved. These strategies have had fewer negative impacts on others in the crowd. The 2021 protests have been less violent overall, so that has been helpful as well. The Bureau is hopeful that these new strategies will be effective with different crowd dynamics.

Maintain open communication with the public and media before, during and after an event.

The main communication strategies used were press releases, Twitter announcements, Soundtruck announcements (along with simultaneous Twitter announcements), communication with protest and community leaders at the events, communication outreach to the Bureau Advisory Councils and other neighborhood contacts, livestreaming the protest activities (before restriction on this method for law enforcement), responding to individual messages of concern sent to the Bureau, and community discussions pertaining to specific

priority concerns. There was neither enough staffing nor trained personnel to match the number of communication needs for the 2020 events in their entirety. Priority was given to communication during the events itself, which appeared to be somewhat effective, but additional outreach would have been helpful. It was also noted that additional work towards ensuring communication is presented in different languages and takes into consideration various disabilities would be beneficial.

The Police Bureau received a vast amount of messages locally and nationally about the protests, and there was also extensive misinformation getting announced publically from outside the Bureau. When the Bureau was able to respond to these communication needs and utilize the above strategies, they appeared to be helpful overall. However, when they were not able to, misinformation did not get corrected, the reasons for police action or inaction did not get explained, the complaints and inquiries did not get responded to, and the community received less information regarding how to navigate the protests in general.

Although the 2021 protests have not required the same amount of communication needs, having enough trained staff for most effectively managing communication pertaining to protests continues to be a challenge. The Community Engagement Unit lost some of its personnel in 2021 due to budget cuts so there is less staffing to do this critical work. This lessens the Bureau's ability to build legitimacy and trust with the community.

Maintain Bureau Essential Functions.

The Portland Police Bureau's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) had 54 essential functions identified in 2020. Numerous Essential Functions were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and some were further compounded by the 2020 protests. Some examples of protest related essential function impacts were substantially longer call times, the elimination of traffic enforcement, only taking priority calls during numerous time periods, the inability of investigators to work on caseloads, and delays in the assignment of investigative cases. The Bureau was unable to respond to and follow-up on normal call loads and associated crime issues. At times, only priority calls were dispatched and no cold calls were taken. Starting in June 2020, the average monthly call response times dramatically increased for low, medium, and high priority calls.⁵¹ During part of this time, many investigator caseloads were put on hold and the ability to investigate measure 11 crimes was substantially reduced, as investigators were staffing the protests and receiving additional felony level crimes from the protests to process.

For the 2021 protests, this has been less of an issue, although there have been times when protests have impacted the Bureau's ability to meet essential functions as well. The Bureau is currently in the process of assessing these impacts more thoroughly and updating the COOP.

⁵¹ More information regarding the Bureau's call response time and dispatched call trends can be found in Appendix F. Overall, the rates show a substantial increase in response times during the start of the 2020 protests and many decreases correlated with the reduction of protests. Although substantially improved, many of the response times have remained higher compared to the start of the 2020 protests. This may be related to the continual decrease in sworn staffing and some sustained increases in dispatched calls.

RESEARCH REFLECTING BEST PRACTICES AND LATEST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS FOR CROWD MANAGEMENT

The Bureau is continuing to research national standards and best practices related to public order and policing. Some of the main methods included in this are the Madison Method, Enhanced Social Identity Model, the RDFC (Reasonable, Disarming, Focused, and Consistent) Interaction Model, and the Decision Making Model.

Some of the more recent training sessions attended by the Bureau's core leaders for crowd management are the following.

2021 Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy

2020 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's Leadership Online Debrief

2020 Federal Protective Services Public Order Conference in Seattle, WA

2019 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public Order Conference in Ottawa, Canada⁵²

Literature Research

The Training Division has begun including crowd management as one of its main research topics for literature reviews as well. This information will be used to help assess the alignment of training with national standards and best practices, identify potential future training needs or material for curriculum, and stay apprised of current trends.

Two of the many reports reviewed during this report were *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned* (2018) by the Police Executive Research Forum and *Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police* by Edward R. Maguire and Megan Oakley.

The *Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned* report is highlighted in this document because of its comprehensive view of recommendations for successful crowd management. In this report, they outline the following training recommendations.

Types of training: How departments should equip and train their officers⁵³

Provide mobile field force and civil disturbance training, ensuring any units that will be deployed together during a mass demonstration train together as well.

Train officers and command staff in the ICS [Incident Command System], so they will be well versed in their roles and responsibilities during a mass demonstration.

Train command staff in all relevant ICS positions so each person can fill a number of roles during a mass demonstration.

⁵² This conference had an international guest list of speakers and attendees.

⁵³ These training recommendations are copied from the following source: Police Executive Research Forum, 2018. *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Provide officers and command staff with training on the use of less-lethal munitions. This training includes how to use less-lethal munitions effectively as well as agency policies that determine when, how, and by whom their use can be authorized.

Train officers on protesters' constitutional rights and what they mean in a mass demonstration context. The role of the police is to protect community members' First Amendment rights while protecting public safety. Officers should be trained to understand these roles and to convey them to demonstrators so the demonstrators will know that the police see their role as protecting protesters.

Emphasize the importance of de-escalation and communications tactics in the context of a mass demonstration. The quality of interpersonal interactions between individual officers and protesters can change outcomes. Ensure officers are equipped to handle interactions calmly and professionally, even if protesters are antagonistic. Small groups may engage in violence, but if most demonstrators understand and see that the police view their role as facilitating the demonstration while protecting public safety, violence is less likely to spread.

Simulate the high-stress environment of a demonstration during scenario-based training.

Bring new commanders into the academy to command cadets [new recruits] during their training on crowd movements. This gives commanders an opportunity to practice directing officers and managing crowds during mass demonstrations.

Constantly re-evaluate training in the context of events in other jurisdictions, taking lessons from those events and modifying training accordingly.

Train officers in procedural justice and how they can practice it in the context of managing demonstrations. Procedural justice is about demonstrating respect to community members, treating them with dignity and fairness, and allowing community members to express their views and tell their side of the story during encounters with the police. Research has shown that when the public believes the police exercise their authority in these procedurally just ways, they are more likely to accept the legitimacy of the police and defer to police authority.

Regularly refresh officers' training on responding to protests.

Training together: Bringing mutual aid agencies together to prepare for mass demonstrations

Agencies with mutual aid agreements and memoranda of understanding should participate in joint training for responding to mass demonstrations. This builds trust among these agencies and creates an opportunity to identify any issue areas, such as inconsistencies in policies and tactics regarding use of force, and address them in advance of a mass demonstration. The host agency must be in charge of all officers responding jointly to an event, setting the policies and practices that will be followed.

Agencies should use interagency training as an opportunity to share partner agencies' expertise. For example, if one agency has expertise in civil disturbance training, the agency can share that expertise by training partner agencies' trainers.

Police departments should involve nonpolice agencies, such as fire departments, in ICS training to improve coordinated responses to mass demonstrations.

The Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police report is being highlighted in this document because of its more extensive review of the interpersonal aspects of crowd management, including an understanding of why these principles are important and how they can be implemented. This report includes information on the Elaborated Social Identity Model, the Negotiated Management Model, the social context of policing protests, the history of protests, procedural justice, and the Madison Method. The following are some of the recommendations highlighted in this report.⁵⁴

Recommendations for Policing Crowds from Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorate of the Constabulary (UK)	
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of the Constabulary recommends that public order command training should be significantly enhanced to provide explicit guidance to officers on managing crowd dynamics, which should include the following:	
<p>Prior to a crowd event, police should seek to inform themselves about the culture and general conduct of particular protest crowds. Planning for an operation should include gathering information on the underlying intent of the protest group.</p> <p>The information regarding the general protest culture of the group should be considered in the local context and an assessment made as to how the policing operation can be designed to facilitate the legitimate intentions of the protesters.</p> <p>Police strategy or tactics should not be oriented exclusively toward the control of the crowd through the threat or use of force but should ensure the effective facilitation of the legitimate intentions underpinning the protesters' action. This should be effectively communicated to protesters together with an indication of what conduct will and will not be tolerated by the police.</p>	<p>Initial contact with the protest group at the commencement of the policing operation should be characterized by "low impact" visibility, information gathering, and monitoring. Police on the ground should engage (including nonaggressive postures, smiles, nods, etc.) with crowd members to gather information about their intentions, demeanor, concerns, and sensibilities.</p> <p>Any targeted intervention by police should be informed by an accurate intelligence assessment about the source of the risk or factors causing the problem and ensure that any police response accurately reflects and is proportionate to the actual level and sources of risk.</p> <p>Depending on the nature of the risk, escalation in police deployment may be necessary. A graduated tactical approach should be characterized by firm but targeted communication of tolerance limits and some increased visibility of the police capability to use force. Critically, police should seek to communicate to those posing the risk that they are creating the potential for police action.</p>

⁵⁴ These recommendations are copied from the following source: Maguire, E., & Oakley, M. (2020). *Policing Protests, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police*. New York, NY; Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

Application to Future Training Needs

The Bureau is currently reviewing the Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy curriculum and recent past training to identify which training needs are still needed for command staff. This will inform the future crowd management curriculum for command staff.

The Bureau agrees with the above literature review recommendations and these are integrated into the current training needs list and training planning processes.

CURRENT TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the current crowd management training recommendations being processed from the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) After Action review reports, this training needs assessment evaluation process (which includes community and external stakeholder sources), and other Training Division evaluation processes.

In addition, the reviews and evaluation process findings support the need for continual work in the following areas generally (many of which are in progress):

Improving the organizational health

Strengthening the general management and leadership of the organization

Improving strategic communications planning and implementation

Increasing the use of strategic planning, implementation, and evaluation generally to identify, track, and achieve Bureau goals

Identifying effective and meaningful strategies for mending police and community relations

Continuing to integrate comprehensive cultural competency and anti-racism training throughout the Bureau

Continuing to integrate robust officer wellness training throughout the Bureau

The Training Division has been on track for supporting many of these needs through its Leadership⁵⁵, Procedural Justice, and Wellness Programs. There have recently been some delays in progress due to funding limitations. However, the Training Division continues to progress the mission of these programs to the extent possible.

Training Recommendations Specific to Crowd Response

For All Bureau Members

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Ensure that all Portland Police Bureau members receive the necessary Incident Command System (ICS) training outlined in the special order for National Incident Management System compliance and ensure sufficient staffing of multiple Incident Management Teams (IMT) to allow rotation of staffing during ongoing events.	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training for Bureau members (see FEMA training list)

⁵⁵ Although, the Leadership Program is currently on hold due to staffing and budget reductions.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	All members of the Police Bureau have an obligation to assist in times of emergency and under special circumstances. In order to effectively do so, all members need to be trained in at least one role within the Incident Command System.	First, the PPB should identify what contingency roles members are assigned to, and then training to commensurate with the position they are assigned can be identified (if training in addition to what is already included in the FEMA training list is needed).

For Specialized Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Training

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Provide training on methods for enhancing collaboration with local media outlets (e.g., television stations, radio stations, newspapers, social media) to communicate objective, factual information and promote transparency about crowd control events and police management of those events.	See FEMA training list for Public Information Officers (PIO). Also, consider sending members to the PIO training track provided at the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Major Cities Chiefs Association Conferences.
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Ensure the Portland Police Bureau has enough trained personnel in strategic communications to allow for a more proactive response, including methods for ensuring messaging is accessible for different languages and disabilities. This would also allow for additional members to be on the ground taking photos to help coordinate the flow of information and memorialize the event.	FEMA training for PIOs (see FEMA training list).

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Reinstitute the quarterly Incident Management Team training and discussions.	The Bureau is planning to reinstitute these. The training should be a combination of review of previous incidents, current trends in incident management, and exercises managed under the FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).
Leadership Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Require all who will assume the role of Incident or Deputy Incident Commander to attend the biannual Public Order Training (as well as the semi-annual training if instituted) to ensure they develop a working knowledge of the concepts and theories and build rapport with the public order teams.	The biannual Public Order Training.
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team	Work with regional partners to develop regional multi-agency Incident Management Teams to address various hazards, allowing for insertion of outside Incident Management Teams, using the state Fire Marshal's Incident Management Teams model as a guideline. This would allow the home agency more personnel for other roles and would build experience throughout the state.	The Portland Police Bureau should work with Oregon Emergency Management to develop the training requirements to implement a multi-agency Type 3 IMT IAW, the FEMA National Qualification System. Courses would include all NIMS Compliance Incident Command System classes as outlined in Special Order, ICS Position Specific Course, and ICS-305.
Reporting / Documentation	<p>Ensure some members are trained for the ICS Documentation Unit.</p> <p>Create a system for storing all Incident Command System documents in one location with consistent naming conventions.</p>	<p>FEMA training for Bureau members (see FEMA training list).</p> <p>Ensure the Document Unit personnel are specially trained in not only city documentation requirements but also the role in incident management. In addition, they may benefit from shadowing the State Fire Marshal Incident Management Team.</p>

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Reporting / Documentation	Establish a workgroup to develop a Resource Tracking Standard Operating Procedure to ensure accurate resource tracking throughout an event that provides for operational accountability as well fiscal tracking.	In addition to the FEMA training list, members assigned to Resources (Planning Section) should receive an additional Incident Command System Resources Unit Leader course. The Finance Section should receive the Finance Section Chief training and develop the Resource Tracking Standard Operating Procedure in conjunction with Planning Section (to ensure procedures are comprehensive yet not to overly burden Operations Section personnel involved in the incident).
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Leadership	Train all Lieutenant and above, in an Incident Command System command position.	The Bureau plans on incorporating this into the 2022 Incident Command System Training Order. These trainings will cost money either through members traveling to courses or arranging for them to be conducted locally.
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Leadership	Ensure some staff is trained and experienced in the Planning/Resources Leader position.	Members assigned to Resources should get position-specific training in addition to the current list of FEMA training for members.
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Leadership	Future event staffing should have one Incident Commander with overall authority and Deputy Incident Commanders assigned to fulfill the overall objectives of the Incident Commander, to increase consistency in Incident Action Plans and objectives.	FEMA training for Command staff (see FEMA training list)

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Leadership	Ensure enough non-sworn staff positions are identified and trained to fill the Logistics Section Chief and other ICP roles.	FEMA training for Logistics staff (see FEMA training list)
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation Leadership	Incorporate training for senior leadership in social media messaging including themes of ownership and acknowledgement of issues that the community values.	To be determined. The FEMA PIO training or the PIO training track provided at the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Major Cities Chiefs Association Conferences may incorporate this suggestion.

For Incident Command System Management

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Leadership General Crowd Management	General crowd management methods and fundamentals, such as crowd psychology, facilitation and communication methods, knowing the local protest culture, and principles from the Elaborated Social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.	This training was recently provided by the 2021 Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy. Components of this training will be incorporated into the curriculum for all supervisors.
Leadership Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Crowd management tactics and contingency planning, including when and how to utilize staging and a graduated tactical response, officer health and safety considerations, and targeted arrest strategies. Consideration should be given to any applications for community members with disabilities (e.g., ensuring they have enough time to respond to directions).	This training was recently provided by the 2021 Public Order Command class by Public Order Management Academy. Components of this training will be incorporated into the curriculum for all supervisors.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	The Portland Police Bureau should develop a general plan for processing a fatal shooting scene during a large-scale event, with possible considerations and responses but enough flexibility to ensure practicality given the unique circumstances of these events.	No major training is needed. Incident Command System management and Detectives only will need to be aware of this information.
Leadership Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Expand the current biannual public order training to include command-level training.	The Bureau is considering the best strategy for officers and command to work together during crowd management training.
Incident Command System and/or Incident Management Team Leadership	Unless the tempo of the event requires changing objectives often, utilize shifts within a longer operational period to avoid the need to write more Incident Action Plans.	This will be incorporated into the Incident Command System lessons learned training.

For All Sworn Supervisors

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation Leadership	Educate supervisors on the importance of promoting and recognizing empathic acts in employee-community interactions as a way of building public trust.	The Training Division is incorporating some of this training topic into the 2021 Supervisors In-Service Procedural Justice class. Additional training is to be determined.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Officer Safety	Protecting officer health during protests, including providing all supervisors with a review of signs of stress and exhaustion, PTSD, or other indications of needing a break from the violence. Strategies for building in officer health considerations into protest planning and scheduling, to reduce stress and exhaustion. Ensuring officers know how they can take a break if needed.	<p>The Bureau is doing better at training regarding PTSD. The need to continue to remind/reinforce that trauma is real, recognizing the signs & symptoms, and training for families may be good as well. Having this incorporated into In-Service every other year is being considered.</p> <p>The rest is to be determined.</p>
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures Leadership	Crowd control tactics and fundamentals for supervisors (including overall plan and contingency plans for crowd management, graduated response tactics and related safety, and options for clearing intersections).	To be determined.
Leadership	Effectively leading a Mobile Field Force Team	To be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures Leadership General Crowd Management	Provide additional training for sergeants running Mobile Field Force with an emphasis on leadership and decision-making practice and scenarios.	<p>Some components of this were integrated into the 2021 Crowd Control training and may be incorporated into the 2022 Directive 1010.00 training.</p> <p>The Bureau is currently creating additional curriculum for sergeants and the other ranks (building block curriculum design that is rank specific). This may be prepared for 2022 delivery.</p>

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	Supervisory level training on de-escalation techniques for crowd control events (this may incorporate strategies about general public communications, informing the public of the crowd response decisions and reasons, collaboration and unified messaging among City government, communications to businesses, and collaborating with community groups interested in maintaining public peace and safety). This may also include an understanding of crowd psychology, and principles from the Elaborated social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.	To be determined. The Incident Commander is currently working on reviewing crowd response methods and updating the curriculum.
Leadership	Implementing internal legitimacy and procedural justice during and after protesting events to increase the effectiveness of crowd response efforts and maintain organizational health factors such as morale and employee retention.	To be determined.
Reporting / Documentation	Assign specific personnel outside of public order actions to review force and write the after actions.	Members who are going to do After Action Reports for large-scale incidents or events will need specialized training on writing worthwhile After Action Reports that include corrective action items (CAI) and a process for assigning the CAI to specific personnel or programs to ensure they are actually corrected. This training is to be determined.

For All Sworn Members

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	<p>Managing protestors engaged in aggressive and challenging behaviors (e.g., surrounding or blocking police vehicles, breaking into precincts, surrounding a law enforcement individual or group such as a Mobile Field Force).</p> <p>Incorporate into training examples from past events, contingency planning, response effectiveness, and what-if scenarios.</p>	<p>Part of this training was included during the 2021 online training. Additional training is being discussed for integration into future Mobile Field Force training (through In-Service or stand-alone training sessions).</p> <p>The Bureau is considering creating some debriefs that include what occurred at the street level and related thought processes. This may be very staff intensive to develop.</p>
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	<p>Provide training on methods for strengthening police-community relations specific to crowd management situations, such as transparent communication, empathetic acts, casual/individualized interactions, etc. Include communication skills that may promote greater dialogue and understanding between the police and the community.</p> <p>This may include some aspects of crowd psychology, facilitation and communication methods, knowing the local protest culture, and principles from the Elaborated Social Identity Model, Negotiated Management Model, procedural justice, and the Madison Method.</p>	<p>The Training Division is incorporating some of this training topic into the 2021 Supervisors In-Service Procedural Justice class. Additional training is to be determined.</p>
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation	<p>Effective de-escalation techniques for crowd control events. Including training on response tactics that are perceived as “less threatening” by citizens during crowd control events; such as employing “out of sight” response strategies, graduated responses, targeted arrest strategies, avoiding the use of chemical agents, etc.</p>	<p>To be determined. The Bureau is currently working on reviewing crowd response methods and updating the curriculum.</p>

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Officer Safety General Crowd Management	Situational awareness and ambush preparedness specific to crowd control situations. Including continuing to provide training to officers regarding the rearguard security and cases where this may be particularly helpful in crowd control situations.	Further integrate this into the Mobile Field Force training, emphasizing the importance of the rearguard and cases where that may be helpful, and integrating other tactics pertaining to officer safety.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures General Crowd Management	Potential Bureau strategies and contingency plans for addressing different types of crowd control situations.	To be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures General Crowd Management	Conduct a comprehensive review of In-Service training for Mobile Field Forces, including the lessons learned from the 2020 events.	Some components of this were integrated into the 2021 Crowd Control training and may be incorporated into the 2022 Directive 1010.00 training. The Bureau also plans to revamp the Mobile Field Force curriculum and deliver this training.
Directives, Law, and Policy	Directives, Law, and Standard Operating Procedures pertaining to crowd management (including clarity on the use of force for crowd management, the Temporary Restraining Order, and law enforcement use of recording devices related laws and policy, and concrete guidance for how law enforcement can effectively apply these laws in crowd management situations). ⁵⁶	To be determined. Some of these are pending legislative and directive changes.

⁵⁶ This may include the following:

HB2481, Prohibits law enforcement from receiving certain military surplus equipment
HB2928, Regulates use of chemical incapacitants, projectiles, sound devices by law enforcement
HB3059, Relates to unlawful assemblies and arresting of people who do not disperse
HB3164, Interfering with a police officer
HB3355, ID requirements for law enforcement during crowd management
HB4208, Use of teargas for crowd management
TRO, the Temporary Restraining Order for PPB
635.10 Crowd Management Directive
1010.00 Use of Force Directive

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Officer Safety	Provide training to all sworn members pertaining to situational awareness and ambushes specifically to Crowd Control events (including knowledge and study on violent crowds, information regarding related tactics to distract and/or agitate officers, and the inherent dangers of direct action events).	The Bureau plans to integrate this into Mobile Field Force training, which may be delivered through In-Service or stand-alone training sessions.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Provide additional training on Control Tactics techniques utilized in Crowd Control situations.	The Bureau plans to integrate this into Mobile Field Force training, which may be delivered through In-Service or stand-alone training sessions.
Reporting / Documentation	Refresher training for all officers and supervisors in the use of RegJIN force codes.	This was included in the 2021 Crowd Control training and may be incorporated into the 2022 Directive 1010.00 training.
Communication, Procedural Justice, and/or De-escalation Officer Safety	Maintaining composure during unrelenting, hostile situations. This may include some components of crowd dynamics and the importance of maintaining composure to increase chances of calming the violence, Verbal Judo ⁵⁷ , stress inoculation training, and options available to officers to break from the violence if needed.	To be determined.
Crowd Management Tactical Procedures	Crowd control tactics and fundamentals (including crowd arrest procedures, rail use safety training, shield training, and Mobile Field Force movement).	To be determined.
Directives, Law, and Policy	Incorporate information from the District Attorney's Office regarding the filing and prosecution of protest-related cases.	The Training Division is considering incorporating this into the 2022 Investigators In-Service.

⁵⁷ This is a method of communication that emphasizes empathy, listening, and other communication techniques to resolve conflicts and de-escalate situations. More information can be obtained from www.verbaljudo.com.

Training, Skills, and/or Knowledge Gap	Recommendation	Training Notes
Use of Force	Training for all members on force justification specific to the use of force in crowd management situations.	Part of this training is currently being conducted during the 2021 Crowd Control training. Additional scenario-based and applied training is to be determined.
Use of Force	Other use of force decision making (including what is important for preventing litigation, what constitutes a crowd, and if the Conducted Electrical Weapon can be utilized when arresting a combative subject during a crowd event).	To be determined.
Use of Force	Use of force reporting (including providing training to all members on the following force terminology as it pertains to batons to ensure consistent reporting: shove, push and strike; and force reporting audit deficiencies that apply to current reporting processes and requirements ⁵⁸).	Some components of this were integrated into the 2021 Crowd Control training. The Bureau is also considering incorporating this into the 2022 Directive 1010.00 or online training.

For Specialized Public Order Unit

During the time of this reporting, it is unknown whether the Rapid Response Team is going to resume this role or if the Bureau is going to have to develop a new specialized team for public order. This decision will impact what training will be required, so this section will be further developed once that information is known. However, regardless of this decision, the following needs have been discussed.

The training will be coordinated with the Training Division to ensure consistency in the Bureau training curriculum and have additional support pertaining to the evaluation of training and tracking of training needs.

All grenadiers will receive training at least every six months per the Temporary Restraining Order.

⁵⁸ The Portland Police Bureau's 2020 Crowd Control Audit Results found some reporting deficiencies, although an overall high reporting compliance rate. Of the deficiencies found, the main trends pertained to documentation of formal debriefs, chain of command review, timeliness, injuries, communication, and review of force by other agencies. Some of the recommendations in the report pertain to changes in the Master After Action form, Directive 635.10, and the After Action form technology. Some of the training needs may be able to be incorporated into other crowd management force reporting trainings immediately and others may need to be reassessed pending the decisions and follow-up to these recommendations.

All members will receive more specialized training for crowd management than was done previously. A set schedule for these maintenance training requirements will be established, such as one day per month.

The training will include more stress inoculation training, crowd psychology, and public order methodology.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Training

The following list of FEMA training needs have been identified for Bureau members. Additional FEMA training needs are anticipated to be identified as the Bureau works through the crowd response recommendations.

FEMA Training	People to Attend	When Anticipating Completion	Training Status
IS-100: Introduction to Incident Command System	All Bureau Members	Oct-22	In progress
IS-700: National Incident Management System	All Bureau Members	Oct-22	In progress
IS-200: Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS-200	All Sergeants, Lieutenants, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	Oct-22	In progress
IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction	All Sergeants, Lieutenants, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	Oct-22	In progress
ICS-300: Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents	All Sergeants and above, PIOs, and Professional Staff Supervisors	Oct-22	In progress, two courses are scheduled for Sept/Oct 2021, and one per quarter will be scheduled before Oct 2022.
G0191: Emergency Operations Center/Incident Command System Interface	All Lieutenants and above	Oct-22	In progress, two courses will be scheduled before Oct 2022.

FEMA Training	People to Attend	When Anticipating Completion	Training Status
ICS-400: Advanced Incident Command System for Command and General Staff Complex Incidents	All Lieutenants and above, and PIOs	Oct-22	In progress, some training sessions will be completed by 2021. One course is scheduled for Nov 2021, and two more will be scheduled before Oct 2022.
ICS-402: Emergency Management Director Briefing	Chief, DC, AC's	Oct-22	The Bureau is working with the Portland Bureau of Emergency Management to schedule this in 2022, as other city bureau directors and deputies need it as well.
E/L0967: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Logistics Section Chief Course*	Members who may be needed to fill the role of Logistics Section Chief to prepare for, prevent or respond to ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.	Dec-21	In progress, some training sessions will be completed by 2021.
IS-29: Public Information Officer Awareness	All Bureau and IMT PIO staff	Oct-22	Online
G0290: Basic Public Information Officer	PIO Sergeants and Professional Staff Supervisors	Oct-22	To be determined. Need to find a course for members to travel to or request to host it.
MGT314: Enhanced Incident Management at Texas A&M TEEX*	All IMT members	TBD	To be determined.
ICS-305: USFA O-305, Type 3 All-Hazards Incident Management Team*	All IMT members	TBD	To be determined.
EO388: Advanced PIO*	All PIO Staff	TBD	To be determined.

*These trainings are not required for maintaining NIMS compliance.

Additional Potential Training Needs

There are several recommendations pending other decisions, such as upcoming legislative decisions, City decisions, changes to reporting processes, and the status of the Rapid Response Team (RRT). These recommendations include the following and will be reassessed for any training implications after additional information is known.

PPB should continue to work with the City to implement the body-worn camera program.

All command staff must attend the Incident Management Team quarterly training meetings. Regular tabletop exercises must be developed to provide practice for newer Incident Commanders and Deputy Incident Commanders to gain confidence and consistency.

PPB should bolster its ability to observe, identify, track, and apprehend individuals committing criminal activity.

Develop resources that would allow those engaged in criminal activity to be identified and strategically removed using the least amount of force.

Continue to build positive relations with our outside law enforcement agencies by continuing to train with them.

The City should work with State officials to develop a program that allows for continued training with National Guard members and a protocol for their assistance during emergencies.

Regional basic and biannual group training should continue to include National Guard units to maintain the operational familiarity and cohesiveness of all units involved.

Explore expanding the regional basic and biannual group training to include more agencies and possibly agencies from Washington State.

Rapid Response Team training should continue to focus on all hazards to ensure that they are well-rounded and able to rapidly adapt to evolving tactics.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to develop a definition of press for the Portland Police Bureau policy.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to seek modifications to the Temporary Restraining Order, to allow for reasonable response options.

Investigate alternatives to less lethal munitions for crowd control events.

The Portland Police Bureau and the City should continue to identify ways to provide better protective gear to members responding to the crowd control events. This includes continuing to research protective goggles that can be placed over the helmet shields to provide laser protection and obtaining funding for helmets that provide ballistic and concussion protection, allow for the use of a gas mask, and provide hearing protection.

Create a system in SharePoint Enterprise that would allow for the tracking of information related to arrests in a centralized location, which could be used by the PIO's office for faster communications.

Find ways for the Bureau to better track, and report on, officer injuries during protest events.

Update Standard Operating Procedures for Formal and Field arrest to reflect the learned efficiencies.

Review use of force policy to develop an abbreviated Force Data Collection Report and process to better streamline the capturing of data and flow of review for public order force reports.

Review the following listed Directives for possible amendments for large-scale and/or long-term crowd management events (specifically for reporting requirements): Directive 1010.00 Use of Force, 635.10 Crowd Management/Crowd Control, 905.00 Non-Force After Action Reporting, and 900.00 General Reporting Guidelines.

Continue to train and certify officers on mountain bikes for public order deployments.

Revise the Force Data Collection Report to collect all necessary data in crowd control situations, and implement an electronic system, such as SharePoint, for collection and tracking.

Develop an updated tracking system for After Actions.

Revise the Force Data Collection Report and After Action Report data reports and seek a technological solution to the gathering and tracking of data.

The Portland Police Bureau should look for ways to connect video to After Action Reports that are in the process or have been completed and find ways to incorporate them in the analysis. Depending on timelines and when evidence may be received, this could be challenging.

Consider developing a system (potentially using SharePoint Enterprise) to collect and track subject injury reported to the Field Arrest Team to ensure it was followed up on and the appropriate documentation was completed by the arresting officer. This would be to capture injuries reported by persons in custody after they had been transferred to the Field Arrest Team.

Create a box for members to check if the video or photos observed are taken by non-Portland Police Bureau persons.

Training For Other Government Officials and Boards

The following are recommendations pertaining to providing training for those involved but not necessarily part of law enforcement.

Incident Command System training for those with policy-level input so they understand their role and the development of the objective and planning processes to enable an event to run more effectively.

Crowd management training should be provided to elected officials to help provide an understanding of crowd dynamics and Portland Police Bureau capabilities.

Specific training on techniques, tools, and force should also be mandatory for any Portland Police Bureau or community member who participate in Public Review Boards related to crowd management events.

CLOSING SUMMARY

Several reports have noted that the protesting dynamics have been significantly changing over the last several years, which impacts the most effective law enforcement response. In addition, a significant amount of research on protesting has been conducted in Europe and researchers are still in the process of studying the application in the United States. It is anticipated that as this research develops, additional changes will be made to the Bureau's crowd management strategies and training.

To date, numerous training recommendations have been identified for enhancing the Bureau's crowd management response. Many of these recommendations also relate to enhancing skills needed for managing many other types of law enforcement interactions. Accomplishing these tasks will be a massive undertaking. Having at least one full-time instructor with expertise in crowd management and the Incident Command System assigned to the Training Division for a minimum of two years may be needed in order to ensure this work can be accomplished. This instructor would be responsible for designing some of the curricula for all sworn members, instructing training sessions, coordinating the design of the management-level and other more specialized curriculum with additional experts within or outside of the Bureau, helping to design the crowd management trainings for other government officials and the public, and assisting with the review of research for training applications and curriculum development.

The Training Division will continue to collect and analyze information to support the training needs assessment and planning processes. Additional information is currently in process pertaining to less lethal devices, the impacts of the protests on maintaining Bureau essential functions, understanding local protesting groups' mission(s) and goals, and general crowd management techniques. It has also been noted that a comprehensive training plan would be beneficial as members get further along in completing their core Incident Command training sessions.

It is also important to note that while training is critical and can be highly impactful, it is largely ineffective in situations with significant barriers to effective on-the-job application.⁵⁹ It was apparent during much of this evaluation process that there have been numerous obstacles to being able to apply the best practices for crowd management in the most effective manner. For instance, the staffing issues, the incongruity of messaging among local government, inability to utilize local law enforcement agencies with a more similar response approach for support, inability to communicate with the Federal law enforcement, inability to live stream, reduction of force options, and in some cases an inability to address some crime issues, all greatly impacts how the Bureau can respond. Addressing many of these issues will be critical for ensuring the effective application of the currently planned training curriculum.

City-Level Evaluation

Throughout this evaluation process, it has been clear that an evaluation of these events at the City-level may be beneficial as well (if not already in progress). While the Portland Police Bureau has a critical role

⁵⁹ For instance, Brinkerhoff, R. (2006), found that only about 15 percent of training participants were able to successfully apply training objectives when the focus of the intervention is on training. However, 85 percent were able to successfully apply training objectives when a more comprehensive intervention approach was used. The Training Division utilizes the Kirkpatrick Model of Training Evaluation which utilizes a comprehensive approach, including the assessment of barriers to effective on-the-job application and the alignment of training objectives with other organizational factors. More information can be found at: Kirkpatrick, J. & Kirkpatrick, W. (2016). *Kirkpatrick's Four Levels of Training Evaluation*. Alexandria, VA: ATD Press.

in managing these events for the City, they have a limited role in deciding how these events will be managed (e.g., if surveillance and force options can be utilized, what crimes can be reinforced, curfews, how a “press” person is identified and related restrictions, etc.). The violence that occurred during the 2020 protests had extensive damage on community members, businesses, public employees, and the City as a whole. It does not appear that the community is overall supportive and/or capable of absorbing these extensive costs. In addition, these costs reduce the City’s ability to carryout programs that would better serve the community and relate to many of the protestors’ voiced concerns.

This is not to suggest that the community (including businesses), nor the police, have any issues with peaceful demonstrations. While peaceful protests demand some City resources to manage and sometimes place inconveniences on the community, they are often not extensive, and the importance of these public demonstrations and people’s right to legitimately exercise their freedom of speech have been recognized throughout the evaluation process.

Such an evaluation may include:

- A comprehensive analysis of the costs of the protests (including for the City, businesses, and the community).

- A cost/benefits analysis of the protests.

- A review of Portland livability measures and consideration to what is needed for Portland’s health and success as a whole.

- An extensive review of the differing community perspectives (including those among different protesting and activist groups).

- A review of the stated objectives from the different protesting groups and whether there is a more effective way for the City to work with the community groups to integrate objectives that are determined beneficial and keep the community informed of those already in progress.

Collaboration in discussing the results and related future planning may be needed with the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office, as well as other influential decision-makers.

APPENDIX A: PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU SWORN STAFFING DISPARITY

The Portland Police Bureau sworn staffing numbers have been substantially lower than the average rate for police jurisdictions of a similar size for many years. This disparity has been worsening over time and the staffing challenges are further exacerbated by difficulties in hiring and retaining officers⁶⁰. Staffing was a substantial challenge to responding to the protests in 2020, as well as for maintaining essential Bureau functions.

This is an important influencing factor of the 2020 protest outcomes and a much needed consideration for pre-planning for future years. Although the 2021 protests have not required the high levels of personnel compared to 2020, this has continued to be a challenge for staffing some of the 2021 protests as well. The Bureau has also had to make several cuts to Divisions and services to meet the allocated budget.

Concerns regarding the low sworn staffing levels for the City of Portland have been recognized and discussed for many years. In 2015, the City contracted with Matrix Consulting Group for a Police Bureau Staffing Study. The results of this study recommended adding additional positions. In 2016, the City of Portland conducted another analysis of patrol staffing needs. While noting that the previous staffing study's (since 2013) projected staffing capacity had not yet been met, it estimated that in order to accomplish the current expectations for policing an even greater amount of patrol officers were needed. Some of these expectations pertain to the increased time required for report writing, attending community meetings and engaging in proactive problem-solving, and following up on crimes. None of the recommendations from these studies seem to have resulted in any sustained additional sworn staffing. The current authorized sworn staffing counts are the lowest they have been since 1993, and the actual sworn staffing counts are the lowest they have been since such information has been collected (2002).

The following graph provides the rate of sworn Portland Police Bureau staffing given the inhabitant population in Portland. The amount of authorized and working (currently staffed) sworn staff were obtained from the Business Services Division⁶¹, and the population estimates were obtained from the Oregon Population Research Center⁶². The red line represents the 2019 national average amount of sworn members for police jurisdictions of a similar population size to Portland.


⁶⁰ Bernstein, M. (April 4, 2021). "'Overworked, overwhelmed and burned out': Why Portland cops say they're leaving in droves." *The Oregonian*. Retrieved December 31, 2021 from <https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2021/04/overworked-overwhelmed-and-burned-out-why-portland-cops-say-theyre-leaving-in-droves.html>

Kavanaugh, S. & Cansler, D. (2021, November 7). "Why Portland has fewer cops now than any point in the past 30 years." *The Oregonian*. Retrieved December 20, 2021 from: <https://www.oregonlive.com/data/2021/11/why-portland-has-less-cops-now-than-any-point-in-past-30-years.html>

⁶¹ This information was obtained in September 2021.

⁶² This was obtained through their population estimate reports which can be found at Population Estimate Reports | Portland State University (pdx.edu).

Portland Police Bureau: Sworn Staffing Rates



*The population counts for 2020 were utilized for this calculation, since the numbers for 2021 are not yet available.

The following chart demonstrates the amount of sworn members the Portland Police Bureau would need to match different benchmarks based on the jurisdiction location or population.

916 Authorized Positions 810 Currently Filled Positions ⁶³	Portland Police Bureau Sworn Staffing Levels as of June 2021	Portland Police Bureau's Budgeting Office
Amount of Sworn Members PPB would need to meet the following standards:		
1728 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of a similar population size (26 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics ⁶⁴
1376 Sworn Positions	The national median amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of a similar population size (20.7 sworn/10,000 pop)	Governing calculations of the 2016 FBI UCR Statistics ⁶⁵
1529 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of all sizes (23 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics
1063 Sworn Positions	The national average amount of sworn for police jurisdictions of all sizes in the West of the nation. (16 sworn/10,000 pop)	2019 FBI UCR Statistics

⁶³ These staffing counts are recorded in June of each year. These numbers reflect the staffing counts at the time of June 30, 2021.

⁶⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigations (Fall 2020). FBI UCR Statistics: Full-time Law Enforcement Officers, by Region and Geographic Division by Population Group, Number, and Rate per 1,000 Inhabitants, 2019. Retrieved on September 21, 2021 from <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/table-71/table-71.xls#overview>

⁶⁵ Maciag, M. (2014, May 7: Updated July 2018). Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities. *Governing*. Retrieved September 21, 2021. <https://www.governing.com/archive/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-departments.html>

Although identifying the exact amount of sworn members Portland needs requires a more in-depth analysis,⁶⁶ this information provides support that this is an essential consideration for understanding Portland Police Bureau on-the-job outcomes and understanding how to enhance Bureau outcomes for the future.

⁶⁶ There are different approaches to assessing sworn staffing needs. Population is one important consideration but there are also many others influencing jurisdiction characteristics such as crime rates and calls for service, the amount of influx of people to a City (e.g., for employment, tourism, social), the amount of public events to manage (e.g., protesting, parades), and public expectations of law enforcement (e.g., influencing time required on calls, community engagement).

APPENDIX B: PROTEST-RELATED CRIMINAL OFFENSES

Extensive crime has occurred during the protests since 2020, this was particularly problematic for those occurring during 2020. To better understand the amounts and types of crime, the Incident Command System reports were reviewed, a summary of the offense statistics was obtained from the Strategic Services Division, Portland Police Bureau press releases were reviewed⁶⁷, and additional information was obtained from Incident Command staff and others working the protests. In addition, the U.S. Homeland Security report⁶⁸ and external news reports discuss some of the crime issues occurring during the 2020 Portland protests.

While the types of crime are well documented, the amount is unfortunately undercounted due to the understaffing of law enforcement (there was not enough law enforcement to attend to all the calls, and in some cases, law enforcement could not intervene in an assault due to barriers from the protestors), many crimes being addressed by other law enforcement agencies (only the reports taken by Portland Police Bureau members are included in the statistics), reduced reporting due to the District Attorney's decisions not to prosecute several crimes, and other barriers to reporting (e.g., threats). However, the offense counts taken by the Portland Police Bureau are included in this report as they help demonstrate the crime types and amounts.

Incident Command System Activity Log and Summary Report Findings

These reports provide a summary of event activities such as Intel reports, protest observations, crime occurrences, and police responses (e.g., de-escalation attempts, warnings, and crowd dispersement announcements) during a set timeframe. Many of the days are filled with extensive criminal activity and suspicious behaviors.

The following provides a brief summary of the types of crimes that occurred during these protests. Additional examples and descriptions of many of these crimes can be found in the cited Portland Police Bureau press releases, news articles, and Department of Homeland Security report.

Assaults and violence against other people

There are numerous reports of protestors throwing dangerous projectiles at officers, community members, speakers, other emergency responders (e.g. medics), and other protestors. The projectiles included things such as glass bottles, fireworks (including commercial-grade fireworks and M-80s), rocks

⁶⁷ The following are a few examples of the Portland Police Bureau Press Releases regarding the 2020 protest-related crime issues. More information regarding the Portland Police Bureau's Press Releases can be found at

<https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/news/>

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, May 29 & 31). Update: Information About Additional Arrests from May 30 Riot.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, June 17). Demonstration Update June 16-17, 2020 One Arrested after Vehicle Strikes 3 Pedestrians and Flees.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, June 23). Chief Chuck Lovell's Statement on Ongoing Demonstrations and Impacts.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, July 18). Group Activity in Portland July 17, 2020.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, July 18). Portland Police Bureau encourages peaceful demonstrations - and update from last night.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, August 21). Update: Assault Suspect Turns Self In, Witness Identified.

Portland Police Bureau Press Release (2020, October 12). Destructive Crowd Topples Historic Statues in South Park Blocks, Breaks Windows, Arrests Made.

⁶⁸ U.S. Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (2021). *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

(including fist-size rocks), other objects on fire, smoke bombs, metal bars (components of fencing), and Molotov cocktails. Some projectiles were thrown with slingshots and equipment to launch commercial fireworks.

Many people were assaulted with more traditional weapons, such as knives and firearms. There were many accounts of people walking around with swords, batons, and baseball bats as well, although it is unknown if all of these objects were used in the assaults (the police were not able to intervene or respond to all of the assaults that occurred due to staffing and an inability to get to victims; they were also often ordered not to address much of the crime that occurred⁶⁹). Some people were shot at with firearms. One Patriot Prayer member, Aaron “Jay” Danielson, was killed by gunfire during these attacks by an opposing protestor.

In addition, there were numerous occurrences of people shining lasers at people which can cause permanent eye damage. Lasers were also shone on flying planes, which can completely block the pilot’s view and cause a plane crash.

Some community members were chased by protestors on bicycles, vehicles, or foot. Many passing vehicles were banged on by protestors, some people got locked in their cars, and at least one person had fireworks thrown at them while being chased by someone on a bike. In one of these cases, a truck being chased by protestors eventually crashed and the protestors subsequently severely assaulted the man, which included head wounds and left him unconscious.⁷⁰

There were also some occurrences of occupied buildings being barricaded and set on fire.

Businesses: Destruction and Theft

Many businesses, including those owned by people of underrepresented groups, experienced intentional and unintentional destruction to their buildings. There were numerous cases of protestors breaking windows, removing protective plywood barriers, creating graffiti (including tagging), and setting fires outside of businesses. Some businesses were caught on fire and some fireworks were even set off inside businesses. The Portland Police Bureau was able to obtain cost estimates from 59 of the business and church vandalism cases. These estimated costs ranged from \$150 to \$1 million, with a total cost of \$2,318,677.50.⁷¹

Businesses experienced extensive amounts of theft through burglaries, robberies, and looting as well. Some of these cases occurred with people armed with chainsaws, guns, and bats. Some of these cases were terrifying to employees and included employees securing themselves in a locked area while protestors rampaged the building. Some business owners started arming themselves early on in the protests.

⁶⁹ This was due to City and County decisions pertaining to how the crime at protests would be managed as well as the various pending law changes and legal restraints placed on law enforcement in regards to crowd management.

⁷⁰ More information regarding this case can be found at: Brown, L. (2020, August 17). BLM mob beats white man unconscious after making him crash truck: video. *New York Post*. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from BLM mob beat white man unconscious after making him crash truck (nypost.com)

Cline, S. (2020, August 16). Portland protesters assault driver of crashed truck downtown. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from Portland protesters assault driver of crashed truck downtown - The Washington Post

⁷¹ The costs estimates were obtained from hard costs from the responsible parties of the builds and estimations based on previous cost information.

Government Buildings and Parks: Destruction

Many government buildings were targeted for violence and experienced extensive damage. For instance, the estimated damage to the Hatfield US Courthouse alone was \$1.6 million.⁷² There were numerous cases of protestors shooting projectiles at government buildings including commercial-grade fireworks, bottles, large rocks, smoke bombs, wrist rockets, and Molotov cocktails. Many windows were broken and at least one building, the Federal Courthouse, had bullet holes.

Some of the buildings were barricaded while occupied. This included surrounding buildings with fencing, setting fires (including at least one fire set at an employee entrance), barricading doors, breaking building cameras, setting trip wire at a front entrance, and attempting to throw multiple incendiary devices into the buildings.

Numerous incidents of removing protective plywood barriers and fences occurred, using metal bars, hammers, sledgehammers, and saws/grinders. Doors were breached using crowbars.

Several of the parks experienced damage, many fires, and the destruction of many statues.

The total amount of damage to City of Portland property was reported at \$2,044,243.02.⁷³

Miscellaneous

Numerous other types of crime occurred as well, such as taking dumpsters and other objects and lighting them on fire (including in streets), breaking street lights, street racing, streets and freeway entrances blocked, and climbing on buildings.

Portland Police Bureau Offense Statistics⁷⁴

The following provides the Portland Police Bureau offense statistics for all of the 2020 protests as well as the 2021 protests (for January through June 2021). As noted above, it is anticipated that these statistics are undercounted for several reasons. However, along with the information provided in the Incident Command System reports, they do help demonstrate the amount and severity of crime that occurred during the 2020 protests. For instance, not only does it demonstrate much higher crime amounts during the 2020 protests, compared to the 2021 protests, the percentage of more violent crimes was higher during the 2020 protests. The 2020 protests had higher percentages of person, arson, burglary, and weapon crimes compared to the 2021 protests. These general findings correlate well with the Incident Command reports.

⁷² U.S. Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (2021). *DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

⁷³ This information was obtained by City of Portland's Risk Management. The amount reported by the Bureau assets managers was \$1,597,620.02 and includes city personnel incurred cost for the cleanup and preservation of property work (excluding damages to art). The City's art Curator reported \$446,623 in damaged city owned art (monuments).

⁷⁴ The offense statistics were obtained from the Strategic Services Division in September 2021.



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Reported Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland May 29, 2020 - December 31, 2020

This report provides offense statistics reported to the Portland Police Bureau during a protest or demonstration between May 29, 2020 and December 31, 2020.

These statistics only include known protest or demonstrations where a police report was submitted and a protests/demonstrations offense code was applied to the case, regardless of whether a crime occurred. Statistics may include a small number of offenses that are related to a protest case but occurred during a non-protest incident (ie: a warrant arrest at a protest for a separate non-protest incident). The statistics do not include protest/demonstration cases that occurred in Portland but were reported by another law enforcement agency.

Total Days with a Known Protest	155
Total Reported Protest-Related Cases	1,578
Total Reported Group A Offenses	676
Total Reported Offenses	2,707


Total Days with a Known Protest is the count of days with a police report containing a protest/demonstration offense.

Total Reported Protest-Related Cases is the count of cases with a protest/demonstration offense plus any related cases.

Total Reported Group A Offenses is the total number of reported NIBRS Group A offenses during a protest or related case.

Total Reported Offenses is the total number of reported offenses during a protest or related case. This includes Group A offenses as well as Group B and Traffic offenses. Disorderly Conduct accounts for over 50% of these offenses (1,411 offenses).

Total Reported NIBRS Group A Offenses by Occurrence Date



Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between May 29, 2020 and December 31, 2020. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on September 20, 2021.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on September 20, 2021



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Reported NIBRS Group A Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland
May 29, 2020 - December 31, 2020

This report groups the NIBRS Group A offenses into custom reporting categories to better highlight key offenses of interest.

Person	Aggravated Assault	101
	Murder/Negligent Manslaughter	1
	Simple Assault/Intimidation	94
	Total	196
Property	Arson	90
	Burglary	88
	Car Prowl	4
	Identity Theft	1
	Motor Vehicle Theft	4
	Robbery	9
	Theft From Building	3
	Theft of Services	1
	Vandalism	212
	Other Larceny	6
	Other Property Offenses	2
	Total	420
Society	Drug Offenses	6
	Weapons Law Violations	54
	Total	60
Total Group A Offenses		676

Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between May 29, 2020 and December 31, 2020. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on September 20, 2021.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on September 20, 2021.



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Reported Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland January 1, 2021 - June 30, 2021

This report provides offense statistics reported to the Portland Police Bureau during a protest or demonstration between January 1, 2021 - June 30, 2021.

These statistics only include known protest or demonstrations where a police report was submitted and a protests/demonstrations offense code was applied to the case, regardless of whether a crime occurred. Statistics may include a small number of offenses that are related to a protest case but occurred during a non-protest incident (ie: a warrant arrest at a protest for a separate non-protest incident). The statistics do not include protest/demonstration cases that occurred in Portland but were reported by another law enforcement agency.

Total Days with a Known Protest	37
Total Reported Protest-Related Cases	168
Total Reported Group A Offenses	134
Total Reported Offenses	334


Total Days with a Known Protest is the count of days with a police report containing a protest/demonstration offense.

Total Reported Protest-Related Cases is the count of cases with a protest/demonstration offense plus any related cases.

Total Reported Group A Offenses is the total number of reported NIBRS Group A offenses during a protest or related case.

Total Reported Offenses is the total number of reported offenses during a protest or related case. This includes Group A offenses as well as Group B and Traffic offenses. Disorderly Conduct accounts for about 45% of these offenses (149 offenses).

Total Reported NIBRS Group A Offenses by Occurrence Date



Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between January 1, 2021 and June 30, 2021. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on September 20, 2021.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on September 20, 2021



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Reported NIBRS Group A Offenses Associated with a Protest or Demonstration in Portland
January 1, 2021 - June 30, 2021

This report groups the NIBRS Group A offenses into custom reporting categories to better highlight key offenses of interest.

Person	Aggravated Assault	12
	Simple Assault/Intimidation	3
	Total	15
Property	Arson	6
	Burglary	4
	Robbery	2
	Vandalism	100
	Other Larceny	1
	Total	113
Society	Weapons Law Violations	5
	Other Society Offenses	1
	Total	6
Total Group A Offenses		134

Data Notes:

Statistics include all Portland Police Bureau cases with a Protests/Demonstrations offense code and all related cases in RegJIN that occurred between January 1, 2021 and June 30, 2021. Cases marked as "unfounded" are not included in crime statistics.

Reports are subject to change. Data accessed via RegJIN RMS on September 20, 2021.

Completed by Strategic Services Division on September 20, 2021

APPENDIX C: PROTEST-RELATED OFFICER INJURIES

The violence that occurred during the 2020 protests, as well as the extensive hours required for staffing the protests, resulted in numerous injuries among sworn Portland Police Bureau (PPB) members. Many law enforcement personnel from other agencies, as well as other first responders, working at the protests experienced injuries as well. While some of the injuries that occurred to non-PPB personnel are noted in the Incident Command System reports, only the injury counts for PPB sworn members and Department of Homeland Security officers were available at the time of this reporting. There is speculation that there were more injuries than included in the injury log counts as one of the challenges noted in the After Action Reports of the events was documenting officer injuries. However, these data still help demonstrate the number of injuries that occurred to law enforcement, as well as the types of injuries.

Portland Police Bureau Sworn Member Injuries

The 2020 injury log statistics that specifically related to the protests were the following⁷⁵:

A total of 462 PPB reported injuries from the 2020 protests.⁷⁶ Of the 462 reported injuries, 42 officer injuries resulted in time loss/days away from work.

421 of these injuries were related to the protests but not use of force.

41 of these injuries were related to use of force at the protests. Note: A total of 58 officers sustaining at least one injury directly related to the use of force was found in the Use of Force After Action reporting process, further supporting the injury log counts may be underrepresented.

The largest portion of the injuries occurred as a result of the following:

PPB members had red, blue, or green lasers repeatedly shined in their eyes (this may have resulted in eye damage for some).

PPB members were assaulted by protesters throwing objects such as rocks, bricks, sticks, frozen cans, glass bottles, and commercial fireworks (mortar rounds, M-80's, etc.).

PPB members were assaulted by protesters by being punched, kicked, bit, head-butted, tackled, struck by skateboards, signs, sticks, etc.

PPB members were exposed to subjects who were purportedly COVID 19 positive.

PPB members were exposed to the excessive noise of the protest events, such as the sound truck announcements and commercial-grade firework explosions (the latter may have resulted in permanent hearing loss for some members).

PPB members reported injuries as a result of the prolonged wearing of the specialized equipment (e.g., the weight of the Rapid Response Team gear).

⁷⁵ A summary of the injury log statistics were obtained from the FPDR Liaison Sergeant who manages the Portland Police Bureau's injury database.

⁷⁶ The total number of injury logs can include different injuries occurring to the same officer from different incidents.

PPB members were exposed to inhalants such as CS gas, smoke, pepper spray, etc.

PPB members reported injuries pertaining to stress and fatigue relating to prolonged days of working protests (some of these have the potential to result in PTSD claims).

In addition to enduring the extensive working hours and violent conditions, many PPB members (and some family members) also experienced targeted threats, extensive harassment, and stalking, many of which extended outside of work hours. In 2020, over 600 Bureau members expressed safety concerns to the City Attorney's Office in response to a public records request. Some of them pertained to the general threats to officers and/or violence occurring during the 2020 protests. However, hundreds of those cases met the criteria for direct, targeted threats. The following provides a few examples of these situations⁷⁷.

During the protest, an individual made verbal and physical threats against an officer, including stating, "I will kill you" while calling him "Uncle Tom." An individual called the officer numerous racial slurs, including the "N" word, while protesters threatened his life. The officer was threatened by an individual who said: "I'm going to kill you" and "I'm going to find where you live."

On May 29th, a crowd of thousands marched to the Justice Center from North Portland. Once there, a small group of individuals broke windows to the Justice Center, offices on the northwest corner, and lit multiple fires. This intentional arson was to an occupied building, threatened the life of the Officer who raised the safety concern as well as hundreds of inmates, professional staff, and law enforcement employees. These action were reinforced by two spray painted messages the officer observed on May 30th: "Only good cop is a dead one" and "All pigs must die." The officer was provided an online special alert that listed Friday, June 12th as "national kill a cop day" along with a Facebook post that said all the "Portland pigs home addresses were obtained by hackers and they would be releasing them soon, question to #portlandpolice is are you going to protect your homes or the Police union this Saturday and coming weeks." People outside the Justice Center yelled at the officer that "the only good cops are dead cops!" Against the background of this vitriol and arson, an individual threatened the officer by stating "I'm gonna fuck you up." Other individuals threatened the officer by stating "We will

⁷⁷ This information was obtained from the City Attorney's Office in November 2021.

come to your house.”

An officer had multiple persons tell him that they intend on looking up him information from online sources and that they would “kill[] my wife,” “firebomb[] my house,” and “hav[e] my children raped.” The officer had multiple protestors and rioters threaten to find his residential address. Protesters threatened the officer multiple times that they will come after him and his family and kill them.

Individuals have followed PPB employees, sworn and non-sworn alike, out of PPB parking facilities when leaving in their personal vehicles.

Protesters and rioters threatened an officer that they would kill the officer and his family. Rioters followed and surveilled the officer coming and going to work and on his way home. An individual specifically targeted the officer, telling him “[Officer Name], we are gonna kill you and your family you fucking pig!”

At least two officers’ home addresses were posted online (minus the actual street numbers, which were to be provided by poster on request).

A person threatened to kill an officer and his wife. A different person threatened to rape his wife. The person explained to the officer how he would find his address online using the officer’s name. The suspect was very specific. The officer checked his method himself online and located his home address in less than two minutes.

An unknown person used oil-based paint-filled balloons to vandalize vehicles and the residence and spray-painted a message related to officer-involved shootings in the street outside the home of an officer, presumably believing it was the home of an officer involved in that shooting who shared the same last name as the owner of the residence.

An individual photographed an officer’s personal vehicle leaving the precinct.

Individuals have said they wanted that officer dead, threatening: “I will kill you Officer (name omitted).” Individuals have threatened to burn the officer’s house down. The officer had seen two separate vehicles watching his home. A different vehicle drove on the officer’s property around the house and appeared to be looking for access to the home. The officer found a person crouching down inspecting the officer’s property from the fence line. The officer has received countless other threats to him and his family while trying to defend critical infrastructure downtown and at North Precinct.

Employees have also expressed fear entering and exiting City buildings due to crowds of people making threats of harm against them. The City has had to adapt its workplace safety procedures to try to account for these increased threats, such as changing work locations for employees when available and adding more security to buildings.

Department of Homeland Security Officer Injuries

In the U.S. Homeland Security’s report on the Federal Law Enforcement Officers response to protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon,⁷⁸ the following injuries were reported:

There were 689 injuries to Department of Homeland Security Officers reported from June 13 to July 30, 2020. These injuries included “eye irritation, blurred vision, and headaches caused by laser attacks; temporary hearing loss and headaches from fireworks and mortars; and wounds from projectiles”.

There were 205 injuries to the Federal Protective Service personnel reported from June 26 to September 30, 2020. These injuries included “to the ankle, back, eye, foot, hand, groin, knee, and shoulder, as well as contact with chemicals and objects”.

⁷⁸ U.S. Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (2021). DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

APPENDIX D: PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES

In order to gain an accurate understanding of community and stakeholder perspectives regarding the 2020 crowd control events, it was crucial to gather input from a variety of sources and varying community perspectives. Input was collected in a variety of formats, including published reports, in-person interviews, letters and emails, and questionnaires.⁷⁹

Sources of Information

- Input from Portland Police Bureau members of varying precincts, divisions, and status (e.g., sworn officers, rank, professional staff).
- Input from representatives of Neighborhood Associations in various districts, including Hazelwood Neighborhood Association, Kenton Neighborhood Association, Mill Park Neighborhood Association, Old Town Community Association, and Pearl District Neighborhood Association.
- Input from advisory councils including the Training Advisory Council and the Coalition of Advisory Groups
- Input from employees at the Portland Business Alliance and Clean & Safe
- Input from letters and emails written to the Portland Police Bureau
- Independent Police Review 2020 Protest Related Cases report and other data
- Portland Protests 2020: Citizen Review Committee Summary and Recommendations. July 22, 2021. <https://www.portland.gov/sites/default/files/2021/portland-protests-2020crc-summary-and-recommendations.pdf>
- TAC Coursework Comments and Suggestions - Force Reporting Post Crowd Control Events, report by the Training Advisory Council, May 21, 2021. <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/784888>
- TAC Coursework Comments and Suggestions – Crowd Control Training, Report by the Training Advisory Council, May 24, 2021, <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/784890>
- TAC Coursework Comments and Suggestions – Crowd Control Training – Second Dry Run, Report by the Training Advisory Council, June 17, 2021. <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/784889>

Summary of Perspectives and Impacts

Protesters that Engaged in Peaceful and Lawful Behavior

Input obtained from community and PPB members suggest that the perspectives of peaceful protestors varied considerably and were largely dependent on their stance regarding policing in America. Many peaceful protestors both supported the *Black Lives Matter* movement while also displaying skepticism

⁷⁹ To preserve anonymity, all those that were interviewed were provided a written and/or verbal statement that names would not be linked to specific quotes or information provided and that reporting would be done in aggregate.

and a lack of trust in the police. It was reported that some peaceful protestors endorsed defunding or abolishing the police. Individuals in this group were more likely to perceive the police response to the protests as either overly aggressive or entirely too absent. For example, it was frequently mentioned that many peaceful protestors belonging to this group likely believed that officers failed to effectively de-escalate incidents and used indiscriminate and excessive force. Other individuals in this group reportedly perceived the police response as ineffective after witnessing officers scale back their response to civil unrest and violent protest activities (e.g., property damage, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles, assaults). Another group of peaceful protestors was also described by community and PPB members; this group reportedly endorsed police reform but also regarded police presence during the protests as essential. Individuals in this group reportedly desired greater police services during protests and generally supported the police response to violent protest activities.

Another theme voiced by peaceful protestors was the lack of information and clarity during protest events. A number of individuals cited a lack of clear communication resulted in unpredictable outcomes. For example, two individuals expressed some confusion regarding a policing procedure that involves officers charging toward the crowd. Other community members mentioned that amidst the protest, it was difficult to get a clear picture of the current state of the protest. This group mentioned that they often could not see the violent acts such as throwing rocks and thus were confused when protests were declared riots. Finally, there was a call for community education requesting information (e.g., legal, policy, definitions, instructions) outlining how members can safely practice their 1st amendment rights.

Protesters that Engaged in Violent or Illegal Behavior

While some peaceful protestors appeared critical of the police, it was suggested that most protestors that engaged in aggressive or violent behaviors held a more negative opinion of the police. Likewise, this group of protestors more consistently reportedly endorsed defunding or abolishing the police, according to reports. It was frequently mentioned that protestors that engaged in aggressive behavior tended to belong to more extremist groups, whose primary motivations were to engage in violent acts (e.g., property damage, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles, assaults) and disrupt police infrastructure. It appeared that individuals in this group were not receptive to dialogue with the police and did not support the police response to the protests.

Business Community

Input obtained from community and PPB members suggest that the business community was significantly impacted by the protests. It was noted that smaller businesses located in affected areas were especially negatively impacted, some in ways that they may never fully recover. Business owners reportedly experienced property damage, graffiti, looting, and lost revenue. Early on in the protests, it was mentioned that several businesses did not cooperate (e.g., press charges, share video) with the police out of fear that they would be branded “anti-BLM.” As the protests continued day in and day out, businesses reportedly began speaking out against the violence (e.g., property damage, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles, assaults) and grew frustrated with the lack of available police services and the City’s handling of the protests. This lack of police service has led to a general erosion of confidence in the police providing basic public safety services and has resulted in several shop owners feeling abandoned and helpless. Furthermore, given the lack of security and police presence, it was

reported that some shop owners felt compelled to remain in their stores and personally defend against violent acts committed by aggressive protesters.

Overall Community

Community and PPB member input demonstrated that the protests and police management of the protests elicited a wide range of perspectives, sometimes creating significant division among community members. A common sentiment with this group was the belief that individuals who supported the police were the “silent majority,” who recognized that officers did the best that they could with the limited resources that they had available. In addition, this group of individuals expressed an understanding of how the protests negatively impacted police-community relations and officer wellness. Other individuals held more critical views of the police. It appeared that individuals in this group believed that the police were either overly aggressive (e.g., use of CS gas, indiscriminate and excessive use of force, military-style uniforms) or did not do enough in their approach to manage violent protest activities (e.g., property damage, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles, assaults). The latter opinion of the police not providing sufficient service was shared widely between community members and business owners who grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of legal action taken on the group of individuals causing the destruction. It was also frequently mentioned that this group of individuals believed that the police needed to identify peaceful versus non-peaceful protesters in a crowd and employ tactics that were appropriate for the varying groups. Several personal stories were shared where innocent bystanders reportedly experienced police interventions (e.g., exposure to CS gas, protest lines) that were designed for more aggressive protesters.

Significant disruptions in police services throughout the City were a theme that emerged from community and PPB member input. It was reported that staff shortages and budget cuts forced the Bureau to place officers on modified schedules and adjust policing operations in order to effectively respond to the protests day in and day out. As a result, community members reportedly experienced delayed response times in calls for service. It appeared that investigative cases for victims of crime were also delayed due to the lack of available resources.

Community and PPB members discussed how the City was impacted by the protests in many ways, including negative publicity. It was noted that the media portrayal of the protests and police management of the protests colored the perception that the City is not safe and that the Bureau did not do an effective job at containing violent protest activities (e.g., property damage, setting fires, throwing potentially harmful projectiles, assaults). Some community members reportedly believed that the police were not transparent about crowd control events and police management of those events. Other community members cited the opposite in that coverage, including live feeds were often provided from groups that portrayed a self-serving skewed perception of the protests. This group recommends that the Portland Police Bureau increase their live feed media⁸⁰ and social media presence, providing the public with a more objective and informative narrative.

Several other themes arose in our conversations, including the fact that additional gaps and structural deficiencies play into community members’ and shop owners’ perceptions of crowd control management. For example, several individuals cited a general lack of leadership and direction not just

⁸⁰ The live media feed is not currently possible due to the Temporary Restraining Order signed on 7/30/20 by Judge Bushong.

within the Bureau but across the City and State. Other examples included the unacceptably long waiting times when calling 911 emergency services. Both community members and business owners often recognize that although reform is needed at the Bureau, the police are one part of a greater system that needs to be assessed.

Taken all together, it appears that the protests negatively impacted community perceptions of safety and confidence in the police and City. Community and PPB member input suggested that levels of safety and confidence among community members will continue to decline until the City and Bureau establish a joint approach to more effectively manage crowd control events in the future.

APPENDIX E: PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU PROTEST-RELATED USE OF FORCE

The following tables pertaining to use of force during Crowd events were obtained from the Portland Police Bureau's Force Audit Team in the Office of the Inspector General. These data findings can also be obtained from the Portland Police Bureau's Force Reports.

Applications of Force

Crowd Control Events

2020

Event Name	Force Application Count Type	Aerosol Restraint	Baton - Nonstrike	Baton - Strike	Box-In	Chemical Agent - CS	Chemical Agent - OC	Control Against Resistance	Hobble	Launchable Impact - 40mm Sponge	Launchable Impact - FN303	Launchable Impact - Marking	Impact - RBDD	P.I.T.	RAM	Resisted Handcuffing	Sound Light Dist. Device	Strikes/Kicks	Takedown	Takedown - Controlled	Minimum # of Applications*
2020 Floyd Protests	Actual*	408	4	172	9	191	137	2,021	1	234	486	354	155	2	1	176	7	106	650	46	5,160
	Estimated*	19	0	42	0	68	42	493	0	5	209	89	52	0	0	0	4	4	64	0	1,091
S26 Call to Action	Actual*	10	1	3	0	0	0	74	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	7	0	11	15	4	127
	Estimated*	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	17
2020 Election	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Red House Mission	Actual*	6	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	3	1	46
New Year's Eve	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	16	9	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	9	0	40
		443	5	217	9	259	179	2,636	1	257	704	445	207	3	1	193	11	121	743	51	6,485

Applications of Force

Crowd Control Events

2021

Event Name	Force Application Count Type	Aerosol Restraint	Baton - Nonstrike	Baton - Strike	Box-In	Chemical Agent - CS	Chemical Agent - OC	Control Against Resistance	Hobble	Launchable Impact - 40mm Sponge	Launchable Impact - FN303	Launchable Impact - Marking	Impact - RBDD	P.I.T.	RAM	Resisted Handcuffing	Sound Light Dist. Device	Strikes/Kicks	Takedown	Takedown - Controlled	Minimum # of Applications*
J20 - Inauguration Day	Actual*	2	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	12	0	30
January 27 Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Fields Park Event	Actual*	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
March 11 Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3
Jamison Square Event	Actual*	9	0	0	0	0	0	34	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	49
April 1st Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
April 10th Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
April 12th Event	Actual*	5	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	24	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	65
	Estimated*	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	9
Director Park Event	Actual*	4	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	2	4	0	39
Chauvin Verdict Event	Actual*	1	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	15	4	0	36
May Day Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	0	13
May 25th Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
May 28th Event	Actual*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
June 24th Event	Actual*	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
		27	0	0	0	0	0	120	0	27	6	6	2	0	0	13	1	18	43	0	263

*** Number of FDCRs by Count Type: Estimated vs. Actual**

When an officer identified an exact number of applications for each force type, the count type was considered an actual count. When an officer did not identify a concrete number of applications for each force type used on their FDCR, the following methodology was applied:

- If an officer provided a numerical estimate (for example, "I pushed a person 3-5 times with my baton"), then this force type was counted using the highest number of the estimate (5 in this example) and considered an actual count .

- If no clear estimate was given (for example, "I pushed multiple persons at multiple locations with my baton throughout the night"), then this force type was counted as one application and considered an estimated count.

The Force Application Count Type is counted per FDCR, not force type.

For the description of the force types listed above, please see the Definitions section of this report and Directive 1010.00. In addition, the following methodology was used for crowd control specific force types:

FN303 Pava/OC Powder 40mm rounds used as an area denial tool were counted as Chemical Agent – OC; Inert RBDD's were counted as Control Against Resistance; Baton/hand used to push an individual who resisted the officer's efforts was counted as Control Against Resistance; Baton/hand used to push an individual that resulted in the individual falling to the ground was counted as Takedown; Each canister was counted for Chemical Agent-CS/Chemical Agent-OC applications.

The following were not considered an application of force: inert smoke canister, smoke SKAT round, baton/hand used to guide an individual who demonstrated no resistance to the officer's efforts.



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION



Dispatch Response Times & Calls for Service by Precinct

January 1, 2016 - June 30, 2021


CITY OF PORTLAND
prepared November 9, 2021

NORTH PRECINCT Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)*

Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)
by Priority & Year





Average Queued to Scene Minutes (Response Time)
by Priority & Month/Year





*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

EAST PRECINCT Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)*



*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

CENTRAL PRECINCT Response Time (Queue-to-Scene)*




*Response Time (queue-to-scene) is the combination of the queue-to-dispatch (time a call is on hold until an officer is available) plus dispatch-to-scene (travel time until the first officer arrives on-scene).

NORTH PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2020 - June 2021



Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %



EAST PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2020 - June 2021



Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %




CENTRAL PRECINCT

Dispatched Calls by Month June 2020 - June 2021



Select Call Category Types - Dispatched Calls per Days by Year
with Average Line & Year-to-Year Change by %



OFFICER LIAISON HANDOUT



The Portland Police Bureau respects community members' First Amendment rights.

PPB wishes to maintain open communication to best ensure a lawful, safe and peaceful event/demonstration.

PPB Demonstration Liaison Officer

During this event, please contact:

Detective John Smith

DPSST # 95768

503-734-4323

John.Smith@portlandoregon.gov

Police Bureau Objective: The Bureau will attempt to facilitate a safe and lawful environment during the event/demonstration. Furthermore, where event participants comply with City laws and ordinances, the Bureau shall encourage participants' efforts to monitor themselves in an attempt to limit police involvement.

THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU REQUESTS:

Event/Demonstration Organizer Share Contact Information with the Demonstration Liaison Officer

Please identify event organizers that may be contacted during the event. This person may contact the DLO assigned to your group or be contacted by the DLO during the event.

Event Self-Monitoring

Please identify event monitors who will address problematic behaviors of participants during the event.

Obey All Laws

While the First Amendment provides broad protections for the expression of speech, it does not protect criminal acts. The expectation is that event participants will obey all laws and ordinances, including traffic-related laws.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Additional resources, laws, and rules regarding Protests/Demonstrations/Special Events may be found at _____

or through the use of a smart phone and this QRC:



PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU
TRAINING DIVISION

14912 NE Airport Way • Portland OR 97230
www.portlandpolice.com

